



CRM-M-61319-2025

1

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

101-2

CRM-M-61319-2025

Parveen Rana

...Petitioner

V/s

State of Haryana

...Respondent

Date of decision: 06.03.2026**Date of Uploading : 09.03.2026****CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL**

Present: Mr. Sandeep Saini, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Gurmeet Singh, AAG Haryana.

SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1. Present petition has been filed under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023 for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No.387 dated 10.11.2023, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 328, 302, 120-B, 201 of IPC and Section 72-A of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (as amended by the Haryana Amendment Bill, 2020) and subsequently deleted Section 304 of IPC and Sections 120-B/302/201/307 of IPC have been added) at Police Station Chhapar, District Yamunanagar, Haryana.

2. The gravamen of the FIR reflects that on 09.11.2023, information was received at Police Station Chhapar, District Yamunanagar regarding the death of one Jagmal, who allegedly died after consuming intoxicating/spurious country-made liquor upon receipt of the said information. The police reached Civil Hospital, Yamunanagar, where the deceased had been brought. On the following day, i.e., 10.11.2023, the



CRM-M-61319-2025

2

statement of Mohit, son of the deceased, was recorded by the police, wherein he alleged that his father, who worked as a labourer, had consumed country-made liquor allegedly purchased from certain individuals, namely Raj Kumar @ Babli, Naresh Kumar @ Khuba, Rajesh Kumar and Radhey. It was alleged that the said liquor was poisonous in nature and resulted in the death of the deceased. On the basis of the said statement, FIR in question was registered and investigation was set into motion. During the course of investigation, several accused persons were arrested and their disclosure statements were recorded, pursuant to which the investigating agency claimed to have unearthed a larger network allegedly involved in the manufacture, supply and distribution of illicit and spurious liquor. Subsequently, upon further investigation and in view of the material collected by the investigating agency, Section 302 IPC was added while Section 304 IPC was deleted at the stage of framing of charge. During the course of further investigation, three more persons namely Anil Kumar, Paramjeet and Sushil were also stated to have died after allegedly consuming the spurious liquor.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner has neither been named in the FIR nor has he any concern whatsoever with the alleged business of illicit liquor. It has been contended that the petitioner is merely a labourer employed in the factory premises to take care of the premises and perform menial duties. It has been further contended that the petitioner has no role in

**CRM-M-61319-2025**

3

the manufacturing, preparation or distribution of the alleged illicit liquor and was not aware about the nature of the chemicals allegedly used in the said factory. According to learned counsel, nothing incriminating has been recovered from the petitioner and no specific role has been attributed to him in the alleged occurrence. It has been further submitted that the petitioner has been nominated in the present case only on the basis of the disclosure/confessional statement of a co-accused person and there is no independent or direct evidence to connect the petitioner with the alleged offence. Learned counsel has emphasized that such disclosure statement has limited evidentiary value and cannot by itself form the basis for continued incarceration of the petitioner. It has been further contended that neither any recovery whatsoever has been effected from the petitioner nor there is any documentary evidence against him. According to learned counsel, the entire prosecution case against the petitioner rests solely upon custodial disclosure statements which by themselves cannot constitute legally admissible evidence in view of the settled position of law. Learned counsel has pointed out that the petitioner was already confined in another FIR and was arrested in the said case on 14.11.2023. Thereafter, the petitioner has been implicated in the present case and was taken into custody on production warrant on 29.02.2024. Furthermore, the challan and supplementary challan have already been presented before the competent Court of jurisdiction. Learned counsel has asserted that out of 107 prosecution witnesses cited not even a single witness has been examined so far and the trial is likely to take a considerable period of time to conclude. It has been further submitted that



CRM-M-61319-2025

4

the continued incarceration of the petitioner, in the absence of any substantive evidence, would serve no purpose. The petitioner shall undertake to abide by all conditions that may be imposed by this Court, including not tampering with the prosecution evidence or influencing witnesses and not leaving the country without prior permission of the Court. On the strength of aforesaid submissions, the grant of petition in hand is entreated for.

4. *Per contra*, learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the grant of bail to the petitioner by arguing that the allegations are grave and serious in nature as the case pertains to the manufacture and supply of illicit/spurious liquor which ultimately resulted in the death of certain persons. Learned State counsel has iterated that during the course of investigation, a larger conspiracy involving several persons engaged in the manufacture and distribution of poisonous liquor has been unearthed. According to learned State counsel, during the course of investigation, the petitioner has been found involved in the illegal activity being carried out at the premises where the spurious liquor has been prepared. Furthermore, the petitioner was present and actively associated with the operations being conducted at the said premises. It has been further contended that the petitioner has been nominated during investigation on the basis of the disclosure statement of co-accused persons and other material collected by the investigating agency. Learned State counsel submits that keeping in view the seriousness of the offence and the larger public interest involved, the petitioner does not deserve the concession of regular bail. Considering



the gravity of the offence and the specific role attributed to the petitioner, learned State counsel has prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have perused the available record.

6. The grant of bail falls within the discretionary domain of the court; however, such discretion must be exercised in a judicious and principled manner, ensuring it aligns with established legal precedents and the interests of justice. While considering a bail application, the Court must evaluate factors such as the existence of *prima facie* evidence implicating the accused, the nature and gravity of the alleged offence and the severity of the likely sentence upon conviction. The Court must also assess the likelihood of the accused absconding or evading the due process of law, the probability of the offence being repeated and any reasonable apprehension of the accused tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. Additionally, the character, antecedents, financial means, societal standing, and overall conduct of the accused play a crucial role. Furthermore, the Court must weigh the potential danger of grant of bail undermining the administration of justice or thwarting its due course. A profitable reference in this regard is made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as ***State through C.B.I. vs. Amaramani Tripathi, 2005 AIR Supreme Court 3490***, relevant whereof reads as under:

“14. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of accused absconding or fleeing if released on



*bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail (see **Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 377 (SC) : 2001(4) SCC 280** and **Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 Supreme Court 179**). While a vague allegation that accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal of bail stated in **Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, 2004(2) RCR (Criminal) 254 (SC) : 2004(7) SCC 528** : "The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are:*

- a. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.*
- b. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.*
- c. Prima facie satisfaction of the **court** in support of the charge. (see **Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, 2002(2) RCR (Criminal) 250 (SC) : 2002(3) SCC 598** and **Puran v. Ram Bilas, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 801 (SC) : 2001(6) SCC 338**."*

This Court also in specific terms held that :

*"the condition laid down under section 437(1)(i) is sine qua non for granting bail even under section 439 of the Code. In the impugned order it is noticed that the High **Court** has given the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused*



on bail, in spite of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case) by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail."

In Panchanan Mishra v. Digambar Mishra, 2005(1) Apex Criminal 319 : 2005(1) RCR(Criminal) 712 (SC) : 2005(3) SCC 143, this Court observed :

"The object underlying the cancellation of bail is to protect the fair trial and secure justice being done to the society by preventing the accused who is set at liberty by the bail order from tampering with the evidence in the heinous crime..... It hardly requires to be stated that once a person is released on bail in serious criminal cases where the punishment is quite stringent and deterrent, the accused in order to get away from the clutches of the same indulge in various activities like tampering with the prosecution witnesses, threatening the family members of the deceased victim and also create problems of law and order situation."

7. Indubitably, the allegations against the petitioner are grave in nature. The material which has come on record, at this stage, *prima facie* suggests that the petitioner has been found involved in the illegal activity being carried out at the premises where the spurious liquor has been prepared. The gravamen of the allegations in the FIR discloses that the deceased Jagmal has allegedly consumed illicit and poisonous liquor, which resulted in his death. On the basis of the statement of the complainant, the FIR was registered against certain persons who were allegedly involved in the sale of such liquor. During the course of investigation, several accused



CRM-M-61319-2025

8

persons were arrested and disclosure statements were recorded, which led the investigating agency to unravel an alleged network engaged in the manufacture and distribution of spurious liquor. As per the case of the prosecution, the name of the present petitioner has surfaced during the course of further investigation through disclosure statements of certain co-accused. On the basis of the said statements and the alleged role attributed to him in the supply chain, the petitioner has been subsequently arrested on 29.02.2024 and was arrayed as an accused in the supplementary challan. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has not been named initially and his implication is based upon the material collected during the course of investigation. It is also a matter of record that the investigation has culminated in the filing of the main challan as well as a supplementary challan and charges have been framed by the Court below against the petitioner and certain other co-accused for offences under Sections 302, 328 and 120-B IPC along with Section 72-A of the Punjab Excise Act. The record further reflects that the prosecution has cited a large number of witnesses and the trial is currently at the stage of recording evidence.

8. The allegations in the present case pertain to an incident involving the manufacture and circulation of illicit liquor leading to loss of human life which is a matter of serious concern. The prosecution case, at this stage, *prima facie* indicates the existence of a conspiracy involving multiple persons engaged in the supply and use of alcohol for the preparation of spurious liquor. The contention of learned counsel that the name of the petitioner does not figure in the initial FIR and he has been



CRM-M-61319-2025

9

subsequently nominated does not, by itself, create a ground for grant of regular bail, as it is well settled that an accused can be arrayed during the course of investigation if sufficient material surfaces against him. Moreover, such submissions would require deeper appreciation of evidence, which cannot appropriately be undertaken at the stage of consideration of a bail petition. It is apt to mention herein that the petitioner has a long criminal history involving a large number of cases registered against him. Though in some of the cases he has been released on bail but the nature of the cases cannot be ignored while considering the plea for grant of regular bail. The criminal antecedents of an accused are a relevant factor while considering the prayer for bail, particularly where there is a reasonable apprehension that the accused, if released, may indulge in similar activities or may attempt to influence witnesses. Furthermore, the petitioner is alleged to be merely working as a labourer at the premises and the allegations relate to the manufacturing of spurious liquor, which is a serious offence affecting public health and safety. At this stage, it cannot be said that the role attributed to the petitioner is insignificant.

9. Furthermore, it is true that the petitioner has been languishing in custody for a considerable period but the seriousness of the allegations and his criminal antecedents weigh heavily against him. The material which has been placed on record does not show that the delay in trial is solely attributable to the prosecution. In such circumstances, long custody, by itself, cannot be treated as a ground for grant of bail. At this stage, no accentuating circumstances have been made out which may *prima facie*



constitute a compelling ground for the grant of regular bail to the petitioner, especially in light of the gravity of the allegations and the evidence on record. It is also to be borne in mind that offences of this nature strike at the very root of public order and societal conscience.

10. Considering the gravity of the offence, the stage of the trial and the overall facts and circumstances emerging from the record, this Court finds no merit in the present petition. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of regular bail in the factual *milieu* of the case in hand.

11. There is yet another aspect *nay* vital aspect of the matter which craves the attention of this Court.

11.1 There is no gainsaying that the powers of the High Court under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 are powers which are unbridled, unfettered and plenary in nature aimed at securing the ends of justice. The inherent powers of a High Court are powers which are incidental replete powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still and helplessly see the process of law and Courts being abused for the purposes of injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to a High Court, it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers of a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of a High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being



obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case, which in fact arises. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless powers, which a High Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice *nay* substantial justice between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.

11.2. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Sanjay Dubey vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 2023 AIR Supreme Court 3263***, relevant whereof reads thus:

“10. Having given the matter our anxious and thoughtful consideration, though the appellant may have a point that, stricto sensu, in a petition under Section 439 of the Code, the concerned Court ought not to travel beyond considering the specific issue viz. whether to grant bail or reject bail to an accused in custody, it cannot be lost sight of that



the Court concerned herein was not a 'Court of Session' but the High Court for the State of Madhya Pradesh, established under Article 214 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the "Constitution").

11. *This singular fact, for reasons elaborated hereinafter, leads us to decline interfering with the Impugned Judgment, but for different reasons. We have no hesitation in stating that had the Impugned Judgment been rendered by a Court of Session, the factors that would have weighed with us would be starkly different.*

12. *A little digression is necessitated. The High Court is a Constitutional Court, possessing a wide repertoire of powers. The High Court has original, appellate and suo motu powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are meant for taking care of situations where the High Court feels that some direction(s)/order(s) are required in the interest of justice. Recently, in B S Hari Commandant v Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 413, the present coram had the occasion to hold as under:*

"50. Article 226 of the Constitution is a succour to remedy injustice, and any limit on exercise of such power, is only self-imposed. Gainful reference can be made to, amongst others, A V Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, (1962) 1 SCR 573 and U P State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Kamal Swaroop Tandon, (2008) 2 SCC 41. The High Courts, under the Constitutional scheme, are endowed with the ability to issue prerogative writs to safeguard rights of citizens. For exactly this reason, this Court has never laid down any strait-jacket principles that can be said to have "cribbed, cabined and confined" [to borrow the term employed by the Hon. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555] the extraordinary powers vested under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Adjudged on the anvil of Nawab Shafiqath Ali Khan (supra), this was a fit case for the High Court to have examined the matter threadbare, more so, when it did not involve navigating a factual minefield.")

13. *Returning to the present case, though usually the proper course of action of the High Court ought to have been to confine itself to the acceptance/rejection of the prayer for bail made by the accused under Section 439 of the Code; however the High Court, being satisfied that*



there were, in its opinion, grave lapses on the part of the police/investigative machinery, which may have fatal consequences on the justice delivery system, could not have simply shut its eyes.”

11.3 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as ***The Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali, 2025 INSC 1155*** has held as under:

“35. The practice of conducting trials on a day to day basis more particularly in important or sensitive cases as was the tradition about thirty years ago has been given a complete go-by. We sincerely believe that it is high time that the courts revert to that practice. For the purpose of reverting to the old practice, it is necessary to understand the current social, political and administrative scenario including the way the Police are functioning. All the High Courts need to constitute a Committee to discuss this issue very seriously for the benefit of their respective district judiciaries.”

11.4 The chronic protraction of criminal proceedings serves as a systemic blight that transcends the individual interest of the accused, inflicting a highly deleterious impact upon the collective conscience of the society. While legal discourse frequently centers on the hardship of the incarcerated, it is a grave juridical error to overlook the active suffering and anguish visited upon the victim. For the aggrieved; an interminable trial is not merely a procedural delay but a form of secondary victimization leading to a state of perpetual emotional purgatory where the wounds of offense are kept raw by the lack of finality. A Three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ***Rattiram and Others Vs. State of M.P. through Inspector of Police; 2012 AIR Supreme Court 1485*** while appreciating the observation in ***Mangal Singh and Another Vs. Kishan Singh and Others;***

2009 AIR Supreme Court 1535; observed as under:



“47. While delineating on the facets of speedy trial, it cannot be regarded as an exclusive right of the accused. The right of a victim has been given recognition in Mangal Singh and Anr. v. Kishan Singh and ors., AIR 2009 Supreme Court 1535 wherein it has been observed thus :-

“Any inordinate delay in conclusion of a criminal trial undoubtedly has highly deleterious effect on the society generally and particularly on the two sides of the case. But it will be a grave mistake to assume that delay in trial does not cause acute suffering and anguish to the victim of the offence. In many cases the victim may suffer even more than the accused. There is, therefore no reason to give all the benefits on account of the delay in trial to the accused and to completely deny all justice to the victim of the offence.”

The fundamental principle of an ever-evolving liberty jurisprudence dictates that prolonged incarceration, absent any realistic prospect of a near-term conclusion of trial, renders continued pre-conviction detention constitutionally impermissible. Under the umbrella of Article 21 of the Constitution, the right to a speedy trial is recognized as an indispensable facet of the guarantee of life and personal liberty. The pre-trial incarceration must not, by mere flux of time, be permitted to assume the character of punishment, as the state cannot be allowed to achieve through procedural delay what it has not yet achieved through a verdict of guilt. However, this Constitutional promise is not an absolute or unregulated license, rather it ensures that deprivations of liberty are neither arbitrary, unconscionable nor unfair.

11.5 Where relief is being sought, solely upon the ground of procedural delay, the Court must adopt a *golden mean* approach, where the rights of the accused/incarcerated person are protected without reducing the criminal justice system to a state of toothlessness. *Ergo*, the Constitutional



inquiry into delay must be a contextual assessment of whether the continued detention remains constitutionally permissible under the specific penumbra of the case. Unless the delay is so inordinate that it shocks the judicial conscience, it cannot be treated as a solitary determinant for enlargement. A plea of delay cannot be examined in a legal vacuum or an abstraction; instead it must be weighed against the gravamen of allegations; specific role attributed to the applicant; trajectory of the trial; risks involved in enlargement of the applicant on bail, etc. A profitable reference in this regard can be made to the *dicta* passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Gulfisha Fatima vs. State (Govt. of Delhi), SLP (Crl.) No.13988-2025***, relevant whereof reads thus:

“26. As the hearing progressed, however, it became evident that the plea of delay could not be examined in abstraction. In the course of submissions and rejoinder, reference was necessarily made to the nature of the allegations, the statutory framework invoked, and the role attributed to individual appellants. This was not a departure from the original submission, but a reflection of the legal reality that the constitutional question of delay does not arise in a vacuum. xxx xxx.

30. Article 21 occupies a central place in the constitutional scheme. The right to life and personal liberty, and the insistence that any deprivation must conform to procedure established by law, are foundational guarantees. The right to a speedy trial has been recognised as an important facet of this guarantee. It follows that pre-trial incarceration cannot, by the mere passage of time, be permitted to assume the character of punishment.

31. At the same time, Article 21 has never been understood as operating in isolation from law. The constitutional promise is not that liberty will be unregulated, but that deprivations of liberty will not be arbitrary, unconscionable, or unfair. The expression “procedure established by law” reflects that balance. xxx xxx.”

A justice delivery system rests on a simple promise; fairness delivered in reasonable time. Any procedural protraction does not merely

11.6 *Ergo*, in cases where, notwithstanding the lapse of time, the Court in its judicious wisdom finds that other factors preclude grant of bail, a proactive approach to prevent travesty of justice must be adopted. In such cases, the refusal to grant on bail must be coupled with a peremptory mandate of expeditious conclusion of trial (or in appropriate cases a time-bound conclusion of trial). A profitable reference in this regard can be made to the *dicta* passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Tarun Kumar Vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement; SLP (Crl.) No. 9431 of 2023***, relevant whereof reads thus:

When the detention of the accused is continued by the Court, the courts are also expected to conclude the trials within a reasonable time, further ensuring the right of speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.”

12. In view of the convenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:



- (i) The petition in hand is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed.
- (ii) The Court below is directed to make an earnest endeavour to expedite the trial and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of one year, in accordance with law. If need be, the learned trial Court is at liberty to adopt the procedure of day-to-day trial as enunciated by the Hon’ble trial Court in case of *Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali* case (supra).
- (iii) Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove shall not have any effect on merits of the case and the investigating agency as also the trial Court shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without being influenced with this order.
- (iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

March 06, 2026
Ajay

Whether speaking/reasoned:	Yes/No
Whether reportable:	Yes/No