

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

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CRM-M No.40550 of 2014

Date of Decision:09.02.2015

Dalbir @ Sonu

.....Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab and another

.....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR.

**Present: Mr.Naresh Kaushik, Advocate,
for the petitioner.**

**Ms.Priyanka Sadar, Assistant Advocate General,
Punjab, for respondent No.1-State.**

**Mr.T.P.S.Bhatti, Advocate,
for Mr.Vinod Bhardwaj, Advocate,
for respondent No.2.**

MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR, J.(oral)

The epitome of the facts & material, which needs a necessary mention for deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petition and emanating from the record is that, initially in the wake of complaint of complainant-Sukhvir Singh @ Tegu son of Joginder Pal(respondent No.2)(for brevity “the complainant”), a criminal case was registered against petitioner-accused-Dalbir @ Sonu son of Jagtar Singh and his other acquitted co-accused, vide FIR No.315 dated 11.08.2003(Annexure P-1), on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under Sections 341, 506, 148 and 149 IPC, by the police of Police Station Nakodar, District Jalandhar.

2. After completion of the investigation, the police submitted

the final police report(challan). The accused were accordingly charge-sheeted for the commission of offences, in question and the case was slated for evidence of the prosecution. Since, the petitioner did not appear, so, he was declared proclaimed offender by the trial Court.

3. During the pendency of the criminal prosecution against the petitioner, good sense prevailed and the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by way of compromise-deed dated 21.11.2014(Annexure P-2) and affidavit of the complainant, (Annexure P-3).

4. Having compromised the matter, the petitioner-accused has preferred the present petition, to quash the impugned FIR(Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C., *inter alia*, pleading that both the parties are known and closely related to each other. The complainant has lodged the present case on account of some misunderstandings. Now with the intervention of respectables of both sides, misunderstandings have been removed and the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by means of pointed compromise-deed(Annexure P-2). The complainant has reiterated the factum of compromise in his affidavit (Annexure P-3). They have redressed their grievances. They want to live in peace and harmony in future in the society. The complainant does not want to further pursue the matter. He has no objection, if the criminal case registered against the petitioner-accused, vide impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) is quashed, on the basis of compromise-deed. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioner-accused sought to quash the impugned FIR(Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings

arising therefrom, in the manner described here-in-above.

5. During the course of preliminary hearing, the trial Court was directed to record the statements of all the concerned parties, with regard to the genuineness and validity or otherwise of the compromise-deed(Annexure P-2), by virtue of order dated November 28, 2014 by this Court.

6. In compliance thereof, having recorded the statements of all the concerned parties, the trial Court has concluded vide its report dated 15.12.2014 that they have amicably settled their disputes with their free will and without any kind of pressure. The compromise has been effected voluntarily and the same is genuine.

7. Meaning thereby, it stands proved on record that the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by way of compromise-deed (Annexure P-2) and affidavit of the complainant, (Annexure P-3). The factum of compromise is also reiterated in the report of the trial Court.

8. What cannot possibly be disputed here is that, the law with regard to the settlement of criminal disputes by means of amicable settlement between the parties is no more *res integra* and is now well-settled.

9. An identical question came to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case **Gian Singh Versus State of Punjab and another**, 2012(4) RCR(Criminal) 543. Having interpreted the relevant provisions and considered a line of the judgments on the indicated points, it was ruled (para 57) as under:-

“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal

proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personnel in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

10. Sequelly, the same view was again(recently) reiterated by Hon'ble the Apex Court in case **Narinder Singh and others Versus State of Punjab and another**, 2014(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 482.

11. Above being the legal position & material on record, now the short & significant question, though important, that arises for determination in this petition is, as to whether the present criminal prosecution against the petitioner deserves to be quashed in view of the

compromise or not?

12. Having regard to the contentions of the learned counsel, to my mind, it would be in the interest and justice would be sub-served, if the parties are allowed to compromise the matter. Moreover, the learned counsel are *ad idem* that, in view of the settlement of disputes between the parties, the present petition deserves to be accepted in this context.

13. As is evident from the record that, in the instant case, both the parties are known and closely related to each other. Now, with the intervention of respectables of both sides, they have amicably settled their disputes, by virtue of compromise-deed(Annexure P-2) with their free will and without any kind of pressure. The complainant has reiterated the factum of compromise in his affidavit(Annexure P-3). They have redressed their grievances. They want to live in peace and harmony in future in the society. The settlement is stated to be in the welfare, benefit and larger interest of the parties. Now, they have no grudge against each other. It is not a matter of dispute that Rinku son of Mangu and other co-accused of the petitioner, have already been acquitted vide judgment of acquittal dated 25.02.2011 in this very case by the trial Court. The complainant has no objection, if the criminal case, in question, is quashed, on the basis of compromise-deed. The factum and genuineness of the compromise between the parties is also reiterated by the trial Court in its indicated report.

14. Thus, it would be seen that since, the compromise is in the welfare and interest of the parties, so, there is no impediment in translating their wishes into reality and to quash the criminal prosecution

to set the matter at rest, to enable them to live in peace and to enjoy the life and liberty in a dignified manner. Therefore, to me, the ratio of the law laid down and the bench-mark set out by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh & others' cases(supra), “mutatis mutandis” is attracted to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. Sequelly, the impugned FIR(Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, deserve to be quashed in the obtaining circumstances of the case.

15. In the light of aforesaid reasons, the instant petition is accepted. Consequently, the impugned FIR No.315 dated 11.08.2003 (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed. The petitioner-accused is accordingly discharged, from the indicated criminal case, on the basis of compromise-deed, subject to all just exceptions.

February 09, 2015
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(MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR)
JUDGE