

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH.**

**Crl. Misc. No. M-40766 of 2014
Date of Decision: 10.08.2015.**

Harnek Singh and anotherPetitioners

Vs.

State of Punjab and anotherRespondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SABINA

Present: Mr. H.S.Batth, Advocate
for the petitioners.

Mr. J.S.Sekhon, AAG, Punjab.

Mr. Sanjeev Kumar, Advocate
for respondent No. 2.

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SABINA, J.

Petitioners have filed this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of FIR No. 62 dated 20.9.2014, under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC' for short) and Section 25, 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 ('Act' for short), registered at Police Station Khalra, District Tarn Taran (Annexure P-1) and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise effected between the parties.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that it is a case of version and cross version. None had suffered any fire-arm injury in the occurrence. However, now the parties have amicably settled their dispute.

Vide order dated 28.11.2014, Area Magistrate/Trial

Court was directed to record the statements of the parties and send its report with regard to genuineness of the compromise effected between the parties.

In pursuance to the said order, Area Magistrate/Trial Court after recording the statements of the parties has reported that the compromise effected between the parties was genuine and without any influence or inducement.

As per the Full Bench judgment of this Court in **Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052**, High Court has power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to allow the compounding of non-compoundable offence and quash the prosecution where the High Court felt that the same was required to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. This power of quashing is not confined to matrimonial disputes alone.

Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of **Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another 2012 (4) RCR (Crl.) 543**, has held as under:-

“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii)

to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their

entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

In the case of **Dimpey Gujral vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh** 2013 (1) RCR (Crl.) 745, Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :-

“5. In light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh, we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing

extreme depravity nor are they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No.163 dated 26/10/2006 registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial court are hereby quashed.”

In the present case, it is a case of version and cross-version. Although, the FIR was registered qua commission of offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and Section 25/27 of the Act but none had suffered any fire-arm injury in the occurrence. Hence, it would be a debatable issue as to whether offence under Section 307 IPC is made out in the present case or not. In any case, now the parties have amicably settled their dispute.

Accordingly, this petition is allowed. FIR No. 62 dated 20.9.2014 under Section 307 IPC and Section 25, 27 of the Act registered at Police Station Khalra, District Tarn Taran (Annexure P-1) and all the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, are quashed.

**(SABINA)
JUDGE**

August 10, 2015
Gurpreet