

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
WRIT PETITION NO. 8400 OF 2026 (GM-RES)

BETWEEN:

1. SRI. M LAKSHMANA
S/O. LATE MUDDALINGAIAH
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
NO.3, 3RD MAIN,
PARAMAHAMSA ROAD,
YADAVAGIRI,
MYSORE - 570 020.

...PETITIONER

(BY SRI. VIVEK S REDDY, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. SUBBA REDDY K N, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE PRESIDENT
THE INSTITUTION OF
ENGINEERS(INDIA)
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
NO. 8, GOKHALE ROAD,
KOLKOTA - 700 020.
2. ELECTION GRIEVANCE
REDRESSAL COMMITTEE
THE INSTITUTION OF
ENGINEERS(INDIA)
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
NO. 8, GOKHALE ROAD,
KOLKATA - 700 020.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
ASHOK KUMAR
3. THE BOARD OF SCRUTINEERS

THE INSTITUTION OF ENGINEERS (INDIA)
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
NO. 3, MR. B.R. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
REPRESENTED BY D.V. PICHA MUTHU

4. THE SECRETARY AND DIRECTOR GENERAL,
THE INSTITUTION OF
ENGINEERS(INDIA)
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO. 8,
GOKHALE ROAD,
KOLKATA - 700 020.
REPRESENTED BY MAJOR GENERAL
(DR.) MJS SYALI, VSM (RETD)
5. SRI. DR. M. CHOWDE GOWDA
S/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 81 YEARS
NO.86, 1ST MAIN, 4TH CROSS
UAS LAYOUT, RMV 2ND STAGE
SANJAYANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 094.

...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. PRABHULING K NAVADGI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. YATHISH S, ADVOCATE FOR R1, R2 & R4(PH);
SRI. AJOY KUMAR PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R5(PH))

THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING/SET
ASIDE THE COMMUNICATION DATED. 07.03.2026 AT 7-12PM
VIDE EMAIL FROM RESPONDENT NO.4 TO THE PETITIONER
VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND ETC.,

THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 26.03.2026, THIS DAY ORDER
WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

CAV ORDER

The captioned writ petition is instituted calling in question the impugned communication dated 07.03.2026, issued through e-mail by respondent No.4 to the petitioner, as produced at Annexure-A, whereby the petitioner's continuance as an elected Council Member representing the Karnataka State Centre of The Institution of Engineers (India) has been interdicted. Consequentially, a writ in the nature of mandamus is sought against respondent No.1 to permit the petitioner to discharge his duties in pursuance of his election, as evidenced at Annexure-C. During the pendency of proceedings, learned Senior counsel appearing for respondent No.1 placed on record an order dated 05.03.2026 passed by the Appellate Authority, and in that view of the matter, the petitioner has filed an application seeking amendment to assail the said appellate order, now produced at Annexure-A1.

2. The factual matrix, as pleaded, would indicate that respondent No.1 is a premier non-governmental

professional body of engineers established in the year 1920, having its headquarters at Kolkata, with more than 110 centres across the country, including State Centres in various State capitals, engaged in the promotion of engineering and technological advancement through academic and professional activities for over a century. The petitioner claims that he was elected and served as the Honorary Secretary of the Karnataka State Centre for the session 2023–2025. It is his specific case that pursuant to a communication dated 21.05.2025 issued by the Secretary and Director General of respondent No.1, calling for conduct of elections for one Corporate Member to the Council from the Karnataka State Centre, elections from Divisions to the State Committee, and elections to the offices of Chairman and Honorary Secretary, a meeting of the State Committee was convened on 31.05.2025. In the said meeting, under Agenda No.4, it was resolved that a Board of Scrutineers be constituted and that the names of such members be intimated to the Headquarters on or before 30.06.2025.

3. The petitioner further asserts that the State Committee, in its meeting held on 31.05.2025, unanimously approved the constitution of the Board of Scrutineers by re-appointing the very same team which had successfully conducted the elections for the previous term (2023–2025). It is averred that upon securing concurrence from all the proposed members of the Board of Scrutineers, the petitioner, in his capacity as the then Honorary Secretary, formally communicated the names of five members to the Headquarters of respondent No.1 on 26.06.2025. Pursuant thereto, the Board of Scrutineers, in co-ordination with the Headquarters, issued the calendar of events governing the electoral process.

4. The petitioner would contend that the Headquarters, having accepted the constitution of the Board, proceeded to facilitate the conduct of elections by enabling requisite protocols, including generation and issuance of secured credentials and passwords to the Board of Scrutineers. On these foundational facts, the petitioner asserts that the Board of Scrutineers was duly

constituted in strict compliance with the governing regulations of the Institution and was fully competent to conduct the elections in question.

5. It is the specific case of the petitioner that in the election so conducted, he was duly declared elected to the Council representing the Karnataka State Centre, having secured 2,287 votes, whereas the nearest rival candidate, namely one C.J. Jagadeesh, secured only 744 votes. The petitioner would further assert that pursuant to such declaration of results, he formally assumed charge as Council Member in the Annual General Meeting held at Bengaluru on 10.12.2025 and commenced discharge of his official duties in accordance with the Regulations governing The Institution of Engineers (India).

6. The petitioner would contend that one M. Chowde Gowda, who has sought impleadment in the present proceedings, initiated civil proceedings in O.S. No.7359/2025 calling in question the election process. However, the said suit came to be withdrawn on

12.11.2025. It is further averred that on the very same day of withdrawal, the said impleading applicant instituted a fresh suit in O.S. No.7941/2025, once again assailing the election process, seeking inter alia a decree of perpetual injunction. In the said suit, the plaintiff also filed interlocutory applications in I.A. Nos.2 and 3 under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "CPC") seeking an order of temporary injunction restraining respondent No.3 from declaring the results of the election pertaining to the session 2025–2029.

7. The petitioner asserts that respondent No.1 herein entered appearance in the said proceedings and stoutly opposed the grant of interim relief sought in I.A. Nos.2 and 3 by filing detailed objections, contending that the election process had been conducted strictly in accordance with the governing Regulations and that no prima facie case was made out warranting interference. Upon consideration of the rival pleadings and material on record, the Trial Court, by a reasoned order, rejected the applications filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

The said order of rejection, it is submitted, was thereafter carried in challenge before this Court.

8. The petitioner further contend that pursuant to a complaint lodged, the respondent No.2 namely, the Election Grievances Redressal Committee, assumed jurisdiction and initiated an enquiry into the electoral process. In furtherance thereof, a communication came to be addressed to the Honorary Secretary of respondent No.1 calling for particulars. It is, however, the categorical grievance of the petitioner that the respondent No.2, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, proceeded to record a finding that the entire election process conducted by the Board of Scrutineers stood vitiated and invalid. The said decision dated 18.12.2025 is produced at Annexure-N. Aggrieved by the said determination, the petitioner preferred a statutory appeal before respondent No.1/Appellate Authority questioning the legality and correctness of the decision dated 18.12.2025.

9. The petitioner would further assert that the Appellate Authority, instead of independently examining the matter in consonance with settled principles governing quasi-judicial adjudication, proceeded in a manner which is *ex facie* arbitrary and violative of *audi alteram partem*. It is in this backdrop that the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court in W.P. No.1052/2026, wherein this Court, by order, allowed the writ petition and directed respondent No.1/Appellate Authority to consider and dispose of the appeal in an expeditious manner. Notwithstanding the said directions, it is alleged that respondent No.1, without furnishing a copy of the reasoned order and without due communication in the manner known to law, issued an e-mail communication dated 07.03.2026 (Annexure-A), purporting to affirm the decision of the respondent No.2. Subsequently, upon production of the formal order by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, the petitioner has, by way of amendment, also laid challenge to the said appellate order dated 05.03.2026, now produced at Annexure-A1,

contending that the same is vitiated by patent illegality and non-compliance with the directions issued by this Court.

10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, reiterating the grounds urged in the writ petition, would vehemently contend that the impugned action of the respondent No.2 in nullifying the entire election process is ex facie arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in law. Taking this Court through the material on record, learned Senior Counsel would emphasize that the very constitution of the Board of Scrutineers was never the subject matter of challenge before the Election Grievances Redressal Committee and, therefore, in the absence of any foundational challenge to the constitution of the said body, the consequential election process conducted under its supervision could not have been invalidated. Placing reliance on Clause 4(E) of the Bye-laws and Regulations governing The Institution of Engineers (India), he would submit that the decision of the competent body in constituting the Board of Scrutineers,

having attained finality, could not have been indirectly unsettled by the second respondent.

11. Learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the order passed by respondent No.1/Appellate Authority suffers from patent illegality inasmuch as it runs contrary to the specific directions issued by this Court in W.P. No.1052/2026. It is his submission that the Appellate Authority has failed to advert to relevant and germane considerations, including the pendency of civil proceedings in O.S. No.7941/2025, and has mechanically affirmed the findings of the second respondent without independent application of mind. He would argue that the impugned appellate order is vitiated by non-consideration of material facts and is, therefore, liable to be set aside.

12. Adverting to the manner in which the impugned action has been carried out, learned Senior Counsel would point out that the petitioner has merely been served with an e-mail communication dated 07.03.2026 without furnishing a copy of the reasoned order passed by the

Appellate Authority. Such conduct, it is contended, clearly demonstrates arbitrariness and lends credence to the allegation that the respondents have acted with a predetermined and mala fide intent to nullify a duly conducted election. It is further submitted that the deliberate withholding of the order from the petitioner has caused serious prejudice and is violative of the basic tenets of fair play and transparency.

13. Placing reliance on the order passed by this Court, produced at Annexure-S, learned Senior Counsel would submit that despite a clear mandate to afford adequate opportunity and to consider the matter afresh, the Appellate Authority has proceeded to pass the impugned order in breach of the principles of natural justice. He would further invite the attention of this Court to the undisputed fact that the petitioner had already assumed charge as a Council Member in the Annual General Meeting held on 10.12.2025 at Bengaluru and had commenced discharge of his duties. In such circumstances, it is contended that the orders passed by

the second respondent as well as the Appellate Authority are vitiated by perversity, arbitrariness and non-application of mind, thereby warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

14. Insofar as the objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, learned Senior Counsel would submit that the same is misconceived. He places reliance on a judgment rendered by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, in the case of ***Manohar Prasad Saha .vs. The Institution of Engineers(India) through its Secretary and others¹***, to contend that a writ petition challenging actions of a professional body such as The Institution of Engineers (India) is maintainable, particularly when the impugned action is arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice. He would submit that the said view takes a contrary position to that adopted by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in ***Ashwani Kumar Shrivastava vs. Institution of Engineers(India)***

¹ **2016 SCC OnLineChh 969**

Calcutta², wherein it was held that disputes relating to election declarations are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Relying on the former, learned Senior Counsel would urge this Court to hold that the present writ petition is maintainable and deserves to be allowed.

15. In further substantiation of his contention regarding maintainability, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed strong reliance on the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar**³, to contend that even a body which may not strictly fall within the ambit of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, but which discharges significant public functions and exercises pervasive control over a field of public importance, would nevertheless be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Drawing a parallel, he would submit that respondent No.1, the Institution of Engineers (India), though a non-statutory professional

² AIR 1986 Allahabad 251

³ (2015) 3 SCC 251

body, performs functions of considerable public significance in the domain of engineering and technological advancement, and its decisions have far-reaching civil consequences on its members. On this premise, he would argue that the actions of respondent No.1 are subject to judicial review.

16. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the reliance placed by the respondents on the view taken by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, more particularly in the judgment rendered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.30119/2025 to contend that disputes pertaining to the internal affairs of the said Institution are not amenable to writ jurisdiction, is misplaced in the facts of the present case. He would urge that the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in BCCI (supra) has expanded the contours of judicial review, and therefore, any action of such a body which is arbitrary, violative of principles of natural justice, or has civil consequences, would fall within the sweep of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On these grounds, he would

contend that the objection as to maintainability deserves to be rejected and the writ petition be entertained on merits.

17. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 would stoutly defend the impugned action and contend that the very substratum of the petitioner's case is vitiated by material irregularities in the constitution of the Board of Scrutineers. Inviting the attention of this Court to the records, he would submit that the constitution of the Board of Scrutineers was never validly placed before or approved in the competent Board Meeting. It is alleged that the petitioner, while functioning as Honorary Secretary of The Institution of Engineers (India), has misused his official position and, by misrepresenting proceedings in the Fourteenth Board Meeting, projected as though the constitution of the Board of Scrutineers had already been resolved in the Thirteenth Meeting, and thereby secured a purported ratification in the Fortieth Meeting. On this premise, it is contended that the petitioner unilaterally proceeded to conduct the

elections on the strength of a fundamentally flawed and non -est constitution of the Board of Scrutineers.

18. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that this foundational defect has been elaborately examined by the second respondent-Election Grievances Redressal Committee as well as by the Appellate Authority, and both authorities, upon appreciation of the material on record, have concurrently held that the constitution of the Board of Scrutineers was in clear violation of the Bye-laws and Regulations governing the Institution. It is thus contended that once the very genesis of the election process is tainted, all consequential actions, including the election itself, necessarily stand vitiated. He would argue that the continued engagement of the same Board of Scrutineers for the present election process, at the instance of the petitioner, is demonstrably irregular and casts serious doubt on the sanctity of the entire process.

19. Placing heavy reliance on the concurrent findings recorded by the competent authorities, learned Senior Counsel would submit that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such matters is extremely limited, particularly when the impugned action pertains to internal affairs governed by the Bye-laws of a professional body. It is his contention that this Court ought not to sit in appeal over factual determinations arrived at by the designated authorities, unless the findings are shown to be perverse or wholly without jurisdiction. In the present case, according to him, the impugned orders are in strict adherence to the governing Bye-laws and are supported by cogent reasons. On these grounds, he would urge that the writ petition is devoid of merit and does not warrant interference, and accordingly seeks dismissal of the same.

20. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, while vehemently supporting the impugned orders passed by the second respondent as well as the Appellate Authority, would, however, fairly concede

that the present writ petition is maintainable in law. In this regard, he places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in ***U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey and others***⁴ to contend that even in cases involving bodies which are not strictly "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable where the impugned action has civil consequences or involves violation of statutory or public duties.

21. Notwithstanding such concession on maintainability, learned Senior Counsel would strenuously contend that no interference is called for on merits. It is his submission that both the second respondent—Election Grievances Redressal Committee and the Appellate Authority of The Institution of Engineers (India) have meticulously examined the entire material on record and have recorded concurrent findings demonstrating that the constitution of the Board of Scrutineers was in clear

⁴ (1999) 1 SCC 741

derogation of the governing Bye-laws. He would submit that the impugned orders have elaborately adverted to the relevant provisions and factual aspects, and have assigned cogent and sustainable reasons while declaring the election process for the present session as invalid. In such circumstances, it is contended that the impugned action neither suffers from perversity nor from any jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On these grounds, he would urge that the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed.

22. In light of the rival submissions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on both sides, the following points arise for consideration of this Court:

*"(i) Whether the judgment rendered by this Court in **Dr. M. Chowde Gowda .vs. The Institution of Engineers (India)** [WP.30119/2025 decided on 16.10.2025], placing reliance on the Division Bench judgment of*

*the Allahabad High Court in **Ashwani Kumar Srivastava .vs. Institution of Engineers (India), Calcutta (Supra)**, holding that disputes relating to The Institution of Engineers (India) are not amenable to writ jurisdiction, is in consonance with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar and others (Supra)** and **U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey and Others (Supra)**?*

(ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the impugned orders passed by the respondent No.2/Election Grievances Redressal Committee and as affirmed by the first respondent/Appellate Authority, declaring the election process as invalid, suffer from arbitrariness, perversity, or violation of principles of natural justice, so as to warrant interference by

this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?"

Finding on Point No.(i): Maintainability:

23. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition. The said objection is primarily founded on the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in ***Ashwani Kumar Srivastava vs. Institution of Engineers (India), Calcutta***, wherein it was held that disputes pertaining to declaration of election within The Institution of Engineers (India) are not amenable to writ jurisdiction, being matters arising out of internal administration of a non-statutory body. However, a contrary and more expansive view has been taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Chhattisgarh in the case of ***Manohar Prasad Shah*** (supra), wherein, upon an elaborate consideration of the nature and origin of the Institution, it has been held that the said body discharges public functions and is therefore amenable to

writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

24. The Chhattisgarh High Court, while arriving at the said conclusion, has placed reliance on Article 372 of the Constitution of India, which preserves pre-Constitution laws, and has undertaken an in-depth analysis of the Royal Charter granted to the Institution at Buckingham Palace on 13th August 1935. By advertent to the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in ***Edward Mills Co. Ltd., Beawar vs. State of Ajmer***⁵ and ***Raj Kumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo vs. State of Orissa***⁶, the learned Single Judge has drawn a distinction between legislative and executive acts of pre-Constitution sovereign authorities and has held that the Royal Charter constituting the Institution partakes the character of a legislative instrument, thereby conferring a public character upon the Institution. It is further noticed that the Charter itself restricts the Institution from engaging in trade or business, thereby underscoring its role as a

⁵ AIR 1955 SC 25

⁶ AIR 1964 SC 1793

professional body serving public and educational purposes rather than private commercial interests. On such reasoning, it has been held that actions of the Institution, particularly those affecting civil consequences of its members, are subject to judicial review.

25. This Court finds considerable force in the aforesaid reasoning, particularly when tested on the anvil of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in ***U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey and Others*** and ***Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Cricket Association of Bihar and Others***. In the case of ***Chandra Bhan Dubey (Supra)***, the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the ambit of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is wider than Article 12 of the Constitution of India and that writs can be issued even against bodies discharging public duties. The judgment in ***Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra)*** further expands this principle by holding that entities which are not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, but which discharge

public functions and wield significant influence over a particular field, are amenable to writ jurisdiction. The emphasis, therefore, is not on the source of power but on the nature of the function discharged.

26. In the considered view of this Court, the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Chhattisgarh aligns with the aforesaid binding precedents of the Hon'ble Apex Court and reflects the correct exposition of law. The restrictive view adopted by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in ***Ashwani Kumar Srivastava (supra)***, which proceeds on the premise that such disputes are purely internal and contractual in nature, does not take into account the evolved jurisprudence recognizing the amenability of bodies discharging public functions to judicial review. Consequently, to the extent that the said judgment runs contrary to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it cannot be treated as laying down good law.

27. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the earlier view taken by this Court in ***Dr. M. Chowde Gowda v. The Institution of Engineers (India) [WP.30119/2025 decided on 16.10.2025]***, following the Allahabad High Court judgment, does not lay down the correct legal position in light of the subsequent authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Accordingly, it is held that the present writ petition, challenging the actions of The Institution of Engineers (India), is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Accordingly, point No. (i) is answered in the ***negative***.

Finding on Point No.(ii): Merits:

28. This Court, having bestowed its anxious consideration to the rival submissions and upon meticulous examination of the material placed on record, finds that the impugned orders do not warrant interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A careful perusal of the order passed

by the respondent No.2/Election Grievances Redressal Committee would disclose that the proceedings of the 13th and 14th meetings of the Karnataka State Centre were minutely scrutinized. The Committee has recorded a categorical finding that in the 13th meeting, there was no agenda whatsoever for constitution of the Board of Scrutineers, and even in the 14th meeting, though the Chairman was present, serious objections were raised indicating that no valid resolution had been passed authorizing such constitution. On a cumulative consideration of the said records, the second respondent has come to a reasoned conclusion that the very foundation for constitution of the Board of Scrutineers was absent, and consequently, the election process conducted under the aegis of such an improperly constituted body stood vitiated. It has been further held that the alleged constitution of the Board of Scrutineers at the instance of the petitioner, who was then functioning as Honorary Secretary of The Institution of Engineers (India), was de hors the Bye-laws and hence unlawful.

29. The Appellate Authority—respondent No.1 while considering the appeal preferred by the petitioner, has independently re-appreciated the material on record and has concurred with the findings recorded by the second respondent. The Appellate Authority has, in fact, gone a step further and has recorded a specific finding regarding conflict of interest, holding that the petitioner, being an office bearer and at the same time an aspiring candidate in the election, could not have unilaterally initiated or steered the process relating to constitution of the Board of Scrutineers. Such conduct, according to the Appellate Authority, strikes at the very root of fairness and transparency expected in an electoral process governed by institutional Bye-laws. It has thus been held that the petitioner's active role in constituting the Board of Scrutineers renders the entire process suspect and fundamentally flawed.

30. This Court finds that both the authorities have extensively adverted to the relevant Bye-laws, the proceedings of the meetings, and the attendant

circumstances, and have arrived at concurrent findings of fact that the constitution of the Board of Scrutineers was not in accordance with the governing Regulations. The conclusions so arrived at cannot be said to be perverse, arbitrary, or unsupported by the record. On the contrary, they are based on a plausible and reasoned appreciation of the material.

31. It is trite that the scope of judicial review in such matters is limited. This Court does not sit in appeal over the decisions of expert or designated bodies, particularly in matters relating to internal administration and electoral processes, unless the decision-making process is vitiated by patent illegality, perversity, or violation of principles of natural justice. In the case on hand, this Court does not find any such infirmity. The second respondent has examined the legality of the constitution of the Board of Scrutineers in the light of the Bye-laws and has recorded findings based on evidence. The Appellate Authority has affirmed the same by an elaborate order assigning independent reasons.

32. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out any ground warranting interference. The concurrent findings recorded by the second respondent and affirmed by the Appellate Authority do not suffer from any legal infirmity. Consequently, Point No.(ii) is answered in the ***negative*** and against the petitioner.

33. Accordingly, this Court proceeds to pass the following:

ORDER

- (i) The writ petition is ***dismissed***.
- (ii) Consequently all interlocutory applications are disposed of.

**Sd/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
JUDGE**

ALB