

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH.

CRM No.M-20791 of 2015
Date of Decision : 27.8.2015

M/s A2Z Powercom Pvt. Ltd. and others

.....Petitioners

Vs.

State of Punjab and another

.....Respondents

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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK

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Present : Mr. Kunal Dawar, Advocate for the petitioners.
Ms. Anmol Grewal, AAG, Punjab.
Mr. Randeep Singh, Advocate for Mr. Vishaldeep Goel,
Advocate for respondent no.2.

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1. To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
2. Whether the judgement should be reported in Digest ?

RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK, J

The petitioners have approached this Court by way of instant petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Cr.P.C.') invoking its inherent jurisdiction for quashing of FIR No.136 dated 7.10.2013 under Sections 406, 420, 379, 506, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short), registered at Police Station Mehatpur, Distt. Jalandhar and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom, on the basis of compromise dated 18.10.2014 (Annexure P-5).

Notice of motion was issued and parties were directed to appear before the learned Illaqa Magistrate, vide order dated 15.7.2015. Petitioners through Ram Chand Sharma, Manager of petitioner no.1-company appeared

before the learned Illaqa Magistrate and got his statement recorded. Report of the learned Magistrate dated 27.7.2015 to this effect has been received, which is available on the record. However, none appeared on behalf of the complainant side.

During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondent did not dispute the material fact of detailed compromise in the form of settlement agreement dated 18.10.2014 (Annexure P-5) which is duly signed by both the parties. Not only this, receipt of total payment by the complainant has also not been denied by the complainant, who is present in the court. Complainant himself did not deny the compromise nor he opposes the same. However, he did not comply with the last order dated 15.7.2015 passed by this court, directing him to appear before the learned Illaqa Magistrate for getting his statement recorded, without disclosing any reasons.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the parties have decided to bury the hatchet and are living peacefully. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that continuation of the impugned FIR and subsequent criminal proceedings arising therefrom, are liable to be quashed in the interest of justice.

Learned counsel for the petitioners, as well as learned counsel for the state are ad idem that, none of the petitioners is a proclaimed offender.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the record of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., so as to secure the ends of justice. It is so said because the parties have arrived at an out of Court settlement by way of compromise (Annexure P-5). The compromise is without any pressure and a genuine one. In such a

situation, continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law.

The abovesaid view taken by this Court also finds support from the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in **Shiji @ Pappu and others versus Radhika and another, 2012 (1) RCR (criminal) 9** and also from the larger Bench judgment of this Court in **Kulwinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another reported as 2007 (3) RCR (criminal) 1052**. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 13 of the judgment in Shiji's case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:

“It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the

offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above,

the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.”

The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Shiji's** case (supra) has been further reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its later judgments including in the cases of **Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State of Gujarat and another, 2012 (12) SCC 401, Gold Quest International Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., 2014 (4) RCR (Crl) 206, Manohar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 2014 AIR (SC) 3649 and Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, 2014 (6) SCC 466.**

Reverting back to the facts of the present cases, this Court has satisfied itself that the compromise arrived at between the parties is a genuine one. In view of the genuine compromise arrived at between the parties, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the continuation of the prosecution any further would be nothing but sheer abuse of the process of law. It would result in wastage of valuable time of the Court because no chance of conviction is left.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this court is of the considered view that this petition deserves to be allowed. Consequently impugned FIR No.136 dated 7.10.2013 under Sections 406, 420, 379, 506, 120-B IPC registered at Police Station Mehatpur, Distt. Jalandhar and the consequential criminal proceedings arising therefrom, are ordered to be quashed.

However, it is made clear that the parties shall be bound by the terms and conditions of their settlement agreement dated 18.10.2014 (Annexure

P-5). It is further clarified that if the petitioners will back out from any of the term and condition of settlement agreement dated 18.10.2014 (Annexure P-5) complainant-respondent will be at liberty to resort to his appropriate remedy, seeking the appropriate relief, in accordance with law.

Resultantly, with the abovesaid observations made, instant petition stands allowed.

27.8.2015
GS

(RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK)
JUDGE