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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Date of Decision: February 12, 2015

+ **CRL.M.C. 1448/2014 & CrI.M.A.4948/2014**

BACHH RAJ LOHIA & ANR. Petitioners
Through: Mr. K.K. Manan, Mr. Ankush
Narang and Mr. Nipun Bhardwaj,
Advocates
versus

BHANU PRATAP SINGH & ANR. Respondents
Through: Mr.Chatanya Siddharth, Advocate
with respondent No.1 in person
Mr. Vinod Diwakar, Additional
Public Prosecutor for respondent-
State with Inspector Ajay Gupta

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR

% **JUDGMENT**
(ORAL)

Quashing of FIR No.176/2013, under Sections 406/420/506/34 of
IPC registered at police station Chanakya Puri, Delhi is sought on the
basis of affidavit of first respondent and *Compromise Deed* of 17th
February, 2014.

Notice.

Mr. Vinod Diwakar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor accepts
notice on behalf of respondent-State and Mr.Chatanya Siddharth,
Advocate, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.1.

Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent–State submits
that respondent No.1, present in the Court, is complainant/first-informant

of the FIR in question and has been identified to be so by his counsel as well as by Inspector Ajay Gupta on the basis of identity proof produced by him. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State submits that charge-sheet in this FIR case has been filed under Sections 406/420/506/34 of *IPC*.

Respondent No.1, present in the Court, submits that the dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved vide aforesaid *Compromise Deed* and now, terms thereof have been fully acted upon as today he has received the balance settled amount of ₹1 crore by way of demand draft of 11th February, 2015 bearing No.164819 alongwith interest of ₹4.5 lac in cash.

Respondent No.1 affirms the contents of aforesaid *Compromise Deed* and of his affidavit of 12th March, 2014 supporting this petition and submits that now no dispute with petitioners survives and so, the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 submits on instructions that the complaint made by respondent No.1 under Section 138 of *the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881*, which is coming up before trial court on 16th February, 2015, would be withdrawn in view of the aforesaid *Compromise Deed*. The undertaking given on behalf of respondent No.1 is taken on record.

In '*Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab*' (2012) 10 SCC 303, Apex Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-

“However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil,

mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.”

The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in *Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab* (2014) 6 SCC 466. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court in *Narinder Singh (Supra)* are as under:-

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It

would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost

complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

In the facts and circumstances of this case and upon perusal of the FIR of this case as well as the status report filed and the affidavit of respondent No.1, I find that the dispute between the parties was a commercial dispute, which now stands mutually and amicably settled between parties, therefore, continuance of proceedings arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

Accordingly, this petition is allowed subject to cost of ₹50,000/- to be deposited by petitioners with *Advocates Welfare Fund, Bar Council of Delhi, Delhi High Court* within a week from today. Upon placing on record the receipt of cost, FIR No.176/2013, under Sections 406/420/506/34 of IPC registered at police station Chanakya Puri, Delhi and the proceedings emanating therefrom shall stand quashed *qua* petitioners.

This petition and the application are accordingly disposed of.
Dasti.

(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE

FEBRUARY 12, 2015
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