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**IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION**

BAIL APPLICATION NO. 3082 OF 2026

Mohd. Sibtem Raza Shaikh

.. Applicant

Versus

State of Maharashtra & Anr.

.. Respondents

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- Mr. Ayush Pasbola a/w Ms. Mrunal Bhide, Mr. Sankalp Vichare, Mr. Khijar Sayyad, Advocates for Applicant.
- Ms. Rajeshree V. Newton, APP for Respondent No.1 – State.
- Ms. Priyanka Chavan, Advocate appointed through Legal Aid for Respondent No.2.

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CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.

DATE : OCTOBER 16, 2026.

P.C.:

1. Heard Mr. Pasbola, learned Advocate for Applicant; Ms. Newton, learned APP for Respondent No.1 – State and Ms. Chavan, learned Advocate appointed through Legal Aid for Respondent No.2.

2. This is an Application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking bail in connection with C.R.No.211 of 2026 dated 02.05.2026 registered with Mumbai Naka Police Station, Nashik for the offences punishable under Sections 64(1), 64(2)(M), 49 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short '**BNS**') along with Sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short '**POCSO Act**').

3. Applicant before me is the sole accused of 18 years and 6 months. He is arrested on 15.06.2026. On 18.07.2026 Special Judge (POCSO Act), Nashik rejected Applicant's bail in C.R.No. 211 of 2026. Hence, Applicant filed present bail application. Investigation is complete and charge-sheet is filed. Victim is aged 17 years and 11 months.

4. Briefly stated, in the year 2024 victim joined tuition namely 'Salaar Tuition classes' operated by Ms. Rasheda Rashid Shaikh at her home in Nashik. Applicant is niece of Ms. Rasheda. Applicant and victim met each other at her tuition classes. It is the case of prosecution that after tuition, Ms. Rasheda used to send victim into her bedroom under various pretexts where Applicant was already present. Applicant forcibly engaged victim into physical relationship on multiple occasions during the period July-2024 to November-2025. Applicant and his aunt – Ms. Rasheda repeatedly threatened victim not to disclose this matter to anyone or else they will defame her by making her photos and videos viral. Ms. Rasheda had also offered victim inducements saying 'if anything happens, I'll make you my daughter-in-law', thereby enabling Applicant to continue and forcibly engage into sexual acts with victim.

4.1. In November 2025, Applicant assaulted victim on the mistaken suspicion that she was having an affair with another boy.

Being subjected to continuous harassment and torture, the victim eventually confided in her family and disclosed the entire incident to them. Thereafter apprehending that the Applicant would make her private photographs and videos viral, the victim and her family attempted to persuade the Applicant and his aunt to refrain from such acts. However, the Applicant and his aunt continued to threaten the victim and her family. Left with no other option, the victim lodged an FIR against the Applicant and his aunt on the basis of the above incidents.

5. Mr. Pasbola, learned Advocate for Applicant would submit that Applicant and victim knew each other well and were in a relationship since the year 2022 when both of them were minors. He would submit that photographs of Applicant and victim showing their consensual relationship are available. He would submit that Snapchat and Whatsapp chats between Applicant and victim which are appended from page Nos.193 to 206 of Application *prima facie* substantiate and show that victim and Applicant were in a love relationship. He would submit that script of call recording between Applicant and mother of victim is also appended at page Nos.208 to 220 which shows that Applicant and victim's mother talked about victim's misbehavior with people.

5.1. He would submit that according to FIR although parents of Applicant and victim were fully aware about their love affair, there is a delay in lodging FIR against Applicant. He would submit that said FIR has been lodged falsely indicting the Applicant for committing sexual assault rather it was consensual love affair where families of Applicant and victim knew each other and had also talked about their marriage but it was decided to wait as both of them were minors at the then time. He would submit that Applicant has no antecedents and he is of a very young age and a student in College. He would submit that chargesheet if filed and continued custodial exposure would serve no investigational purpose and hence Applicant be enlarged on bail.

6. Ms. Newton, learned APP for State has vehemently opposed the Bail Application. She has drawn my attention to the order dated 18.07.2026 passed by Special Judge (POCSO Act), Nashik while rejecting the Bail Application of the Applicant and would submit that Trial Court has correctly observed that sexual offences against minor girls affects their modesty and dignity. She would submit that hesitation, trauma, fear, embarrassment and social stigma reasonably explain the causes of delay in lodging FIR. She would submit that victim is minor and there exists reasonable apprehension that if the Applicant is released on bail he may attempt to contact, intimidate or influence the victim, her family members and other witnesses as Applicant resides in the same vicinity as that of victim which would

create a hurdle in the trial. She would submit that considering the serious nature of offence, prosecution is desirous of examining 24 prosecution witnesses in trial and the same will be completed expeditiously which would eventually prove the guilt of Applicant as there is sufficient *prima facie* material on record to establish his complicity. She would submit that Applicant has taken advantage of vulnerability of victim and hence gravity of such offences against minors need to be taken into consideration by the Court. Hence she has urged the Court to reject the Bail Application.

7. Ms. Chavan, learned Advocate appointed through the Legal Aid to espouse the cause of Respondent No.2 would adopt and support the submissions of the learned APP and would additionally submit that in cases where accused is indicted under the provisions of POCSO Act, Courts should be cautious while granting bail to offenders considering the intent of the legislation behind enactment of the POCSO Act which is to provide protection to children like the victim herein. She would submit that delay in reporting matters arising out of POCSO Act is not fatal to the prosecution case as the victim being minor was scared to disclose the said incident to anyone. She would therefore urge the Court to reject the Bail Application considering her above submission and allow the trial to be completed.

8. I have heard the learned Advocates for both the parties and perused the record of the case. From the facts of the present case what is *prima facie* seen is that Applicant and victim were in contact with each other since 2022. It is seen from the material placed on record that they had a love affair and were in a consensual relationship. It is seen that victim continued to visit the place of Applicant's aunt i.e. attended her tuition classes there from July-2024 to July-2025 where she alleged that she was assaulted on various occasions. It is seen that although victim stopped her classes in July 2025, Ms. Rasheda used to call the victim to her place under the pretext of '*Mehndi*' orders where Applicant would allegedly be waiting for the victim and they both used to meet each other. It is seen that despite having knowledge of the said fact victim continued to visit the said place of the aunt. It is also borne out from the record that victim has filed the FIR barely 7 days before turning 18 years of age. Further the fact that victim's family members were clearly aware about the relationship between them is *prima facie* seen from the record.

9. It is seen that victim has willingly visited the place of incident on several occasions. In that view, it is difficult to believe the case of prosecution that she was forcibly harassed, tortured or sexually assaulted as stated in the FIR. It is seen that apart from the allegations contained in the FIR, no other material has been placed on record to substantiate the prosecution's case. Furthermore, it is seen that as per

the medico-legal examination report appended at page No. 35 of the Application, no signs of physical injuries or indications of the use of force against the victim have been recorded.

10. However, on perusal of the screenshots of Snapchat and WhatsApp chats appended at page Nos.193 to 206 it is seen that there is no incriminating material placed on record to *prima facie* indicate that Applicant sexually assaulted the victim rather it shows there was love and affection and attraction for each other, mutual understanding and connection between both of them. Furthermore, it is evident from the script of call recording between Applicant and mother of victim which is appended at page Nos.208 to 220 that victim's mother knew the Applicant very well and had also discussed about her daughter's love affair between them. It is seen that victim's mother and Applicant have also talked about future consequences of their relationship as they were very young at this stage. Moreover, it is seen that although both parties were minor, they were of mature age to understand the consequences of their acts at this stage.

11. It is a crystal clear fact that bitterness in love affair between Applicant and victim had upset both of them. It is seen that the family members of both parties initially attempted to resolve the matter amicably at their own level. However, it is seen that their efforts proved unsuccessful, which further aggravated the situation and

ultimately led to the lodging of the FIR. It is seen that in those circumstances the remaining aspects of the case can be examined and determined during the course of the trial for which custodial interrogation of the Applicant is not required. Therefore, I am of the opinion that Applicant has made out case for grant of bail.

12. It is settled law that a Court while deciding a Bail Application has to keep in mind the principal rule of bail which is to ascertain whether the accused is likely to appear before the Court for trial. There are other broad parameters also like gravity of offence, likelihood of accused repeating the offence while on bail, whether he would influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence, his antecedents which are required to be considered in such cases.

13. In the case of *Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson*¹, the Allahabad High Court, as far back as in the year 1931 held that power of granting bail conferred on High Court is entirely unfettered by any conditions. It held that legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is the Rule and refusal is an exception. This was in the famous Meerut

¹ AIR 1931 ALL 356

Conspiracy case.

14. Justice Mukerji writing for the Bench held as under:-

“9. Speaking for myself, I think it very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules for the guidance of the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court entirely unfettered. The reason for this action on the part of the legislature is not far to seek. The High Court might be safely trusted in this matter and it goes without saying that it would act in the best interests of justice whether it decides in favour of the prosecution or the defence. The variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it will be dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes.

This being my reading of the law, I proceed to see whether this is a case in which the applicants ought to be let out on bail.

On general principles, and on the principles on which sections 496 and 497 (as amended in 1923) are framed, the grant of bail should be the rule and refusal of bail should be the exception. In the case of a bailable offence, the law expressly says that if the accused person applies for bail he shall be released (section 496). Section 497 applies to cases of non-bailable offence and there it is said that the accused person shall be released on bail except where there appears to be a reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of a very heinous offence, namely one which may be punished by either death or by transportation for life : section 497(1). Again it is laid down that where, at any stage of the investigation or trial, there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused person has committed a non-bailable offence, but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall be released on bail : section 497(2).

*The principle to be deduced from sections 496 and 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, therefore, is that **grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception.** (emphasis underlined) That this must be so is not at all difficult to see. An accused person is presumed under the law to be innocent till his guilt is proved. As a presumably innocent person he is entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. It goes without saying that an accused person, if he enjoys freedom, will be in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. One of the complaints made by the applicants in this case is that their letters sent from the custody have been opened and inspected and censored, and, therefore, they were not in a position to conduct their defence with the aid of such friends as may be outside the prison. As I have said, it is obvious that a presumably innocent person*

should have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.

This being the rule, there may, of course, be exceptions. I will not attempt to lay down any cases of exceptions, because these cases before us are not exceptions and I do not want to say anything which will be only in the nature of an obiter dictum.”

14.1. Justice Boys writing a concurrent view held as under:-

“As to the object of keeping an accused person in detention during the trial, it has been stated that the object is not punishment; that to keep an accused person under arrest with the object of punishing him on the assumption that he is guilty, even if eventually he is acquitted, is improper. This is most manifest. The only legitimate purposes to be served by keeping a person under trial in detention are to prevent repetition of the offence with which he is charged, where there is apparently danger of such repetition, and to secure his attendance at the trial. The first of these purposes clearly to some extent involves an assumption of the accused's guilt, but the very trial itself is based on a prima facie assumption of the accused's guilt and it is impossible to hold that in some circumstances it is not a proper ground to be considered. The main purpose, however, is manifestly to secure the attendance of the accused.”

15. In this regard, assistance is drawn from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ***S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras***²

wherein the Court in paragraph No.2 has held thus:-

“2. Where a minor girl alleged to be taken away by the accused person, had left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing and voluntarily joined the accused, it could not be said that the accused had taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian within the meaning of section 361 of the Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for short). Something more had to be done in a case of that kind, such as an inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention either immediately prior to the minor leaving her father protection or at some earlier stage.”

16. Though the above referred case was decided well before the POCSO Act was enacted, this Court is well conscious of the

² AIR 1965 942

presumption ingrained in Section 29 of the said Act and that argument on prosecutrix's consent is irrelevant but *prima facie* if the statements of prosecutrix which are recorded are read, it is clearly borne out that she has been consenting to the actions which is gathered from the record of the case.

17. In the facts of the present case, attention is drawn to the decision of this Court (Coram: Mridula Bhatkar, J.) in the case of ***Sunil Mahadev Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra***³ to contend that consensus of the prosecutrix who is below the age of 18 years is a mitigating circumstance for a Court to consider. In furtherance to the above, Court has laid down certain specific guidelines after taking into consideration relevant cases as also the ethos and development of the age of the young offenders in the Indian Society in general. Court in paragraph Nos.8, 9,11 and 12 has laid down certain principles which I find it apt to be reproduced hereinbelow for consideration of bail in such Applications. Paragraph Nos.8, 9, 11 and 12 read thus:-

“8. It is to be noted that the case of S. Varadarajan was decided in the year 1967 when the women were not enjoying the freedom which today the women have. Albeit the Hon'ble Supreme Court then has taken a pragmatic view and has acquitted Varadarajan. Now we come across such cases everyday. If a girl is a minor between the age group of 15 to 18 years and if it can be safely inferred that her consent was obvious, then it is a mitigating circumstance. Some trial Courts dealing with such Bail Applications, especially after Nirbhaya case, started taking a strict approach and the accused are denied the bail only on the ground that the prosecutrix being minor below 18 years, her consent is immaterial, therefore, in the case

3 Bail Application No. 1036 of 2015, decided on 03.08.2015.

of rape on such minor, no bail can be granted. This is a matter of concern.

9. In view of the increasing offences against the women especially of rape, the legislature and judiciary both found it obligatory to deal these offences with severe punishment and women can be protected if the laws are made rigorous. Therefore, report of Justice Verma Committee was accepted and necessary and significant amendments were made in these two sections. A wrong doer is to be punished, guilty is to be convicted. However, at the stage of bail, the Court has to consider prima facie under what circumstances the offence is committed by the accused. In the Criminal law, the Court cannot ignore the intention or motive behind the act and that is an important factor in the commission of offence so also to decide the quantum of sentence at the end of trial, so in the case of bail.

10. ...

11. Today teenagers are exposed to more sex related issues and lot of material is also available to them to know the sexual relationship between a man and a woman. Because of their impressionable age, girls and boys both may tend to get provoked and there can be a curious and very compelling demand of the body to get into such kind of relationship. Sexual urge differs from person to person and there cannot be any mathematical formula in respect of sexual behavioral pattern of teenagers, as biologically whenever the child turns into puberty, the child starts understanding his or her sexual needs. The nature of response depends on the upbringing, peer pressure, how civilized the environment is etc. Sex requires proper physical and emotional preparation, as it results in many physical and emotional consequences. This is all considered as a sexual maturation. Therefore, some sects with view to regularize sexual behaviour of the community have acknowledged this biological factor and therefore, the early age marriages are performed in some religions or communities. Taking into consideration this social and biological factors, the law makers have considered the age of 15 as a age of consent when the marriage is performed. Taking into consideration this background, the trial Judge has to pass an order of bail in such cases.

12. The overall considerations while deciding such applications can be summed up as -

When a boy and a minor girl are in love with each other and chose to live together without consent of their parents, then the following factors are to be considered:

- (i) What is the age of the prosecutrix, who is minor.*
- (ii) Whether the act is violent or not.*
- (iii) Whether there are antecedents or not.*
- (iv) Whether the offender is capable of repeating the Act or not.*

(v) Whether there is likelihood of threats or intimidation, if at all the boy is released.

(vi) Whether any chance of tampering with the material witnesses when their statements are recorded.

(vii) It is also to be taken into account in such cases that a boy in his early 20's deserves to get employment and to plan, stabilize and secure his future."

18. Next, the decision of this Court (Coram: Sandeep K. Shinde, J.) in the case of *Anirudha Radheshyam Yadav Vs. The State of Maharashtra*⁴ is also relevant in the facts of the present case. Relevant paragraph No.4 is reproduced below for reference and reads thus:-

"4. The conduct of the victim is indicative of the fact that she had left the home of her parents by her own will and that she had surrendered to the physical desires of the applicant out of her love and affection for him. It is not the case of the prosecution that the applicant had promised to marry her. Additionally, it is also not a case where under the misconception of the fact, she had served herself to the desire of the applicant for physical relations. No doubt, that the applicant, under the preview of POCSO Act, is a minor; however, the facts of the present case indicate that she had sufficient knowledge and capacity to know full import of what she was doing and had only thereafter voluntarily joined the complainant (applicant)."

19. There is no doubt that presumption under Section 29 exists but it is not an absolute presumption. This Court is of the opinion that presumption would come into play only when prosecution is able to bring on record facts that would *prima facie* form the foundation for the presumption. Otherwise, all that the prosecution would be required to do is to raise some allegation against the accused person and claim that the case projected by it is true. Court will have to be on guard to see that application of presumption without adverting to the essential

⁴ Criminal Bail Application No.2632 of 2019 decided on 09.01.2020

facts shall not lead to injustice since we are at a *prima facie* stage and trial has not even begun. The presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act is not absolute. Attention in this regard is invited to the decision of High Court of Kerala in the case of ***Joy Vs. State of Kerela Represented through the Public Prosecutor***⁵ in a similar case where age of prosecutrix was below 18 years and a similar argument was made.

The relevant paragraph Nos.9 to 11 are reproduced below:-

“9. Mere delay in reporting the matter to the authorities concerned, especially sexual assault on a minor girl, is immaterial and it would not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, in the instant case, it is not the delay alone that is significant. The significant fact is that the complaint was given to the authorities concerned only two weeks after the mother received the lawyer notice from the petitioner claiming a huge amount as professional fees. This raises suspicion on the prosecution case against the petitioner. When the victim had disclosed the matter to her mother in July, 2018, one would have expected the mother to report the matter to the authorities concerned much earlier than 22.09.2018. The fact that she reported the matter only after receiving a lawyer notice from the petitioner assumes significance.

10. This court is not oblivious to Section 29 of the Act which contains a legislative mandate that the court shall presume commission of the offences by the accused unless the contrary is proved. Section 29 of the Act states that where a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the Act, the Special Court shall presume, that such person has committed or abetted or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be, unless the contrary is proved. The court shall take into consideration the presumption under Section 29 of the Act while dealing with an application for bail filed by a person who is accused of the aforesaid offences under the Act (See State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad, (2017) 2 SCC 178: AIR 2017 SC 630).

11. However, the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the Act does not mean that the prosecution version has to be accepted as gospel truth in every case. The presumption does not mean that the court cannot take into consideration the special features of a particular case. Patent absurdities or inherent infirmities or improbabilities in the prosecution version

5 2019 SCC OnLine 783.

may lead to an irresistible inference of falsehood in the prosecution case. The presumption would come into play only when the prosecution is able to bring on record facts that would form the foundation for the presumption. Otherwise, all that the prosecution would be required to do is to raise some allegations against the accused and to claim that the case projected by it is true. The courts must be on guard to see that the application of the presumption, without advertent to essential facts, shall not lead to any injustice. The presumption under Section 29 of the Act is not absolute. The statutory presumption would get activated or triggered only if the prosecution proves the essential basic facts. If the accused is able to create serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case or the accused brings on record materials which would render the prosecution version highly improbable, the presumption would get weakened. As held by the Apex Court in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : AIR 2011 SC 312, frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of anticipatory bail. No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. It should necessarily depend on facts and circumstances of each case in consonance with the legislative intention.”

20. Considering Applicant’s age, if he is enlarged on bail Court is hopeful that his family will undoubtedly do their duty to make every effort and attempt to reform and aid the Applicant in leading a reformed life while on bail rather than keep him in prison and expose him to criminal outlook and life in prison. However on the flip side, if a chance is given to the Applicant because of his young age by enlarging him on bail, there is a possibility that he will be remorseful and repent in retrospect. This is a chance required to be taken by the Court because punishment has to be believed to be inflicted for a reformatory result rather than being punitive in nature.

21. Undoubtedly the trial will determine the complicity of Applicant in the offence. While considering Bail Application in such facts, Court feels that reform and rehabilitation of the under trial accused needs to be considered especially when age of the accused person is young so that he gets an opportunity / or is given an opportunity to reform, rehabilitate and earn his livelihood honorably from the perspective of social integration. This is a chance which the Court must take considering the young age of accused person. The age of the Applicant is very young. If the Applicant is incarcerated in prison further, there is every possibility that he might lose faith in the institution and society at large and may tread the path of criminality or would waste his life. Incarceration in prison exposes many youth to abuse as is shown statistically.

22. There are several harms of incarceration which are inflicted disproportionately on the youth. This is the reason why Court feels that any / every semblance of a chance towards a reformative approach in punishment should be adopted, especially in the case of young offenders. Hence every opportunity or to that extent risk should be constructively taken by the Court in the case of young offenders – accused before committing such accused to further custody and give such accused an opportunity to become a good citizen in the Society. These observations are only in the view of the young age of the Applicant before me and it is only a means to explore an alternative to

incarceration so that the Applicant can become a good citizen.

23. Hence, in view of my above *prima facie* observations, Applicant is granted bail subject to following conditions:-

- (i) Applicant - Mohd. Sibtem Raza Shaikh is directed to be immediately released from prison in connection with C.R. No. 211 of 2026;
- (ii) Applicant is directed to be released on bail on furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs. 25,000/- (Rs. Twenty Five Thousand only) with one surety of the like amount;
- (iii) Applicant shall report to the Investigating Officer at the Mumbai Naka Police Station, Nashik, once every month on the first Sunday of the month between 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.;
- (iv) Applicant shall co-operate with the conduct of trial and attend the Trial Court on all dates, unless specifically exempted and will not take any unnecessary adjournments, if he does so it will entitle the prosecution to apply for revocation of this order;
- (v) Applicant shall not leave the State of Maharashtra without prior permission of the Trial Court;

- (vi) Applicant shall not influence with any of the witnesses or tamper with the evidence in any manner;
- (vii) Applicant shall keep the Investigating Officer informed of his current address and mobile contact number and / or change of residence or mobile details, if any, from time to time, as applicable;
- (viii) Applicant and his family members including the co-accused – aunt are expressly warned by this Court not to harass the victim in any manner whatsoever or attempt to contact her physically or by any electronic means or meet her or create any hurdle in her education by any overt act and if it so happens, it shall be open to the prosecution to immediately apply for cancellation of this order of bail; and
- (ix) Any infraction of the conditions shall entail cancellation of bail granted to the Applicant.

24. Considering that the Applicant and the victim are studying in the same college and attending the same class, the Principal of the concerned college is directed to take appropriate steps to ensure that they are assigned to separate classes, with a view to safeguarding the victim's well-being and ensuring a safe and conducive environment for the continuation of her education.

25. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are limited for the purpose of granting Bail only and I have not made any observations on merits of the case. The trial shall be adjudicated on the strength of the evidence led and strictly on its own merits being uninfluenced with any of the *prima facie* observations made herein above in this order.

26. This Court appreciates the valuable assistance rendered by Ms. Chavan, learned Advocate appointed through the Legal Aid to espouse the cause of Respondent No. 2. Her fees be paid by the High Court Legal Aid Services Authority as per rules on production of a server copy of this order and other compliances in accordance with the decision of this Court in the case of *Sanjyot Nitin Telharkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.*⁶ and the Schedule under Regulation 18(1) of the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority Rules, 1998.

27. Bail Application No.3082 of 2026 is allowed and disposed.

[MILIND N. JADHAV, J.]

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