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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Date of Decision: August 24, 2015

+ CRL.M.C. 770/2015
MANOJ SAINI

..... Petitioner

Through: Mr. Sanjeev Kumar, Advocate

versus

THE STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI)
& ORS.

.... Respondents

Through: Mr. Satya Narain Vashisth,
Additional Public Prosecutor for
State with SI Parveen Atri
Mr. Manobal Gupta, Advocate for
Respondents No.2&3 alongwith
Respondent No.2-in-person

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR

JUDGMENT
(ORAL)

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Quashing of FIR No.62/2011 under Sections 324/365/34 IPC, registered at Police Station Aman Vihar, Delhi is sought in this petition on the basis of *Mediated Settlement* of 17th May, 2013 (*Annexure G*) arrived at Delhi Mediation Centre, Rohini District Courts, Delhi between the parties.

Mr. Satya Narain Vashisth, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State submits that respondent No.2, present in the Court is represented by a counsel and she is the first-informant/complainant of

FIR in question and she has been identified to be so by her counsel as well as by SI Parveen Atri on the basis of identity proof submitted by her.

Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the settled amount of ₹3 lac has already been paid to respondent No.2/complainant and an affidavit of 21st August, 2015 of petitioner has been placed on record wherein petitioner has undertaken that he will not directly or indirectly interfere in the life of respondent No.2, who has since remarried.

The aforesaid undertaking of petitioner is taken on record.

Respondent No.2 submits that in view of aforesaid undertaking furnished on behalf of petitioner, she has no objection to quashing of the FIR in question.

In '*Gian Singh Vs State of Punjab*' (2012) 10 SCC 303, Apex Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-

“Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery.

Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put

to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor.”

The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in *Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab* (2014) 6 SCC 466. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court in *Narinder Singh* (*supra*) are as under:-

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest

its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. *While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be*

liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

Applying the afore-noted dictum to the facts of instant case and upon hearing and on perusal of FIR in question and affidavit of petitioner placed on record, I find that the instant FIR is an off-shoot of a matrimonial dispute between the parties, which now stands amicably resolved and the misunderstanding which led to registration of FIR in question now stands cleared between the parties and, therefore, continuance of proceedings arising out of FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

Accordingly, this petition is allowed subject to cost of ₹10,000/-.

At this stage, counsel for petitioner volunteers that the cost of ₹10,000/- shall be paid to respondent No.2 by way of demand draft within two weeks.

Subject to petitioner handing over cost of ₹10,000/- to respondent No.2 and placing on record receipt of cost within two weeks, FIR No.62/2011 under Sections 324/365/34 IPC, registered at Police Station Aman Vihar, Delhi and the proceedings emanating therefrom shall stand quashed *qua* petitioner.

(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE

August 24, 2015

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