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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

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+ **CRL.M.C. 8349/2024 and CRL.M.A. 31859/2024**

RAHUL SOOD

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Mir, Sr.
Advocate with Ms. Yashodhara
Singh, Advocate

versus

DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

.....Respondent

Through: Mr Vivek Gurnani Panel for ED with
Mr Pranjal Tripathi and Mr Kanishk
Maurya Advocates.

32

+ **W.P.(CRL) 3312/2024 and CRL.M.A. 31943/2024**

RAHUL SOOD

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Mir, Sr.
Advocate with Ms. Yashodhara
Singh, Advocate

versus

DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

.....Respondent

Through: Mr Vivek Gurnani Panel for ED with
Mr Pranjal Tripathi and Mr Kanishk
Maurya Advocates.

33

+ **CRL.M.C. 982/2025 and CRL.M.A. 4524/2025**

DIRECTORATE OF ENFOCEMENT

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr Vivek Gurnani Panel for ED with
Mr Pranjal Tripathi and Mr Kanishk



Maurya Advocates.

versus

RAHUL SOOD

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Mir, Sr.
Advocate with Ms. Yashodhara
Singh, Advocate

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDR KUMAR KAURAV

ORDER

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21.07.2026

1. By this common order, the Court disposes of three connected matters arising out of the same Enforcement Case Information Report bearing No. ECIR/GNZO/07/2022 dated 22.06.2022 ("ECIR"), registered by the Gurugram Zonal Office of the Directorate of Enforcement ("ED") against, *inter alia*, the respondent/petitioner Rahul Sood. The lead matter, CRL.M.C. 982/2025, has been instituted by the ED under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ("BNSS") [erstwhile Section 482 Cr.P.C.] read with Section 483 BNSS [erstwhile Section 439(2) Cr.P.C.], seeking cancellation of the regular bail granted to Rahul Sood and setting aside of the order dated 25.11.2024 passed by the Special Judge, PC Act, CBI-14, Rouse Avenue District Courts, New Delhi, in Bail Application No. 233/2024 ("impugned order").

2. The other two connected matters have been instituted by Rahul Sood himself, prior in point of time to the grant of bail. CRL.M.C. 8349/2024 seeks setting aside of the remand orders dated 09.10.2024 and 11.10.2024 passed in the subject ECIR, and a declaration that his remand to the custody



of the ED is illegal and bad in law. W.P.(CRL) 3312/2024 seeks a declaration that his arrest and continued detention are illegal and bad in law on account of non-compliance with the mandatory safeguards contained in Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”).

3. The Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) registered FIR No. RC0742020E0007 dated 23.11.2020 under Sections 120-B/420/471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on the basis of a written complaint dated 17.11.2020 lodged by Canara Bank. It was alleged that M/s Amira Pure Foods Private Limited (“APFPL”), through its Directors, Promoters and other functionaries, had committed a large-scale banking fraud by siphoning off and diverting credit facilities sanctioned by a consortium of banks led by Canara Bank, aggregating to approximately Rs. 1,357 crores, causing a wrongful loss of approximately Rs. 1,201.85 crores to the consortium. A forensic audit report dated 22.05.2019 recorded that borrowed funds to the tune of Rs. 734.20 crores had been routed through non-genuine and sham transactions with fictitious entities.

4. On the basis of the said predicate offence, the ED recorded the subject ECIR on 22.06.2022 and commenced investigation into the offence of money laundering under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the PMLA. During investigation, the ED traced diversion of funds amounting to more than Rs. 410.98 crores from APFPL to six entities through a web of shell companies, carried out search and seizure operations under Section 17 PMLA on 02.05.2023, and provisionally attached assets worth Rs. 131.51 crores vide Provisional Attachment Order dated 13.03.2024, later confirmed by the learned Adjudicating Authority on 29.08.2024.



5. Rahul Sood is stated to have served on the Board of APFPL as a non-executive, additional Director between 01.03.2011 to 05.10.2015, and again for a short spell of three months between 01.07.2016 to 30.09.2016. It is not in dispute that he is not named as an accused either in the predicate offence FIR or in the ECIR. He is, on the ED's own showing, a practising Advocate of over three decades standing who was engaged by APFPL, on the request of its Chairman Promoter Mr. Karan A. Chanana, initially as a legal advisor from the year 2009 and, in that continuing professional capacity, was subsequently invited to join the Board as a non-executive Director. He was issued summons on four occasions, when his statements were recorded under Section 50 PMLA, and it is not disputed that he joined and cooperated with the investigation on each such occasion.

6. Pursuant to a fourth summon dated 03.10.2024, the Respondent was arrested by the ED on 08.10.2024 under Section 19(1) PMLA. He was produced before the Duty Sessions Judge at his residence in the late hours of the same night; upon contest, the application for 14 days ED custody was rejected and only two days custody was granted *vide* order dated 09.10.2024.

7. Upon production on 11.10.2024, before the Duty ASJ, four further days ED custody was granted. On 15.10.2024, the Respondent was remanded to judicial custody. It is the legality of the orders dated 09.10.2024 and 11.10.2024, and of the arrest itself, that form the subject matter of CRL.M.C. 8349/2024 and W.P.(CRL) 3312/2024 respectively.

8. The Respondent, thereafter, moved an application for regular bail, being Bail Application No. 233/2024, before the Special Judge, PC Act, CBI-14, Rouse Avenue District Courts. The said application came to be



allowed *vide* the impugned order dated 25.11.2024, whereby the respondent was admitted to bail on furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 2,00,000/- with two sureties in the like amount, subject to conditions restraining him from tampering with evidence, influencing witnesses, and leaving the country without permission, and requiring him to join and cooperate with the investigation.

9. Notwithstanding the grant of bail, the Respondent was not released and was, on the same date, produced before a Court at Kaithal, Haryana, in connection with a separate FIR arising out of similar allegations *qua* APFPL, and was kept in custody there for a further period of almost two months. It was only on 27.01.2025, upon an application moved by the Haryana Police itself, recording that the Respondent's role was confined to that of a non-executive Director with no hand in the day-to-day affairs of the company, that he came to be released. In the meantime, the ED filed its Prosecution Complaint dated 06.12.2024, arraying the respondent as accused No. 5, upon which the learned Special Court took cognizance on 31.01.2025.

10. The Special Judge, after advertent to the twin conditions embedded in Section 45 PMLA, examined the material placed on record by the ED and recorded the following broad findings in paragraph no. 5 and 6:-

“5...It is important to mention here that applicant/accused Rahul Sood is not named as an accused in the CBI case i.e. predicate offence. Though the CBI, during its investigation, can examine the role of the applicant, yet it is a fact that so far nothing appears to have been done in the said case against any accused persons.

5.5 The present ECIR was registered in 2022 and applicant is not named as an accused in the said ECIR as well. However, as per ED, accused has been found to be involved in PMLA during investigation.



5.6 As per ED, the applicant/accused Rahul Sood was working as Director in M/s. Amira Pure Foods Private Limited (APFPL) from 2011 to 2015 and again from July 2016 to September 2016. In addition to being a director, he was also a legal advisor to the company. As a director, he also signed balance-sheet for 2016-2017 and annual return of the company for the year 2013-2014 and it unequivocally denotes the involvement and knowledge of the signatory regarding affairs of the Company. His role and responsibilities included drafting and reviewing distributors agreement/employment agreement / consultancy agreement/ trademarks agreement etc., replying for Legal notice etc. for the Company and he used to get professional fees for the same. Thus, he was among the key managerial persons and was involved in day to day activities of the accused company. He was Director for approximately 4 years and during the said time, major diversion took place from M/s APFPL. He resigned from the company and again joined back in 2016 and signed balance-sheet of the company. It is not possible that he was not aware of the activities taking place inside the company i.c. diversion of Bank funds.

From the investigation so far conducted, it appears that accused was a Director of the company for the period 2011 to 2015 and for three months in 2016. He was legal advisor of the company. The accused has been in custody since 08.10.2024 and the case has been investigated so far. From the investigation, nothing concrete has come, at least at this stage, to show that accused was involved in day-to-day affairs of the company or had participated in the activities of the company through Board Meetings or other Committees or permanent employee having knowledge or information about the activities of the company.

In fact, during the course of arguments, Ld. Counsel for accused had filed documents like Form DIR-11, DIR-12 & Form – 32. From the said documents and other documents with the ED, it appears that accused was appointed as Additional Director in 2011 in a professional category and was the Non- Executive Director in the said company.

Thus, from the investigation conducted so far, applicant/accused is arraigned as an accused on the premise that he is a Director of the company and having signed balance-sheet for 2014 and annual return for 2016 only and thus, the presumption has to be made that he was having knowledge of the day-to-day activities of the company. The ED will have to find more material against the accused but the Court has to see the material available so far. Not all the Directors of the company are arraigned as an accused in this case.

5.7 Statement of various persons have been recorded under Section 50 of PMLA and none of them have named or referred to the present



applicant/accused with whom transaction of siphoning of funds or conspiracy or cheating were made.

5.8 There is no specific material to allege that accused is a flight risk or will tamper with evidence. Despite the case being registered in 2020 by CBI and 2022 by ED, the accused has not run away. In fact, he joined the investigation when the summons were served upon him. Moreover, it is the main accused who has absconded from India. Also, the evidence is documentary in nature.

“6. In view of the above discussion and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, accused has been able to satisfy the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of the alleged offences, hence, I am inclined to allow the bail application of the applicant/accused Rahul Sood.”

11. On this conspectus, the Special Judge recorded a specific finding that the respondent had been able to satisfy the twin conditions under Section 45 PMLA, namely, that there existed reasonable grounds to believe that he was not guilty of the alleged offence, and that he was not likely to commit any offence while on bail, and accordingly enlarged him on regular bail.

12. Mr. Vivek Gurnani, learned Counsel appearing for the ED, assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that the findings recorded by the Special Judge run contrary to the settled position of law under the PMLA. It was contended, first, that the reliance placed by the learned Special Judge on the fact that the respondent is not named in the predicate offence, or in the ECIR, is wholly misconceived, inasmuch as Section 3 PMLA does not require an accused of money-laundering to also be an accused in the scheduled offence.

13. Placing reliance on ***Tarun Kumar v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement***¹ it was further submitted that the finding recorded at

¹ 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486.



paragraph 5.6 of the impugned order, that “*nothing concrete has come, at least at this stage, to show that accused was involved in day-to-day affairs of the company*”, amounts to an impermissible appreciation of evidence at the stage of bail.

14. He submits that the Court is not required to weigh evidence meticulously but must nonetheless demonstrate application of mind. It was contended that the respondent, having signed the balance sheet and the annual return of APFPL as a Director during the very period when diversion of funds took place, must be presumed to have had knowledge of its affairs, and that mere possession of “*proceeds of crime*”, as defined under Section 2(1)(u) PMLA, was in itself sufficient to attract liability. It was lastly submitted that the twin conditions of Section 45 PMLA had not been satisfied and that, with the filing of the Prosecution Complaint on 06.12.2024 and the taking of cognizance on 31.01.2025, the material on record against the respondent stood considerably strengthened, warranting cancellation of the bail granted to him.

15. Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Mir, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondent, opposed the petition both on the threshold question of maintainability and on merits. On maintainability, it was submitted that the ED’s petition does not, even remotely, plead any supervening circumstance arising after the grant of bail, such as misuse of liberty, tampering with evidence, attempt to influence witnesses, or risk of the Respondent absconding.

16. Mr. Mir submits that the respondent’s role in APFPL, even on the ED’s own case, was confined to that of a non-executive, professional Director appointed at the instance of the principal accused Karan A.



Chanana and that his tenure overlapped with the period of the alleged forensic audit findings (01.04.2015 to 31.03.2018) for barely nine months out of a nearly five-year directorship. His role is merely limited to signing one balance sheet and one annual return, each already signed and certified by the Managing Director, another Director, the Company Secretary and a statutory Chartered Accountant, in a purely ratifying capacity; and that he was never a bank signatory. He submits that Rahul Sood derived no benefit from APFPL beyond his professional legal fee of Rs. 74,00,000/- earned over eight years, fully reflected in his income-tax returns.

17. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the record, including the impugned order, the pleadings filed by the parties, and the material relied upon by them.

18. At the outset, it would be fruitful to recapitulate the well-settled legal principle that the cancellation of bail is to be dealt with on a different footing in comparison to a proceeding for grant of bail. It is necessary that ‘cogent and overwhelming reasons’ are present for the cancellation of bail. Conventionally, there can be supervening circumstances which may develop post the grant of bail and are non-conducive to fair trial, making it necessary to cancel the bail. Supreme Court in ***Daulat Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana***², observed that:-

“Rejection of bail in a nonbailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of Justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the

² (1995) 1 SCC 349.



accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial.”

19. It would, however, be an incomplete statement of the law to hold that the power to interfere with an order granting bail is confined only to cases of supervening circumstances. The law on the subject has developed along two distinct, though occasionally overlapping, tracks. The first track, illustrated by **Daulat Ram** (supra), concerns withdrawal of a concession on account of conduct or events after the grant of bail. The second track concerns a challenge to the correctness of the original order itself, on the ground that it was passed in ignorance of material facts, in disregard of binding principles, or otherwise suffers from perversity or illegality, a challenge that does not depend upon anything happening after the grant of bail at all. This second track finds early recognition in **Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh**³, and was explained with clarity in **Puran v. Rambilas**⁴, in the following terms:-

“The concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order is totally different from the concept of cancelling the bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or because of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation.”

20. The existence of this second, independent track was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in **Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P.**⁵, where it was held in express terms that “cancellation of bail cannot be limited to the occurrence

³ (2002) 3 SCC 598.

⁴ (2001) 6 SCC 338.

⁵ (2022) 8 SCC 559.



of supervening circumstances” and that the Court possesses inherent power and discretion to cancel or set aside bail even in the absence of any supervening circumstance, where the original order itself is shown to be unsustainable. The Court proceeded to lay down, by way of illustration and not exhaustively, the circumstances in which such interference would be warranted even absent any subsequent misconduct. Paragraph no. 31 is reproduced as under:-

“31. It is no doubt true that cancellation of bail cannot be limited to the occurrence of supervening circumstances. This Court certainly has the inherent powers and discretion to cancel the bail of an accused even in the absence of supervening circumstances. Following are the illustrative circumstances where the bail can be cancelled: -

- (a) Where the court granting bail takes into account irrelevant material of substantial nature and not trivial nature while ignoring relevant material on record.*
- (b) Where the court granting bail overlooks the influential position of the accused in comparison to the victim of abuse or the witnesses especially when there is prima facie misuse of position and power over the victim.*
- (c) Where the past criminal record and conduct of the accused is completely ignored while granting bail.*
- (d) Where bail has been granted on untenable grounds.*
- (e) Where serious discrepancies are found in the order granting bail thereby causing prejudice to justice.*
- (f) Where the grant of the bail was not appropriate in the first place given the very serious nature of the charges against the accused which disentitles him for the bail and thus cannot be justified.*
- (g) When the order granting bail is apparently whimsical, capricious and perverse in the facts of the given case.*

21. The precise contours of this dichotomy were, more recently, articulated with considerable clarity by the Supreme Court in ***State of***



Haryana v. Dharamraj⁶, Relevant Paragraph no. 8 is reproduced as under:-

“The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted.”

22. This position has since been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in **State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan**⁷, and in **Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh**⁸, wherein it has been authoritatively clarified that cancellation of bail on account of post-bail misconduct stands on a fundamentally different footing from annulment of a bail order that is itself unjustified or legally unsustainable at its inception, and that an order granting bail is liable to be interfered with, without the necessity of waiting for supervening circumstances, where it reveals reliance on irrelevant considerations, ignores relevant material on record, or otherwise suffers from perversity.

23. The above line of authority require that where a petition seeking interference with an order of bail proceeds, as the present one does, wholly on the footing that the original order is unsustainable on merits, the petitioner must clear the considerably higher threshold applicable to that distinct enquiry. It must be shown that the order suffers from perversity, illegality, reliance upon irrelevant material, or a disregard of material on record of a substantial nature. Mere disagreement with the view taken by the

⁶ (2023) 17 SCC 510.

⁷ 2025 INSC 979.

⁸ 2025 INSC 1367.



Special Judge, or a submission that a different view was also reasonably possible on the same material, would not suffice; nor would it suffice for the ED merely to reiterate, before this Court, the very submissions that were urged and considered before the Special Judge.

24. Applying the illustrative circumstances enumerated in **Deepak Yadav** (supra) to the impugned order, it is evident that none of them is attracted. There is no question of the Special Judge having taken into account irrelevant material of a substantial nature while ignoring relevant material on record. The material principally relied upon by the ED, the Respondent's directorship, his signature on the balance sheet and annual return, and the statements recorded under Section 50 PMLA, has each been specifically adverted to and dealt with in the impugned order.

25. There is no question of the Special Judge having overlooked any influential position of the respondent vis-a-vis a victim or witness, no allegation of any concealed criminal antecedents having been ignored, and, for the reasons that follow, the order cannot be said to have been passed on untenable grounds or to disclose discrepancies of a kind causing prejudice to the prosecution. Tested, in the alternative, on the formulation in **Dharamraj** (supra), the question is whether there has been an improper or arbitrary exercise of discretion rendering the order perverse, illegal or unjustified.

26. The submissions advanced on behalf of the ED do not persuade the Court to interfere with the impugned order. The first limb of the ED's argument, that the Special Judge erred in adverting to the fact that the respondent is not named in the predicate offence or in the ECIR, does not, on a fair reading of the impugned order, advance the ED's case.

27. The Special Judge has nowhere held that absence of the respondent's



name in the scheduled offence is, by itself, a complete answer to the ED's case. The observation has only been made as one of several circumstances cumulatively considered, along with the specific and more substantial finding that nothing concrete had emerged, even after two years of investigation, to connect the respondent with the day-to-day affairs of APFPL. The law declared in ***Pavana Dibbur vs The Directorate Of Enforcement***⁹ and ***Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs Union of India***,¹⁰ that an accused of money-laundering need not be named in the scheduled offence is not in dispute. It does not, however, dispense with the independent requirement that there exist reasonable material connecting the person concerned with the process or activity relating to the proceeds of crime.

28. On the question of the respondent's role, the material on record, as noticed by the Special Judge and reiterated before this Court, is confined to his signature on one balance sheet and one annual return, admittedly signed after the Managing Director, another Director, the Company Secretary, and a statutory auditor had already appended their signatures. It is well settled that criminal liability attaching to a company's affairs is a function of the actual role discharged by an individual and not merely of nomenclature or designation.

29. In ***S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla***¹¹, the Supreme Court held that "*liability depends on the role one plays in the affairs of a company and not on designation or status alone*", and that there is "*no universal rule that a director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs.*" This principle was applied with reference to a Director's signature on a balance

⁹ (2023) 15 SCC 91

¹⁰ (2023) 12 SCC 1



sheet in ***Rajender Shah v. State of Maharashtra***¹², where it was observed that where a balance sheet bears the signatures of a Managing Director and Chairman in addition to the Director concerned, “*on the basis of only signature, it cannot be said that there is enough material to show the knowledge of the Respondent.*” The finding of the Special Judge that the material available, even *prima facie*, did not establish the respondent’s involvement in the day-to-day affairs, control, or management of APFPL cannot, in these circumstances, be said to be perverse or contrary to the weight of the record.

30. Insofar as the ED’s reliance on the mere possession of “*proceeds of crime*” under Section 2(1)(u) PMLA is concerned, it bears notice that even the ED’s own showing does not identify any specific asset of the respondent as being traceable to the diverted funds of APFPL. The properties provisionally attached from him have been sought to be explained, at the stage of bail itself, by reference to disclosed professional income and bank financing. Whether such explanation will ultimately hold good is, of course, a matter for trial; it cannot, however, be said that the Special Judge committed any manifest error in declining to treat the bare fact of attachment as conclusive of guilt at the pre-trial stage.

31. The submission that the filing of the Prosecution Complaint dated 06.12.2024 and the subsequent taking of cognizance thereon on 31.01.2025 constitute a fresh or aggravating circumstance warranting cancellation of bail also does not commend itself to acceptance. The taking of cognizance upon a complaint that reiterates the very allegations already tested at the

¹¹ (2005) 8 SCC 89

¹² 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 13099.



stage of bail does not, without more, constitute either a supervening circumstance for the purposes of Section 483 BNSS, or a ground to hold the original grant of bail illegal.

32. This position is not in conflict with the observations of the Supreme Court in **Tarun Kumar** (supra), which caution against a mechanical, wholesale re-appreciation of evidence at the bail stage while simultaneously requiring the Court to record a broad, *prima facie* view. The impugned order, in the view of this Court, reflects precisely such an exercise of application of mind, and not its absence.

33. It further merits notice that the respondent's continued liberty since the grant of bail has occasioned no prejudice to the investigation or the trial. The Prosecution Complaint already stands filed, cognizance has been taken, and the respondent has, on the ED's own admission, been regularly appearing before the learned Trial Court. In these circumstances, no case is made out, either on the touchstone of supervening circumstances or on the touchstone of illegality or perversity in the impugned order, for cancellation of the bail granted to the respondent.

34. For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any infirmity in the order dated 25.11.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, PC Act, CBI-14, Rouse Avenue District Courts, New Delhi, in Bail Application No. 233/2024. CRL.M.C. 982/2025, along with the pending application, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. It is, however, clarified that the observations made hereinabove are confined to the examination of the prayer for cancellation of bail and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case, which shall be independently examined by the learned Trial Court, uninfluenced by anything stated in this judgment.



35. Having regard to the conclusion recorded above, whereby the petition of the ED seeking cancellation of the Respondent's bail has been dismissed and the order dated 25.11.2024 granting him regular bail stands undisturbed. The Respondent continues, as on date, to be enlarged on bail. In these circumstances, the questions raised in CRL.M.C. 8349/2024 and W.P.(CRL) 3312/2024, touching upon the legality of the remand orders dated 09.10.2024 and 11.10.2024, and the validity of the arrest effected under Section 19 PMLA, have, for all practical purposes, been rendered academic.

36. The relief that could flow from a finding in the respondent's favour on either of these petitions, namely, his release from custody, already stands secured by virtue of the bail granted to him. No useful purpose, therefore, would be served by embarking upon an adjudication of these questions at this stage, particularly when doing so would have no bearing on the Respondent's present liberty, and would, in substance, amount to deciding questions that no longer arise for decision on the facts as they now stand.

37. CRL.M.C. 8349/2024 and W.P.(CRL) 3312/2024, along with the pending applications therein, are accordingly disposed of as having been rendered infructuous, in the above terms.

PURUSHAINDR KUMAR KAURAV, J

JULY 21, 2026

Nc/NK