

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

(1)

CRM-M No.23606 of 2014

Jatinder Singh and another

.....Petitioners

Versus

State of Punjab and another

.....Respondents

(2)

CRM-M No.42411 of 2014

Baljit Singh

.....Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab and another

.....Respondents

Date of Decision:13.01.2015

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR.

Present: Mr.Sukhjit Singh, Advocate,
for the petitioner(s).

Mr.Raj Preet Singh Sidhu, Assistant Advocate General,
Punjab, for the respondent-State.

MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR, J.(oral)

As, identical questions of law & facts are involved, therefore, I propose to decide the above indicated petitions bearing CRM No.M-23606 of 2014, titled as Jatinder Singh and another Versus State of Punjab and another(for brevity “the 1st petition”) and CRM No.M-42411 of 2014, titled as Baljit Singh Versus State of Punjab and another(for short “the 2nd petition”), arising out of the same FIR/case, by means of this common judgment, to avoid the repetition of facts.

2. The matrix of the facts & material, which needs a necessary

mention for deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petitions and emanating from the record is that, initially in the wake of complaint of complainant-Amritpal Singh son of Balbir Singh(respondent No.2)(for brevity “the complainant”), a criminal case was registered against petitioners-accused-Jatinder Singh and Baljit Singh sons of Surjan Singh and Baljit Singh son of Mohinder Singh, vide FIR No.73 dated 04.07.2014(Annexure P-1), on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under Sections 336, 34, 506 IPC and Sections 25 & 27 of The Arms Act, by the police of Police Station Singh Bhagwantpur, District Ropar.

3. During the course of investigation of the criminal case, good sense prevailed and the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by way of compromise-deeds dated 10.07.2014(Annexure P-2 in 1st petition)(colly.) and dated 08.12.2014(Annexure P-2 in 2nd petition)(colly.)

4. Having compromised the matter, the petitioners-accused have preferred the present separate petitions, to quash the impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C., *inter alia*, pleading that now with the intervention of respectables and relatives, the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by means of pointed compromise-deeds (Annexure P-2). They have redressed their grievances. They want to live in peace and harmony in future in the society. The complainant does not want to further pursue the matter. He has no objection, if the criminal case registered against the petitioners-accused, vide impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) is quashed, on the basis of compromise-deeds. On the

strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioners-accused sought to quash the impugned FIR(Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, in the manner depicted here-in-above.

5. During the course of preliminary hearing, the Magistrate, having the jurisdiction, was directed to record the statements of all the concerned parties, with regard to the genuineness and validity or otherwise of the compromise-deeds(Annexure P-2), by virtue of order dated 29.08.2014(in 1st petition) and by means of order dated 12.12.2014 (in 2nd petition), respectively, by this Court.

6. In compliance thereof, having recorded the statements of all the concerned parties, the concerned Magistrate has concluded vide her reports dated 09.10.2014 & 23.12.2014 that they have amicably settled their disputes with their free will and consent without any kind of pressure or coercion. The compromise has been effected voluntarily.

7. Meaning thereby, it stands proved on record that the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by way of compromise-deeds (Annexure P-2). The factum of compromise is also reiterated in the reports of the Magistrate.

8. What cannot possibly be disputed here is that, the law with regard to the settlement of criminal disputes by virtue of amicable settlement between the parties is no more *res integra* and is now well-settled.

9. An identical question came to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case **Gian Singh Versus State of Punjab and another**, 2012(4) RCR(Criminal) 543. Having interpreted the relevant

provisions and considered a line of the judgments on the indicated points,

it was ruled (para 57) as under:-

“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personnel in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

10. Sequelly, the same view was again(recently) reiterated by Hon'ble the Apex Court in case Narinder Singh and others Versus State of Punjab and another, 2014(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 482.

11. Such, thus, being the legal position & material on record,

now the short & significant question, though important, that arises for determination in these petitions is, as to whether the present criminal prosecution against the petitioners deserves to be quashed in view of the compromise or not?

12. Having regard to the contentions of the learned counsel, to my mind, it would be in the interest and justice would be sub-served, if the parties are allowed to compromise the matter. Moreover, the learned counsel are *ad idem* that, in view of the settlement of disputes between the parties, the present petitions deserve to be accepted in this context.

13. As is evident from the record that, in the instant case, with the intervention of respectable and relatives, the parties have amicably settled their disputes, vide pointed compromise-deeds(Annexure P-2) with their free will and without any kind of coercion, pressure or undue influence. They have redressed their grievances. They want to live in peace and harmony in future in the society. The settlement is stated to be in the welfare, benefit and larger interest of the parties. The complainant does not want to further pursue the matter. He has no objection, if the indicated criminal case is quashed, on the basis of compromise-deeds. The factum and genuineness of the compromise between the parties is also reiterated by the Magistrate in her indicated reports.

14. Thus, it would be seen that since, the compromise is in the welfare and interest of the parties, so, there is no impediment in translating their wishes into reality and to quash the criminal prosecution to set the matter at rest, to enable them to live in peace and to enjoy the life and liberty in a dignified manner. Therefore, to me, the ratio of the

law laid down and the bench-mark set out by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh & others' cases(supra), “mutatis mutandis” is applicable to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. Sequelley, the impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, deserve to be quashed in the obtaining circumstances of the case.

15. In the light of aforesaid reasons, the instant petitions are accepted. Consequently, the impugned FIR No.73 dated 04.07.2014 (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed. The petitioners-accused(in both the petitions) are accordingly discharged, from the indicated criminal case, on the basis of compromise-deeds, subject to all just exceptions.

January 13, 2015
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(MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR)
JUDGE