

ORDER: This appeal is filed by the Insurance Company under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act against the order dated 21-06-2005 in W.C.No.184 of 2004 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour-III, Hyderabad, awarding compensation of Rs.3,29,766/- in favour of the 3rd respondent herein/claimant against the appellant and the respondents 1 and 2 herein. 2. The facts leading to the appeal are that the 3rd respondent/claimant filed W.C. case before the Commissioner claiming compensation of Rs.4,00,000/- on account of death of her husband B. Anil Kumar, who is driver of auto rickshaw under the Opposite Party No.1/1st respondent herein. On 18-02-2005, the driver-workman was driving the auto rickshaw bearing No.AP-23-V-0532 belonging to Opposite Party No.1 and employer of the driver and when he was proceeding from Jogipet towards Sangareddy and at about 4.00 P.M. when he was near Choutkur village outskirts, a lorry bearing No.AP-28-T-6619 dashed against the said auto rickshaw resulting in injuries and later the driver was shifted to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad and while undergoing treatment, the driver succumbed to injuries on 28-04-2004. The Pulkal police registered a case in Crime No.16 of 2004 and the auto rickshaw was insured with the Opposite Party No.3/appellant herein vide insurance policy No.051403/31/04/00010. As the claimant did not receive any amount from the opposite parties, the claimant filed the W.C. case. The Opposite Party No.1 is the deceased employer of the deceased workman and the Opposite Party No.2 is the wife of the deceased employer of the deceased workman in successor in interest of the insured vehicle. 3. The Opposite Party No.2 filed her counter admitting the relationship of the employee and employer between the deceased driver and the Opposite Party No.1, the occurrence of the accident on 18-02-2004 and the narration of the accident. The Opposite Party No.2 denied that the deceased driver was paid Rs.3,500/- per month by the Opposite Party No.1, but he was paid wages at Rs.3,000/- per month. She admitted that the deceased had a valid driving licence at the time of accident and the vehicle was insured with the Opposite Party No.3/appellant herein. 4. The Opposite Party No.3/appellant filed its counter denying all averments made in the application, stating that the claimant is not the legal heir of the deceased workman. The Opposite Party No.3/appellant stated that the amount claimed by the claimant is excessive and exorbitant and the accident occurred is not within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and the Opposite Parties 1 and 2 are not residents within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and therefore, the application is not maintainable, and sought for dismissal of the application. 5. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation awarded compensation of Rs.3,28,608/-. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed on the following substantial questions of law. Whether the Commissioner is justified in deciding the employee and employer relationship between the deceased Anil Kumar in the absence of the driving licence, which is mandatory under law to drive auto rickshaw? Whether the Commissioner is justified in deciding the employee and employer relation contrary to the Section 2 (n) (ia) (c) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923? Whether the Commissioner is justified in fixing the liability to pay compensation on the appellant insurance company in the absence of driving licence contrary to the policy conditions? Whether the Commissioner is justified in awarding the compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act in the absence of driving licence and fixing the liability against the appellant-insurance company contrary to the insurance policy conditions? Whether the Commissioner is justified in passing the award contrary to the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence of appellant-insurance company and in fixing the liability against the insurance company contrary to policy conditions? 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the deceased workman was not having driving licence, which is mandatory in law to drive an auto rickshaw, as such, the appellant-insurance company is not liable to pay compensation. He also contends that grant of compensation against the appellant is contrary to the insurance policy conditions as the deceased workman is not having driving licence. He further contends that in the absence of driving licence, the Commissioner should not have held that there exists employer and employee relationship contrary to Section 2 (n) (ia) (c) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. In support of his contentions, he relied on decisions reported in Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Rabi Sahoo and another, Sardari and others v. Sushil Kumar and others and Chhotekhan and Rajeshkumar Agrawal. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has thoroughly considered oral and documentary evidence adduced by the 3rd respondent in proper perspective and came to the conclusion that the deceased workman died in the course of employment, while driving the auto rickshaw bearing No.AP-23-V-0532, which was owned by the 2nd respondent herein and held that the appellant-insurance company was not able to prove that the deceased workman was not having driving licence. The Commissioner also found that since there is a valid insurance coverage, the appellant-insurance company is liable to pay compensation. These are all findings of fact, which cannot be interfered with as the appeal under Section 30 of the Act lies only where substantial questions of law are involved. He further contends that the appeal itself is not maintainable since no substantial question of law is involved as envisaged under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He further contends that absence of driving licence cannot be a ground for the appellant-insurance company to deny its liability, since a categorical finding was given by the Commissioner that the deceased workman died in the course of employment while driving the auto rickshaw. In support of his contentions, he relied on Ande Naga Jyothi and another v. Gorla Nagi Reddy and another, T.S. Shylaja v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., and another, National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Swaran Singh and others, National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Rajala Lakshmi (died) and others, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Noora, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Davis and another, Abooba ker and others v. Mohammed Shaffin and another and United India Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Annakutty and another. 8. The Commissioner, after examining AW.1 and marking of Ex.A.1-FIR, Ex.A.2-discharge card, Ex.A.3-inquest report, Ex.A.4-Post Mortem report, Ex.A.5-charge sheet, Ex.A.6-RC papers of the auto rickshaw and Ex.A.7-insurance policy on behalf of the applicant and RW.1 and 2 and Exs.D.1 on behalf of the third opposite party, came to the conclusion that the deceased workman died out of and in the course of employment as a driver of auto rickshaw belonged to Opposite Party No.1. The Commissioner held that the Opposite Party No.3 did not produce any material to substantiate that the driver was not having any driving licence. Further, the Commissioner, relying on 1999 (6) ALD 256 (DB), held that in the light of the ratio laid down in the said judgment, the Opposite Party No.3-insurance company cannot escape its liability to indemnify the Opposite Party No.2 and by applying proper multiplier as per the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, by taking the age of the deceased driver as 20 years as well as the income of the deceased at Rs.2,934/- as per G.O.Ms.No.30 LET & F (Lab-II) Department, dated 27-07-2000, the Commissioner awarded compensation of Rs.3,28,608/-. 9. The main thrust of the appellant is that the deceased workman is not having driving licence, as such, the insurance company is not liable to pay compensation. 10. In Ande Naga Jyothi and another v. Gorla Nagi Reddy and another (4 supra), it is held as follows: ".....it is not in dispute that the deceased died during the course of employment. As per the averments of the claim petition and evidence on record, it is clearly proved that the deceased died during the course of employment with the first respondent while driving the tractor, which was insured with the second respondent. The Tribunal below has not assessed the compensation only on the ground that the claimants have not proved that the deceased was possessing valid driving license at the time of accident. The plea of the second respondent that the driver was not having driving licence, is no reason to record the finding that no compensation can be awarded to the applicants. In any event, even with regard to issue, whether the driver was possessing valid driving license or not, except the report under Ex.R-1, which was prepared by an Advocate-Commissioner appointed by the insurer, no other evidence was adduced. It is now fairly well settled that the Insurance Company in order to avoid its liability towards insured, has to prove, that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling conditions of policy regarding driving of vehicle by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. Mere absence, fake or invalid licence or disqualification of the driver for driving alone are not in themselves defences available to the insurance company....." 11. In National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Swaran Singh and others (6 supra), the Apex Court held as follows: "..... The breach of policy conditions, e.g., disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2) (a)(ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the

condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time....." 12. In *National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Rajala Lakshmi (died) and others* (7 supra), wherein this Court held as follows: ".....In the present case, it is not the contention of the insurance company that the deceased was having a fake driving licence. If that is established, the position would be different. But, when it is asserted by the owner as well as the applicant that the driver was having valid driving licence as on the date of accident, it is for the insurance company to prove that there was no valid driving licence. In any event of failure of the insurance company to establish the said fact, it can be safely concluded that the driver was having valid driving licence as on the date of accident and the insurance company can be made liable under the Workmen's Compensation Act as there is evidence to the effect that the deceased was under the employment of the owner of the vehicle as on the date of accident. Though there is a general denial of the allegations in the counter, there was no specific denial that the driver was not at all employed by the owner. In the cross-examination, the owner admitted that the deceased worked under him on a monthly salary of Rs.2,000. Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner rightly came to a conclusion that accident occurred during the course of employment and the driver was having valid driving licence as on the date of accident and rightly made the insurance company liable and granted compensation....." 13. In *United India Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Noora* (8 supra), it is held as follows: ".....the aim and purpose of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is to ameliorate the suffering of the workman and to provide a remedy to the workman in order to save the victims of accident from the destitution, vagrancy and other social evils. The legislation was enacted to assuage and remedy the poverty. It is profitable to reproduce the passage from the objects and reasons for the legislation published as early in 1922: "The general principles of workmen's compensation command almost universal acceptance, and India is now merely alone amongst civilized countries in being without legislation embodying those principles. For a number of years the more generous employers have been in the habit of giving compensation voluntarily, but this practice is by no means general. The growing complexity of industry in this country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent danger to workmen, along with the comparative poverty of the workmen themselves, renders it advisable that they should be protected, as far as possible, from hardship arising from accidents." While going through the Workmen's Compensation Act, what is required to be proved is that deceased was workman and was employed to do an act in the course of employment and during the course of employment the workman died due to an accident. The provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act nowhere prescribe that if a driver is employed he should possess valid licence as is required in terms of the mandate of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This view is fortified by the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka titled *Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd, v. Hazira Begum* 1995 ACJ 236 (Karnataka), it is profitable to reproduce para 9 of the judgment herein: "(9) A scan of various decisions of the High Court will disclose that where a workman was engaged in the employer's business and who was doing the very thing he was employed to do, then the mere fact that he was not acting strictly by the letter of law will not make the accident any the less arising out of and in the course of employment. It follows, therefore, the owner and insurance company are both liable in such an event....." 14. In *United India Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Annakutty and another* (11 supra), it is held as follows: ".....It is an admitted case that the deceased workman was an employee of the insured and that the accident occurred while he was driving the said jeep and the accident resulted in his death. It was on 28-03-2002 when the accident has resulted in the death of the workman, necessarily clause (b) (ii) of the proviso to Section 3 (1) of the Act will have no application. Wilful disobedience of an order or rule expressly framed for the purpose of securing such safety like the insistence of a driving licence will have bearing going by the said provision, only in respect of any injury not resulting in the death of the workman. Necessarily even if there was any contravention of the provisions of law, the compensation shall have to be paid by the employer where ever death occurs as a result of the accident. When there was valid insurance policy that liability shall be on the insurer. Therefore, absence of driving licence cannot be taken as a reason to deny the compensation, in cases like this where the accident resulted, admittedly in the death of the workman....." 15. In the instant case, the so-called substantial questions of law raised herein relate to pure findings of fact as the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation held that the insurance company did not prove that the deceased workman is not having valid driving licence at the time of accident as held by this Court and the Apex Court in the above referred judgments. The Commissioner, while relying on the strength of Exs.A.1-FIR, Ex.A.2-original discharge card, Ex.A.3-inquest report, Ex.A.4-Postmortem certificate, Ex.A.5-certified copy of the charge sheet, Ex.A.6-R.C. papers of the auto rickshaw and Ex.A.7-copy of the insurance policy, held that the deceased workman is the driver of the insured auto rickshaw bearing No.AP-23-V-0532 and died due to the injuries sustained in the accident during the course of his employment with the Opposite Party No.1 and therefore, the employer of the deceased workman and the insurer of the insured vehicle are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the dependents of the deceased workman. These are all pure questions of fact and this Court cannot interfere with, since this court cannot reappraise the evidence as the appeal lies before this court where substantial question of law is involved. The Apex Court in *T.S. Shylaja v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.*, and another (5 supra) held as follows: ".....What is important is that in terms of the first proviso, no appeal is maintainable against any order passed by the Commissioner unless a substantial question of law is involved. This necessarily implies that the High Court would in the ordinary course formulate such a question or at least address the same in the judgment especially when the High Court takes a view contrary to the view taken by the Commissioner. The only reason which the High Court has given to upset the above finding of the Commissioner is that the Commissioner could not blindly accept the oral evidence without analysing the documentary evidence on record. We fail to appreciate as to what was the documentary evidence which the High Court had failed to appreciate and what was the contradiction, if any, between such documents and the version given by the witnesses examined before the Commissioner. The High Court could not have, without adverting to the documents vaguely referred to by it, upset the finding of fact which the Commissioner was entitled to record. Suffice it to say that apart from appreciation of evidence adduced before the Commissioner, the High Court has neither referred to nor determined any question of law much less a substantial question of law, existence whereof was a condition precedent for the maintainability of any appeal under Section 30. Inasmuch as the High Court remained oblivious of the basic requirement of law for the maintainability of an appeal before it and inasmuch as it treated the appeal to be one on facts it committed an error which needs to be corrected....." 16. This Court in *Ande Naga Jyothi and another v. Gorla Nagi Reddy and another* (4 supra) held that the plea of the second respondent that the driver was not having driving licence, is no reason to record the finding that no compensation can be awarded to the applicants. In any event, even with regard to issue, whether the driver was possessing valid driving licence or not, except the report under Ex.R.1, which was prepared by an Advocate-Commissioner appointed by the insurer, no other evidence was adduced. It is now fairly well settled that the insurance company in order to avoid its liability towards insured, has to prove, that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling conditions of policy regarding driving of vehicle by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. Mere absence, fake or invalid licence or disqualification of the driver for driving alone are not in themselves defences available to the insurance company. In the present case also, the insurer has not proved that the deceased workman is not having valid driving licence. Hence, the above decision is applicable to the facts of the present case. 17. In *National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Rajala Lakshmi (died) and others* (7 supra), this Court observed that when it is asserted by the owner as well as the applicant that the driver was having valid driving licence as on the date of accident, it is for the insurance company to prove that there was no valid driving licence and in any event of failure of the insurance company to establish the said fact, it can be safely concluded that the driver was having valid driving licence as on the date of accident and the insurance company can be made liable under the Workmen's Compensation Act as there is evidence to the effect that the deceased was under the employment of the owner of the vehicle as on the date of accident. 18. In *Sardar and others v. Sushil Kumar and others* (2 supra), the Apex Court held that the driver had never a valid licence and basing on the said finding of fact, the Apex Court held that the insurance company was not liable to pay any compensation. In that case, the driver was examined and admitted that he did not know how to drive a tractor and he never even tried to learn driving of the tractor and he also admitted that he had not been possessing any valid driving licence to drive a tractor and admitted that he did not hold a driving licence. But, in the present case, the applicant as well as the second opposite party asserted that the deceased workman is having valid driving licence, but the insurance company failed to prove that the deceased workman was not having valid driving licence. Therefore, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 19. In *Chhotekhan and Rajeshkumar Agrawal* (3 supra), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that when the deceased had himself endangered his safety and life by inviting unnecessary calamity by unnecessary adventure, by endangering in driving of that vehicle, when he was not having valid licence, neither the employer nor the insurance company can be asked to pay compensation to the heirs-claimants of such deceased and dismissed the appeal confirming the award of the Commissioner. But, the facts in the present case are entirely different and distinct to the

facts of the above decision, As such the said decision has no application to the facts of the case. Even in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Rabi Sahoo and another (1 supra), it is held that the Insurance Company let in evidence to show that the driver did not have valid driving licence authorised to drive transport vehicle. In the present case, it is not so, as such, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent cited supra, clearly held that it is for the insurance company to prove that the deceased workman is not having valid driving licence and in United India Insurance Co. LTD., v. Noora (8 supra), it is stated that the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act nowhere prescribe that if a driver is employed he should possess valid licence as is required in terms of the mandate of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 20. Therefore, in view of my foregoing discussion and the law laid down in the decisions cited supra, I am of the opinion that no case is made out by the appellant-insurance company and no substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and consequently, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.

A. RAJASHEKER REDDY, J

Date: 30-01-2015 Ksn 2001 Accident Claims Journal 538 2008 (3) Scale 570 1999 II LLJ 197 (181) 2005 (5) Andhra Legal Decisions 137 2014 Accident Claims Journal 480 2004 Accident Claims Journal 1 2009 Accident Claims Journal 2458 2007 Accident Claims Journal 64 2007 Accident Claims Journal 1617 2011 Accident Claims Journal 1290 2006 Accident Claims Journal 40 PAGE PAGE 17 ARR, J C.M.A.No.720 of 2005 (BFGJQRXZbdnTMs;ĖĖİØÜà ħçÛĞpÇÜĂ[™]nŲ^ˆ,zŁUpppREh&yhrCİOJQJaJhrcİOJQJaJh9[°]OJQJaJh[°]CJOJQJaJhmOJQJaJh&ÿht†OJQJaJh,BÃOJQJaJhðA€OJQJaJ = g n o ++òîèèàÙÙÙÙÓÍ!+-Æ/\$a\$gd°Cgd°C\$a\$gdrCİgdms\$a\$gd°Cgdİ(Rgd°Cgd°Cdãgd°CédUfœfýýý = W[_fgl m n o p Œ ôáôÖlöİÁ,ó~xaj3-hjbCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hó(çCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hT#qCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hğÿh[°]C>CJOJQJJaJh&ÿh°C5CJOJQJJaJh&ÿh°Os>CJOJQJJaJh&ÿht†,À>CJOJQJaJhð6BOJQJaJhñÚOJQJaJh†VOJQJaJh&ÿh°C>*O -Đ Ý é ó j s èÑ[°]£CEu^G0-hQ5CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h@=...CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h3eÂCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h¶7CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hİCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hýCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h,B,CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h[°]6CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hâJUCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @ s u ~ œ ® ° Å × á èÑ[°]£CEPƎEYB+hmJCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h[°]9SCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h,-HCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @6hdj|hdl CJH^OJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hdlCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h4zCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hl :CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-heqCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hçDJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @o Hr,\$aYEF[°]#X(ü(a)/ðððððæææææPÔÊÊÊ½¢c\$a\$gdÜ_\$,7,ädjh,7^,äa\$gdıc\$dää\$gd3ð \$dää\$gdγy% \$dää\$gdÆ/\$a\$gd²4\$ &Fdh\$a\$gd²4 \$dää\$gdT#q 2579DN^vèÑ[°]£CEPƎYB+hñJCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-ht†µCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h(çCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @6h@Ah@ACJH^OJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h@ACJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hùtuCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h1[°]CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hŠ[°]6CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h;mCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @ v'ÄİÖäîèÑ[°]£CEu^G0-hPçCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h)=CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hCEZCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h\—CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hFgeCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h(çCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h[5CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hTCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h+<◀CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @İ![°]EcnèÑ[°]ž[°]pYB+hö-VCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-ht†CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h^âCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hİÖCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hÝCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @6h,BÁh,BÁCJH^OJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h,BÁCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-htwvCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hİ§CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @ n{~ —œĴÂç~řðèÑ[°]£CEu^uG0-hBFaCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h@z?CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h...tƎCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hp—CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h[°]%CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h)LÉCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h9wtCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hEQ—CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h OİCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hð4 V i n | % . ' ° Á èÑ[°]£CEu^G0-hJMyCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hÝÖCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h,beCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hmh/CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hcCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hÂqZCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h{z,CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h%CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hvM[°]CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @ Å Ê É Ö Õ P ò ð ý ""BUÈNèÑ[°]£CEuE^G0-hwÜCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h@řCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hzX—CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hsXzCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hY@CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hc1<◀CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hİ) CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hTLCCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hDsCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @Uh[°]Tmž[°]*ÜY#èÑ[°]£CEuE^N^G0-hzbOCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hc(CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hULCCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hYxYCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h?)CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hé+ÂCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hkfcCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h(3CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h[°]-ÖCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @#EIWX]dm— èÑ[°]£CEu^EGE0-hòMÁCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hPCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hý ±CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hw CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hÇCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hp*CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hEsCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hés%CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hİCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @—¥İÖæğèÑ[°]£ÑCEu^G0-h^tCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hS[°]6CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hi&CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h:CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h4CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hÁCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hzbPCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hòMÁCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hqzNCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @ /4Fh~ŠçèÑ[°]£CEu^G0-hHCHCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-heCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hjÿCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hVÉCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h5ÂCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h-CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hQfCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hcCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h†p0CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @ ç°µ-Ä[°]0èÑ[°]£CEu^uGu0-hælfCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h~½CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h÷VCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hİCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h3qcCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h69%CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h(ç6CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h†jCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h(LøCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @0İjesx^{*}.~èÑ[°]£CEu^G0-hJàCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hâ;0CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hc1xCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hİCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h1ÑCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-hTCJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH tH @-h8CJOJQJ^JaJmH nH @sH t

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