



2026:DHC:7588-DB



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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

CNR No. DLHC010242682024

+ **W.P.(C) 6161/2024**

BALA DEVI & ORS.

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik,
Sr. Adv. with Mr. Jatin Hooda and Mr.
Jitesh Malik, Advs.

versus

UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Puneet Yadav, Sr. PC for
UOI
Mr. Jitendra Kumar Tripathi and Ms. Sonali,
Advs.

CNR No. DLHC010262572024

+ **W.P.(C) 6547/2024**

SHAMSHER SINGH RANA & ORS.

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik,
Sr. Adv. with Mr. Jatin Hooda and Mr.
Jitesh Malik, Advs.

versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Ravi Kant Srivastava, SPC
with Mr. Lovekesh Aggarwal, GP with Mr.
Robert Laishram, Adv. for UOI with Mr.
Pankaj Dhanda (IB)

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR

JUDGMENT (ORAL)

31.08.2026

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C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. This case is squarely covered by the judgments of the Supreme Court in *Jaggo v. Union of India*¹, *Shripal v. Nagar Nigam*², *Vinod Kumar v. Union of India*³, *Dharam Singh v. State of U.P.*⁴ and *Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand*⁵, which have been considered by this Court in its decisions in *Pawan Sharma v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi*⁶ and *New Delhi Municipal Council v. Kalpana Sharma*⁷ as well as the subsequent judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court, speaking through Hon'ble the Chief Justice, in *Om Prakash Gaur v. Delhi Technological University*⁸, which follows the decision in *Pawan Sharma*. The judgement of this Court in *Pawan Sharma* was specifically affirmed and upheld on merits by the Supreme Court in *Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Pawan Sharma*⁹.

2. No detailed allusion to the facts is needed.

3. The petitioners were employed by the Intelligence Bureau¹⁰ on various dates between 1998 and 2003 on daily rated casual basis. They were holding tasks such as loading/unloading of heavy items, upkeep of office rooms, disposal of shredded papers and other manual jobs. They were paid from the office contingency fund of the IB Headquarters.

¹ 2024 SCC Online SC 3826

² 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221

³ (2024) 9 SCC 327

⁴ 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735

⁵ 2026 SCC OnLine SC 129

⁶ 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8313

⁷ MANU/DE/2899/2026

⁸ 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6224

⁹ Civil Appeal No. 7837/2026, SLP (C) No. 17750/2026

¹⁰ "IB" hereinafter



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4. There is no dispute about the fact that, since the date of their appointment, they had been working continuously with periodical renewals of their contracts and artificial breaks between renewals. Having retained the services of the petitioners for nearly two decades and more, the IB, in February 2021, decided to avail services such as those being rendered by the petitioner, from the Govt. e-Marketplace¹¹ portal. Pending finalization of tender through the GeM portal, the IB continued to avail the services of the petitioners. The petitioners were, however, told that they would have to get themselves re-employed through the contractor via the GeM portal.

5. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners approached the Tribunal by way of OA 1349/2021 and OA 1692/2021. They objected to their services being shifted to the GeM portal and being placed under a contractor having been directly engaged by the IB for over 20 years.

6. The respondents contended, by way of response before the Tribunal, that the decision to source the employees to undertake the work performed by the petitioner through a contractor, via the GeM portal, was a policy decision of the Government of India, which was not itself under challenge. It was, therefore, submitted that the petitioners had no sustainable cause of action as would entitle them to maintain the OAs.

7. The Tribunal has, by judgment dated 7 November 2023, disposed of the OAs filed by the petitioners in the following terms:



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“6. We perused the records of the case and heard the arguments advanced by both the counsels for the parties. In the instant case, the applicants have not challenged the decision of Government of India to introduce the GeM Portal and hiring the services of man-power as required for intermittent work through the GeM Portal. The GeM Portal has been introduced under the Rule 149 of GFR of 2017 which stipulates that "The Procurement of Goods and Services by Ministries or Departments will be mandatory for goods and services available on the GeM Portal". As this Rule under GFR has not been challenged by the applicants, any such subsequent action by any individual Ministry or Department including the action of the respondents for hiring the man-power through a private contractor through the GeM Portal cannot be termed as illegal. As regards to applicability of the ratio of the judgments in W.P.A No. 692/2022, it is my considered view that W.P.A. No. 692/2022 is related to contractual employees in a Statistical Institution. The present applicants are not contractual employees rather they are part time daily wagers. Hence the facts and circumstances in W.P.A No. 692 of 2022 are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case at hand. Hence, the ratio of the said judgment is not fairly applicable in the instant case. Similarly, the order dated 05.03.2021 in OA No. 2112/2020 of this Tribunal also relates to engagement of the contractual applicants therein as the nature of the jobs of the applicants in the said OA are different from the nature of the work in the present case, the ratio of judgment in the said case is also not directly applicable in the instant case. Moreover, the judgments in W.P.A No. 692/2022 passed by the Calcutta High Court and OA No. 2112/2020 passed by the CAT, PB New Delhi are the judgments in personum. They are not judgments in rem to be applicable to across to all category of contractual/ daily wager/ casual labourers. I do agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the Union Government has prerogative of adopting the manner of hiring the services of man-power for intermittent work. The introduction of GeM Portal and hiring of services of man-power through the GeM Portal have not been challenged in any Court of Law nor it has been set aside by any Court. Accordingly, all the Ministries or Departments are bound to hire the services of man-power for intermittent work through GeM Portal. Moreover, such hiring ensures the efficiency and economy in providing services to general public through various Ministries and Departments.

6.1. Having said that, on humanitarian grounds, the respondents should look into engaging the present applicants through the contractor appointed/ engaged through the GeM Portal. It all depends upon the willingness of the present applicants to work

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under this arrangement and also to the satisfaction of the contractor, who will be providing the services of man-power to the respondents. The respondents may direct the contractor appointed through the GeM Portal to consider engaging the present applicants, who have rendered the satisfactory services to the respondents No.2, for providing man-power to respondent No.2.

6.2. Both the OAs are disposed of in above terms with no order as to costs. Accordingly, all pending MAs are also disposed of.”

8. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the petitioners are before us.

9. We have heard Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Puneet Yadav and Mr. Ravi Kant Srivastava, learned SPCs for the respondents.

10. Learned Counsel for the parties have broadly reiterated the contentions advanced by them before the Tribunal.

11. It is not necessary for us to embark into any inquisitorial exercise in these matters, as the law now stands settled by the Supreme Court in a plethora of decisions, noted in para 1 *supra*, starting with **Jaggo**.

12. This Court has, in its judgment in **Pawan Sharma**, distilled the essence of these decisions and the propositions which emanate therefrom, thus:

“15. To our mind, the present petitions stand covered on facts by the decision in **Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal** and **Dharam Singh**. We have already set out the propositions emerging from the said decisions, and do not deem it necessary to repeat them *in extenso*.



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However, some principles, which are dispositive of the petitions before us, may be enumerated:

- (i) If
 - (a) the employees are selected by a process which *mirrors regular recruitment*, by holding selections and interviews,
 - (b) they have worked continuously for several years, and
 - (c) they are performing duties essential for the establishment or organization,they are entitled to regularization.
- (ii) The right to regularization, thus earned, is *substantive* in nature.
- (iii) In such cases, the initial label under which they were recruited, whether part-time, or contractual, or casual, or *ad hoc*, or temporary, would not matter.
- (iv) However, the appointment must not be illegal, *mala fide*, surreptitious, or “back door”.
- (v) In such circumstances, *it is not open to the respondents to contend that the posts occupied by the employees were not regular posts*. The recurrent nature of the duties performed by the employees *necessitated the classification of the posts as regular, irrespective the original label under which the employees may have been appointed*. The initial temporary, ad hoc, contractual, or casual, nature of their employment stood *transformed*, in such cases, “into a scenario demanding fair regularization”.
- (vi) The right to regularization would enure, in such cases, *even if the posts against which the employees were appointed were not sanctioned posts* – though, in the present case, the posts against which the petitioners were appointed *were* sanctioned.

16. In the present cases, the petitioners were employed, albeit on contract basis, pursuant to advertisement. A regular selection process, therefore, took place, qualifications were prescribed, and the petitioners fulfilled the qualifications. The appointments were against sanctioned posts. The nature of duties rendered by the petitioners, being nursing and para-medical duties, were, by their very nature, essential and perennial. They could not, therefore, be regarded as dispensable. The service rendered by the petitioners is blemish free. There is no complaint against them at any point of



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time. They have continued rendering uninterrupted service for close to 20 years. The very fact they have been extended periodically from time to time against sanctioned posts indicates that there is continued need of their services. Their case, therefore, in fact, stands on a much better footing than the cases of the employees/workmen which were before the Supreme Court in ***Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal*** and ***Dharam Singh***, as the petitioners were duly qualified, appointed against sanctioned posts and appointed consequent to a regular recruitment process.

17. These factors, by themselves, entitle the petitioners to be regularized in the posts against which they were originally appointed. This is the unmistakable consequence of the decisions in ***Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal*** and ***Dharam Singh***.

18. Article 141 of the Constitution of India makes the judgments in ***Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal*** and ***Dharam Singh*** binding on us. Article 144 requires us to act in the aid of the law declared by the Supreme Court, which would include making all efforts to ensure that the law declared by the Supreme Court is implemented with full vigor. We cannot, therefore, craft an exception into the law declared in ***Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal*** and ***Dharam Singh*** in cases where regular recruitment exercises were undertaken. Where petitioners had, by dint of their original appointment and continuous uninterrupted blemish free service on the post in which they were appointed, earned a right to regularization, they could not be compelled to participate in any recruitment exercise. Expressed otherwise, the omission on the part of the petitioners to participate in the regular recruitment exercises undertaken by the respondents cannot derogate from their right to regularization flowing from the facts of their cases and the law declared in ***Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal*** and ***Dharam Singh***.

19. Any attempt at distinguishing the facts of the present case from those which stand covered by the judgments in ***Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal*** and ***Dharam Singh***, to our mind, would be no less than an affront to the said judgments. We, as a Court lower in the judicial hierarchy, are least inclined to pursue this perilous course. The legal position in this regard stands tellingly underscored in the recent decision of the Supreme Court, rendered just three days ago, in ***Rohan Vijay Nahar v State of Maharashtra***¹², from which the following paragraphs merit reproduction:

“1. The judiciary draws its strength from discipline and not dominion. The Constitution of India creates courts of



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record that are independent in their spheres and yet binds them together through a coherent hierarchy. The High Courts in India possess a wide jurisdiction, *but the Supreme Court of India remains the final interpreter of law. Article 141 of the Constitution of India declares that the law laid down by this Court binds every court in the country. Further, Article 144 of the Constitution obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, to act in aid of this Court. These are not ceremonial recitals. They are the structural guarantees that convert dispersed adjudication into a single system that speaks with one voice and commands public confidence.*

2. Judicial discipline is the ethic that turns hierarchy into harmony. *It requires courtesy, restraint, and obedience to binding precedent even where a judge is personally unpersuaded. The lawful course is to apply the precedent and, if needed, record reasons for inviting a larger Bench to reconsider it. The unlawful and unjust course is to distinguish in name while disregarding in substance or to recast issues in order to sidestep a rule that binds. “Stare decisis et non quieta movere” which means to stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters, is not a slogan but a safeguard of equality before the law. Judges do not sit to settle scores. The gavel is an instrument of reason and not a weapon of reprisal. A vindictive stance is incompatible with the oath to uphold the Constitution and the law.*

3. Judges across our country must remember that collegiality is the companion virtue of independence and that a reversal on appeal is not a personal affront but the ordinary operation of a constitutional hierarchy that corrects error and settles law. *Respect for the senior jurisdiction is not subservience. It is an acknowledgment that all courts pursue a common enterprise to do justice according to law. An Appellate Court reviews and, where necessary, sets right the decision of the lower court with restraint and measured language, and the courts below reciprocate through prompt, reasoned, and transparent compliance. Courts speak through reasons, and reasons that align with binding authority preserve both legality and legitimacy of the judiciary. Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution make obedience a constitutional duty and not a matter of personal preference. A judgment that attempts to resist binding authority undermines the unity of law, burdens litigants with avoidable expense and delay, and invites the perception that outcomes depend on the identity of the*



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judge. In a constitutional judiciary, it is the law, as declared, that brings the conversation to a close. We restate the simple duty of Courts: apply precedent as it stands and give effect to appellate directions as they are framed. In that discipline lies the confidence of litigants and the credibility of courts.”

We draw sustenance from these passages.

20. In the light of the law that has now been declared in ***Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal*** and ***Dharam Singh***, it is clear that the judgment of the Tribunal cannot be upheld.”

(Emphasis supplied)

13. The decision in ***Pawan Sharma*** was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court by way of SLP (C) 17550/2026, which was disposed of, by the Supreme Court, by the following order dated 14 May 2026:

- “1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
4. Though we are not inclined to interfere with the direction issued by the High Court to regularize the writ petitioners (the respondents herein) on the posts they were originally appointed, we deem it appropriate to clarify the direction contained in paragraph 22 of the impugned order so that the seniority of all those regularly appointed in between the date of initial appointment of the respondents and the date of judgment is not disturbed.
5. Accordingly, we clarify that the direction contained in paragraph 22 of the impugned order shall not affect the inter se seniority of all those who were regularly appointed between the date of initial appointment of the respondents and the date of the judgment of the High Court. In effect, the respondents shall be placed below those regularly appointed candidates in the order of seniority.
6. With the aforesaid clarification/ modification of the impugned order, this appeal is disposed of.
7. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”



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14. Thus, the judgment of this Court in *Pawan Sharma* stands affirmatively approved by the Supreme Court, except to the extent of clarifying that the regularized petitioners would not be entitled to seniority over others who may have been regularly appointed in the interregnum.

15. Learned Counsel for the petitioners before us do not seek any such seniority.

16. *Pawan Sharma* was thereafter followed by this Court in *Kalpana Sharma*, from which we may reproduce the following paragraphs:

“19. From the decisions in *Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal* and *Dharam Singh*, the position which emerges is that a right to regularization arises ipso facto in favour of the employees who were initially employed after open selection against sanctioned vacancies and continued on the posts for long periods of time. These three facts i.e., (i) appointment by open selection, (ii) appointment against sanctioned vacancies, and (iii) long and continued discharge of duties on the posts to which they were appointed, by themselves entitled them to regularization. In fact, in *Jaggo*, the Supreme Court even went to the extent of holding that it was not open to the respondents to contend that the appointments were not made against sanctioned vacancies.

20. The only other additional consideration which emerges from the later decisions on the issue is the duties discharged by the employees concerned. If the appointment is against posts which are transient in nature, the entitlement to regularization would be of a somewhat lower degree. If, however, the employees discharge duties which are basic and essential to the functioning of the organization, their right to regularization stands sanctified.

21. In such circumstances, there can be no question of the employees being required to await framing of RRs or any other such eventualities in order to be regularized. Their right to



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regularization flows as a consequence of long and unblemished service of the establishment consequent on appointment by open selection against sanctioned vacancies, for work which is essential to the functioning of the organization. It is not open to the establishment after extracting work from such persons for protracted periods of time to contest their claim to regularization on the ground that RRs were to be framed or that RRs which had been framed after the appointment of the respondents, did not qualify them for regularization.

22. We are not inclined to agree with Ms. Dave's contention that we should await the outcome of the correspondences between the NDMC and the UPSC. In para 4(v) of the writ petition, the NDMC has specifically averred that the UPSC rejected the proposal for regularization mooted by the NDMC consequent on an earlier decision of the Tribunal rendered in OA 3597/2017 on the ground that the appointment of the employees was not in accordance with the RRs and that, therefore, their services could not be regularized merely because they had been serving the Establishment for a long period of time. Reliance was placed by the UPSC for this opinion, on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in *Uma Devi*. The view adopted by the UPSC is in the teeth of the law declared in *Jaggo* and the decisions which followed it and reiterated the same position. *Uma Devi* has been considered in all these decisions and the Supreme Court has consistently held that *Uma Devi*, which was intended to be a beneficial decision, aimed at curbing back door appointment, has been weaponized and used as a tool to continue persons on contractual and ad hoc basis for years at a stretch without regularizing their services. Such a practice not only amounts to unfair labour practice but also violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. As the UPSC has, in a similar case, refused to recommend regularization of the employees concerned, we are of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by awaiting the reply of the UPSC even if NDMC has been communicating with the UPSC in that regard.

23. Besides, once the right of the respondents to regularization stands crystalized by, as on date, seven judgments of the Supreme Court, all of which are consistent with each other, it would be a travesty of justice and grossly unfair to the respondents to allow their cases to continue to remain in suspended animation.

24. It is true that in some earlier orders, we had issued notice without disposing of the matters, keeping in mind the fact that against earlier decisions passed by us, appeals had been preferred before the Supreme Court which had issued notice thereon and, in some cases, directed, as an interim measure, that the employees



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before it in those cases be not removed from the posts which were held by them. In view of the fact that the issue was sub judice before the Supreme Court in some cases, we had refrained from passing any final decisions in the writ petitions before us.

25. Ms. Dave predictably draws our attention to this fact.

26. After that, however, the same position had been reiterated by the Supreme Court twice, firstly, in **Bhola Nath** and thereafter in **Pawan Kumar**, rendered by two different Division Benches of the Supreme Court. **Pawan Sharma** expressly reproduces and relies on **Jaggo**.

27. Once the Supreme Court has made its view thus clear, we, as a Court hierarchically lower on the judicial ladder, are bound to decide the lis before us in terms of the law declared by the Supreme Court.

28. Besides in view of the decisions in **Jaggo**, **Shripal**, **Dharam Singh**, **Bhola Nath**, **Vinod Kumar** and **Pawan Kumar** and the judgment of this Court in **Pawan Sharma**, we find no error whatsoever in the view adopted by the Tribunal.

29. However, we clarify that the respondents would be entitled to exactly the same benefits which were granted to the petitioners in Pawan Sharma, i.e., to be regularised prospectively with however, the benefit of fixation of pay, seniority and continuity of service from the date of initial appointment but without any back wages.”

17. A Coordinate Bench of this Court has, in **Om Prakash Gaur**, speaking through the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, followed the decision in **Pawan Sharma**. The relevant paragraphs from the decision of the Coordinate Bench in **Om Prakash Gaur** may be reproduced thus:

“24. A Division Bench of this Court in **Pawan Sharma** (supra), referring to **Jaggo** (supra), **Shripal** (supra) and **Dharam Singh** (supra) has held that in the said case since the employees were selected by a process which mirrors regular recruitment and they had worked continuously for several years and have been performing duties essential for the establishment or organisation, hence they were entitled to be regularised. It is to be noticed that in **Pawan Sharma** (supra) as well the advertisement pursuant to which the employees were initially engaged was for a walk-in



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interview only, as is the case with the employees in these two appeals. Para 15 of the report in **Pawan Sharma** (supra) is extracted herein below:

“15. To our mind, the present petitions stand covered on facts by the decision in Vinod Kumar, Jaggo, Shripal and Dharam Singh. We have already set out the propositions emerging from the said decisions, and do not deem it necessary to repeat them in extenso. However, some principles, which are dispositive of the petitions before us, may be enumerated:

(i) If

(a) the employees are selected by a process which mirrors regular recruitment, by holding selections and interviews,

(b) they have worked continuously for several years, and

(c) they are performing duties essential for the establishment or organization, they are entitled to regularization.

(ii) The right to regularization, thus earned, is substantive in nature.

(iii) In such cases, the initial label under which they were recruited, whether part-time, or contractual, or casual, or ad hoc, or temporary, would not matter.

(iv) However, the appointment must not be illegal, mala fide, surreptitious, or “back door”.

(v) In such circumstances, it is not open to the respondents to contend that the posts occupied by the employees were not regular posts. The recurrent nature of the duties performed by the employees necessitated the classification of the posts as regular, irrespective the original label under which the employees may have been appointed. The initial temporary, ad hoc, contractual, or casual, nature of their employment stood transformed, in such cases, “into a scenario demanding fair regularization”.

(vi) The right to regularization would enure, in such cases, even if the posts against which the



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employees were appointed were not sanctioned posts - though, in the present case, the posts against which the petitioners were appointed were sanctioned.”

25. The Division Bench in **Pawan Sharma** (supra), has also held that the right of regularisation in such cases would accrue even if the posts against which the employees were initially appointed were not sanctioned posts. The final direction issued in **Pawan Sharma** (supra) by the Division Bench of this Court is as under:

“22. The petitioners are, therefore, directed to be regularized against the posts on which they were originally appointed, irrespective of the labels governing such appointment. They would be entitled to fixation of pay treating them as having been regularly appointed ab initio. They shall also be entitled to all other benefits which would follow, except for back wages.”

26. In view of the detailed discussion of the entire law regarding entitlement of regularisation of a contractual/ad-hoc/temporary employee made by the coordinate Bench of this Court in **Pawan Sharma** (supra), we are of the opinion that having regard to the facts of the instant case as well, the employees are entitled to be considered for regularisation of their services. Their long continuance of service with the University clearly indicates that ever since their initial appointment they have been performing functions and duties, the requirement of which is perennial and accordingly, they are entitled to be regularised in service.

27. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in **Pawan Sharma** (supra), was challenged in *Civil Appeal No. 7837/2026*, which had arisen out of *SLP(C) No. 17550/2026*. The said Civil Appeal, *vide* order dated 14-5-2026 passed by the Supreme Court, has been disposed of, maintaining the order of this Court with a clarification that the employees to be regularised pursuant to the order of this Court shall be placed below those employees who were regularly appointed candidates in the order of seniority. The directions issued for regularising the services of the employees in **Pawan Sharma** (supra) were, thus, maintained by the Supreme Court.”

18. Legally, therefore, the issue is now crystallised by the above decisions.

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19. The petitioners, undisputedly, were employed directly by the IB without any intervening contractor or any GeM portal. Their services were periodically extended for over 20 years with artificial breaks. They were rendering services which were unquestionably routine services required to be rendered on day-to-day basis. The fact that their services were continued for so long clearly indicates that their services were not dispensable. It is nobody's case that the appointment of the petitioners was illegal or through backdoor or for any ulterior considerations.

20. We are, preambularly, a socialist democracy. Our Constitutional goal of socialism would require us to ensure that the lowest of the low obtains justice, and is not unnecessarily victimised. The petitioners before us are casual labourers and Group D contractual employees who have, without demur or complaint, been serving the IB for decades. Uprooting them from their employment at this stage would go against the very fundamentals of the socialist fabric on which the edifice of our Constitution rests.

21. Following the judgments of this Court in *Pawan Sharma* and *Kalpna Sharma*, as well as a recent judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in *Om Prakash Gaur*, these writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are quashed and set aside.

22. The petitioners are, therefore, directed to be regularised on the posts held by them. They would be entitled to the benefit of regularisation from the date of their initial appointments which would also include the benefits of pay fixation and the like but would not be



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entitled to any additional back wages beyond the wages which have already been paid to them. They would also be entitled to parity of pay with others who may be rendering the duties being rendered by them on regular basis. They would, however, not be entitled to any seniority over persons who may be recruited, during the period their services have continued on contract basis, to similar posts on regular basis by the IB.

23. The writ petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

VINOD KUMAR, J.

AUGUST 31, 2026/aky/dsn