

**HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA**

WP(C) No.742 of 2021

Sri Arindam Paul, S/o Sri Alok Baran Pal, resident of T.G. Road, Krishnanagar, Agartala, P.O. Agartala HPO, P.S. West Agartala, Sub-Division: Sadar, District: West Tripura, Pin:799001, through his power of attorney Sri Anupam Paul, S/o Sri Alok Baran Pal, resident of T.G. Road, Krishnanagar, Agartala, P.O. Agartala HPO, P.S. West Agartala, Sub-Division: Sadar, District: West Tripura, Pin-799001

.....Petitioner(s);

Versus

The High Court of Tripura, represented by its Registrar General, having his office at New Capital Complex, Agartala, P.O. New Secretariat, P.S. New Capital Complex, Sub-Division: Sadar, District: West Tripura, Pin:799010

.....Respondent(s)

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Anupam Paul, Advocate,
Mr. Sankar Bhattacharjee, Advocate.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Bibhal Nandi Majumder, Sr. Advocate,
Mr. D.J. Saha, Advocate.

**HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA**

Date of hearing : 27.08.2025 & 03.09.2025

Date of Judgment & Order : 19.09.2025

Whether Fit for Reporting : YES

JUDGMENT & ORDER

(M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)

1) Petitioner was appointed as a Judicial Officer Grade-III of Tripura Judicial Service on 03.02.2004. He was promoted to Grade-II post of the said service on 22.12.2010. By an order dt. 30.01.2015, he was promoted to Grade-I of the said service with effect from 02.02.2015.

2) On 26.3.2018, he was posted as Director of the Tripura Judicial Academy.

3) On 11.02.2020, *adverse* remarks along with '**average**' grading were recorded in the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) of the petitioner for the year 2018, and were communicated to him. They were:

“Grading:- “Average”

Adverse entry recorded by the Reporting Authority:

During my tenure, he was always trying to motivate me to provide him financial power which was and still is under the control of High Court. I discussed the issue with Brother Justice S. Talapatra who suggested me not to do that. In spite of my unwillingness he left no stone unturned to motivate me in this regard. I found him misusing the official vehicle allocated to him as Director. During Regional Conference of NJA, Mr. Pal's activities in many matters including Hotel booking, purchase of backpack. During my tenure in the year 2018-19 I found him to be very arrogant. As I newly took over the charge I proceeded on good faith. Many cautioned me about him in regard to financial transactions. Then, I came to know about some irregularities which he committed abusing his position as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kamalpur. Mr. Pal under the garb of carrying electrical repair, two Air Conditioners have been included in the items of repairing by way of manipulating the list. Full Court had observed that Air Conditioners being new item cannot be shown under the head of repair. And it was not the end when it was found that those Air Conditioners were already installed in the residence of Mr. Pal without any prior approval and sanction of the High Court. Furthermore, when Mr. Arindam Pal was holding the post of the Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Unakoti Judicial District, Kailashahar, Air Conditioner was installed in his official chamber. At that relevant period only the Judges in the rank of District Judge or Addl. District Judge were entitled for Air Conditioner machine in their official chamber. Mr. Pal was directly involved in the installation of two Air Conditioners in the official chambers of CJM, Kailashahar, SDJM, Kailashahar and Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Kailashahar. He also abused his power in engaging 3(three) PSOs for him. The officer was show-caused for irregularities during Hon'ble Chief Justice Deepak Gupta though no final order was passed. However, subsequently, it was withdrawn.”

4) On 26.02.2020, petitioner submitted a representation in connection with the adverse remarks recorded in the ACR for the year 2018.

5) By a letter dt. 23.03.2020, the decision of the Full Court, whereby the representation submitted by the petitioner was rejected, was communicated to the petitioner. The Full Court held:

“Considered the representation of the concerned Judicial Officer to the adverse remarks. The Full Court noted that the following portion of the said remarks was only by way of a reference and should not be treated as adverse remark:

“Then, I came to know about some irregularities which he committed abusing his position as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kamalpur. Mr. Pal under the garb of carrying electrical repair, two Air Conditioners have been included in the items of repairing by way of manipulating the list. Full Court had observed that Air Conditioners being new item cannot be shown under the head of repair. And it was not the end when it was found that those Air Conditioners were already installed in the residence of Mr. Pal without any prior approval and sanction of the High Court. Furthermore, when Mr. Arindam Pal was holding the post of the Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Unakoti Judicial District, Kailashahar, Air Conditioner was installed in his official chamber. At that relevant period only the Judges in the rank of District Judge or Addl. District Judge were entitled for Air Conditioner machine in their official chamber. Mr. Pal was directly involved in the installation of two Air Conditioners in the official chambers of CJM, Kailashahar, SDJM, Kailashahar and Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Kailashahar. He also abused his power in engaging 3(three) PSOs for him. The officer was show-caused for irregularities during Hon'ble Chief Justice Deepak Gupta though no final order was passed. However, subsequently, it was withdrawn.”

Subject to the above observation there is no reason to delete the adverse remarks. The representation is rejected.”

(emphasis supplied)

6) For the year 2019, *adverse* remarks along with ‘**average**’ grading were recorded in the petitioner’s ACR, and they were communicated to him by a letter dt. 20.02.2021. The noting of the Reporting Authority is as under:

‘Grading: Average

Remarks: “ ‘Copy and paste’ habit is required to be avoided. Similar case laws are referred in almost all the judgments. It is not clear how the principle of a case law is relevant to the factual context of a particular case. The officer should apply his mind and discuss as to how the principle enunciated in a judgment of the higher Courts is applicable to the facts of the case in hand. The officer needs to improve better relationship with the Bar.”

7) On 15.03.2021 petitioner submitted representation in connection with the adverse remarks recorded in his ACR for the year 2019.

8) By a letter dt. 16.04.2021, the decision of the Full Court rejecting petitioner’s representation subject to partial modification, was communicated to him. It recorded:

“In partial modification of the remarks conveyed, the group of words “Copy and paste habit is required to be avoided” may be substituted by “The Judicial Officer may discuss the applicability of reproduced portion of earlier orders or judgments in proper perspective.”

The Writ Petition

9) Petitioner, therefore, filed the instant Writ Petition for quashing/setting aside of the adverse remarks and the ‘**average**’ grading recorded in his ACR for the years 2018 and 2019 along with Full Court resolutions dt. 20.03.2020 and 13.04.2021 which were communicated to him on 23.03.2020 and 16.04.2021, and also the Full Court resolution dt. 18.07.2019 insofar as it relates to his ACR. He also prayed for sending his

ACR for the year 2018 to the Chief Justice for proper assessment, and for upgrading his ACR for both years.

10) The petitioner *inter alia* contended that for the previous years his ACR gradings were “Very Good” or “Good”, that his work was appreciated, that he was handpicked by the then Chief Justice to head the Tripura Judicial Academy as it’s Director, that the adverse comments for 2018 and 2019 were recorded by the Judge-in-charge, Judicial Education and Training (for short ‘**the Judge-in-Charge**’) who was newly sworn in and that he had worked under the said Judge-In-Charge only for 4 months.

11) Petitioner contended that the recording of adverse entries in the ACR for 2018 had no reasonable basis and has no factual foundation; that he had merely reminded the Judge-in-Charge of the pending proposal for adoption of Delegation of Financial power Rules followed by the State Government for the Judicial Academy, that this cannot be the basis of recording of an adverse remark, that no show cause notice was issued to him for misusing the official vehicle, that events relating to NJA Regional Conference held in 2018 or purchase of Air Conditioners which happened in 2015 cannot be included in the ACR of 2018.

12) Petitioner contends that in 2019 he was posted as Judge, Family Court, Kailashshahar, Unakoti District where he worked till 16.04.2021 and same learned Judge-in-Charge was Portfolio Judge of Unakoti Judicial District and he assessed the petitioner’s performance in ACR of 2019 also and again recorded ‘**average**’ grading and certain *adverse* remarks therein. He contended that criticism by the said Judge of petitioner adopting ‘copy-paste’ method in writing judgments was also not warranted. He explained that since

facts and circumstances were similar in almost every case, similar case laws were applied by him. He also stated that he had good relationship with the Bar.

13) He also claimed that he had dealt with a Criminal case in which the father of the Judge-in-Charge was a charge sheeted accused and he took steps for its early disposal and this might have displeased the Judge-in-Charge.

14) According to petitioner, in 2018, the Service Rules did not provide as to who would be the Reporting Authority and would record the ACR; that the Chairman of the Judicial Academy was the Chief Justice as per the bye-laws and they did not provide for the Judge-in-Charge to be the Reporting Authority; that the resolution dt.18.07.2019 changed it; the said resolution cannot be applied retrospectively; and so the ACR for 2018 could only have been written by the Chief Justice as he was reporting to him and not by the Judge-in-Charge. This is an error of procedure according to him.

15) He pleaded that having modified to some extent the remarks of the Judge-in-Charge in the ACRs of 2018 and 2019, the Full Court erred in maintaining the 'average' grading.

16) He contended that the impugned proceedings deserve to be quashed in the light of above contentions

The stand of the High Court of Tripura (respondent no.1)

17) The Registrar General of the High Court of Tripura has filed a response to the Writ Petition, and defended the decision of the Full Court with regard to the ACRs for 2018 and 2019 as regards the petitioner.

18) It is pointed out that after the establishment of the Tripura Judicial Academy, the petitioner was the first in-service Judicial Officer

appointed to the post of Director of the said academy, and all the former Directors were retired officers of the Tripura Judicial Service.

19) As a result, the matter of evaluation of ACR of the Director, Tripura Judicial Academy i.e. the petitioner, came up for consideration before the High Court for the first time, and it was duly considered by the Full Court in a meeting held on 18.07.2019.

20) In the said Full Court meeting, it was decided by the Full Court that for the purpose of evaluation of the ACR of the Director of the Tripura Judicial Academy, the Judge-in-Charge, Judicial Education and Training of the High Court shall be the Reporting Authority, and the Full Court would be the Reviewing and Accepting Authority.

21) Pursuant to this decision dt. 18.07.2019 of the Full Court, the Judge-in-Charge, Judicial Education and Training became the Reporting Authority of the Director, Tripura Judicial Academy towards evaluation of his performance. The resolution of the Full Court dt. 18.07.2019 is filed as Annexure-R/3.

22) The allegations levelled by the petitioner against the respondent were denied.

The consideration by the Court

23) Before we consider the respective contentions of the parties, we may refer to the legal position with regard to scope of judicial review of a challenge to the decisions of the Full Court concerning ACRs of Judicial Officers.

24) In the case of ***Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others***¹, the Supreme Court held that judicial review of the ACRs/Full Court decisions regarding them is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not the decision itself, as such.

It held that critical or independent analysis or appraisal of the materials by the courts exercising powers of judicial review unlike the case of an appellate court, would neither be permissible nor conducive to the interests of either the officers concerned or the system and institutions of administration of justice by going into the correctness as such of ACRs or the assessment made by the Committee of the High Court and approval accorded by the Full Court of the High Court.

It held that in cases of assessment of ACRs, evaluation and formulation of opinions, a vast range of multiple factors play a vital and important role and no one factor should be allowed to be overblown out of proportion either to decry or deify an issue to be resolved or claims sought to be considered or asserted.

It declared that in the very nature of things it would be difficult, nearing almost an impossibility to subject such exercise undertaken by the Full Court, to judicial review except in an extraordinary case when the Court is convinced that some monstrous thing which ought not to have taken place has really happened and not merely because there can be another possible view or someone has some grievance about the exercise undertaken by the Committee/Full Court.

¹ (2003) 9 SCC 592

In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the evaluation made by the Committee/Full Court with regard to the opinion expressed in the ACR and held that it is neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor irrational as to shock the conscience of the Court to warrant or justify any interference.

25) This was reiterated in ***S.D. Singh v. Jharkhand High Court through R.G. and Others***² in the context of the question as to whether petitioner therein could have been asked to retire at the age of 58 years and his service not extended to the age of 60 years.

The said decision had been taken on the basis of the petitioner's ACRs wherein he was graded only "Average" in respect of the years immediately preceding his attaining the age of 58 years, and also on the basis of a vigilance proceeding initiated against him on the basis of several allegations made against him including a report made by the Inspecting Judge who had made an inspection, and had reported that petitioner did not have a good reputation. However the allegation of the Inspecting Judge was concerned, the matter was placed in the Standing Committee meeting and was ultimately dropped.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Full Court saying that "*it cannot be said that there was no material on the basis of which the Evaluation Committee and subsequently the Full Court of the High Court formed the opinion that the petitioner was not suitable for continuing in service beyond the age of 58 years*".

26) In ***Arun Kumar Gupta v. State of Jharkhand***³, while affirming the judgment in ***Syed T.A. Naqshbandi*** (1 supra), the Supreme Court held:

² (2005) 13 SCC 737

³ (2020) 13 SCC 355

“ 24. As is obvious from the law quoted above, adverse entries with regard to integrity do not lose their sting at any stage. A judicial officer’s integrity must be of a higher order and even a single aberration is not permitted. As far as the present cases are concerned, the matter has been considered by the Screening Committee on two occasions and the recommendations of the Screening Committee have been accepted by the Standing Committee on both occasions. The action taken is not by one officer or Judge, it is a collective decision, first by the Screening Committee and then approved by the Standing Committee.

25. Senior Judges of the High Court who were the members of the Screening Committee and Standing Committee have taken a considered and well-reasoned decision. Unless there are allegations of mala fides or the facts are so glaring that the decision of compulsory retirement is unsupportable this Court would not exercise its power of judicial review. In such matters the court on the judicial side must exercise restraint before setting aside the decision of such collective bodies comprising of senior High Court Judges. In our opinion these are not fit cases to interfere with the said decisions.”

It dismissed the Writ Petition in that case and did not grant relief to the Judicial Officers concerned.

27) Counsel for the petitioner does not dispute that there is a very limited scope of judicial review in the light of the decisions referred to supra, and that there can be no appraisal of merits and only the decision making process is to be seen i.e. whether there exist materials on the basis of which the grading could have been given by the Reporting Authority and confirmed by the Full Court.

28) There is no dispute that Justice A. Lodh had been elevated as judge of the High Court on 07.05.2018 and he was appointed as the Judge-in-Charge of Judicial Education and Training, High Court of Tripura by the then

Chief Justice of the High Court on 14.05.2018 through a notification issued, which has been placed on record by the counsel for the High Court.

29) By that date, the petitioner was already the Director of the Judicial Academy. So the Judge-in-Charge had opportunity to observe petitioner's conduct as the Director till the petitioner was moved to the Family Court Kailashshahar, Unakoti District in 2019. The same Judge of the High Court was admittedly the Portfolio Judge of Unakoti District where he worked till 16.04.2021. So the Judge of the High Court had occasion to consider the Judgments of the petitioner and have awareness of petitioner's relationship with the Bar.

30) It is not in dispute that prior to 2018, the Tripura Judicial Academy was always headed by a retired Judicial Officer and so there did not arise the question of who would be the Reporting authority to write the ACRs of the Director of the Judicial Academy.

31) The petitioner was the first in-service Judicial officer who was posted as Director of the Judicial Academy on 26.03.2018.

32) Thus a need arose for designating the Reporting authority, the Reviewing and Accepting Authority. This need was realized in 2019 and accordingly the matter was decided by the Full Court on 18.07.2019.

33) Annexure-R/3 resolution of the Full Court was passed on 18.07.2019 directing that the Judge-in-Charge, Judicial Education and Training should be the Reporting Authority of the Director, Tripura Judicial Academy, that the Full Court will be the Accepting and the Reviewing Authority. The said resolution of 18.07.2019 in fact directed that the petitioner's ACR be placed before the Full Court along with the assessment

report of the Judge-in-Charge, Judicial Education and Training since the petitioner had worked as a Director of the Tripura Judicial Academy from 26.03.2018 to 31.12.2018 during the reporting year.

34) The plea of the petitioner that this resolution was applied retrospectively cannot be countenanced for the reason that even if he was reporting in 2018 to the Chief Justice, who was the Chairman of the Academy, the byelaws of the academy also did not designate the Chairman as Reporting Authority. So even if the Chief Justice had written the petitioner's ACR for 2018, if there were adverse comments, petitioner would have raised the plea that the Chief Justice was not competent to write the ACRs.

35) Therefore, the Full Court was right in designating on 18.07.2019 the Judge-in-Charge A. Lodh to be the Reporting Authority and asking the latter to write his ACR as he was familiar with the work and conduct of the petitioner as Director of the Judicial Academy from 14.05.2018 till 31.12.2018.

36) Had this not been done, none would have been competent to write petitioner's ACR for 2018 and if it is not written, the petitioner himself would have suffered in his career.

37) There cannot be an interpretation of a situation which would create a vacuum in the service career of an employee and also complicate the duty of the employer of doing the impossible.

38) Therefore the doctrine of necessity would have to be applied and the decision dt.18.07.2019 of the Full Court cannot be found fault with.

39) The plea of petitioner that the Judge-in-Charge was acquainted with his work and conduct for only 4 months is incorrect since the record

shows that 7 and a half months was the period of observation available to the Judge-in-charge. The petitioner tried to mislead the Court by trying to give a false impression that only for a short while, the Judge-in-Charge had known about his work as Director of the Judicial Academy.

40) This period is a substantial period on the basis of which the ACR for 2018 could be written by the said Judge-in-Charge after noting the conduct of the petitioner as he would have interacted with him constantly.

41) Obviously this must have been written after Justice A. Lodh was designated as Judge-in-Charge of Judicial Education and Training on 14.05.2018, and after the Full Court passed the resolution on 18.07.2019 making him (the Judge-in-Charge, Judicial Education and Training) as the Reporting Authority.

42) This grading and adverse entry recorded by the Reporting Authority was communicated to the petitioner on 11.02.2020 when he was working as a Judge, Family Court, Kailashahar, Unakoti Judicial District.

43) He then gave a representation on 26.02.2020 raising certain contentions including the contention that the Judge-in-Charge, Judicial Education and Training had a very limited role of assisting the Chairman (Chief Justice) to conduct training programmes, that financial and day to day administrative control remained with the Chief Justice, and he had reported to the Chief Justice for the most part of 2018 and the Chief Justice should have assessed his performance for the year 2018.

44) The Full Court considered his representation in its meeting held on 20.03.2020. As set out above in para 5 supra, a major portion of the adverse remarks contained in the Reporting Authority's views was directed to

be treated by the Full Court *not* as adverse remark. However, the first portion of the remarks of the Judge-in-Charge/Reporting Authority was retained and so was the ‘**average**’ grading.

45) The adverse remarks which were retained were that the petitioner was always trying to motivate the Judge-in-Charge to provide him financial powers which was and still is under the control of the High Court at that point of time, and in spite of the unwillingness of the Judge-in-Charge, the petitioner left no stone unturned to motivate him in that regard.

46) In the Writ Petition at para 10.1, the petitioner himself admitted that he had moved a proposal for adoption of Delegation of Financial Power Rules followed by the State Government for the Tripura Judicial Academy with suitable amendments as there was no Delegation of Financial Power Rules laying down the procedure and safeguards to be followed by the Tripura Judicial Academy for financial transactions.

47) So the petitioner has admitted that he himself proposed the conferment of financial powers on himself by the High Court as regards the financial affairs of the Judicial Academy are concerned. The petitioner did not dispute that at that point of time, the financial powers qua the Judicial Academy were still under the control of the High Court.

48) Admittedly the Chairman of the Judicial Academy was the Chief Justice of the High Court and financial powers vested in the High Court. We find this anxiety of petitioner to get the full financial powers as regards the affairs of the Judicial Academy delegated to him, to be highly inappropriate and unwarranted. He ought to have left it to the High Court to deal with the issue instead of putting pressure on the Judge-in-Charge for it.

49) It would also have been extremely awkward for the Judge-in-Charge to press the Chief Justice/Full Court to confer the financial powers on the Director of the Academy, and the petitioner must also realize the embarrassment which would be caused to the Judge-in-Charge, if he put it to the Chief Justice and the latter declined.

50) No doubt as per the bye-laws of the Academy, the Director of the Judicial Academy was held responsible for all the administrative and financial matters of the Society under Clause 25(iii)(e). But this is admittedly *subject to order which may be passed by the* Board of Governors, the Chairman i.e. the Chief Justice or the Judge-in-Charge, Judicial Education and Training. So unless such orders are passed, he cannot clamour for delegation of the said powers.

51) The Judge-in-Charge also found the petitioner misusing the official vehicle allocated to him as Director, and he also found him to be very arrogant. These would naturally be within the knowledge of the Judge-in-Charge and noticed by him during the petitioner's tenure as Director of the Judicial Academy.

52) The contention of the petitioner that there was no discernable basis for the Reporting Authority to say these things, and no instances have been set out cannot be countenanced because of the limited scope of judicial review which precludes this Court from going into the merits of the material, and only requires this Court to go into the existence of the material, which cannot be doubted.

53) To this extent the Full Court had accepted the view of the learned Judge-in-Charge and maintained the 'adverse remarks' and the '**average**' grading.

54) It cannot be said these 3 items are not valid 'material' for the Judge-in-Charge to record the same as an 'adverse remark' and give him '**average**' grading in the ACR of 2018.

55) Though there is a reference to certain conduct of the petitioner during the Regional Conference of the National Judicial Academy at Agartala in 2019 in regard to hotel booking and purchase of backpack, the said sentence in the noting of the Judge-in-Charge is incomplete, and it does not convey any adverse comment.

56) Anyway since the said Regional Conference of the National Judicial Academy was held in 2019, the reference to the same in the ACR of 2018 was unnecessary. But as pointed out above, nothing adverse is conveyed by the Judge-in-Charge with regard to the said conference vis-à-vis the petitioner.

57) More importantly, the Full Court had looked at the totality of the circumstances and focused only on the portion of the Reporting Authority's view which is required to be taken into account, by eschewing the other portion by not treating it as 'adverse' remark, and it approved the '**average**' grading given to him by the Reporting Authority on the basis of remarks of the Reporting Authority to the extent it had relied on. So the action of the Full Court in that regard does not warrant any interference.

58) Coming to the ACR for the year 2019, the same Reporting Authority had made the notings/grading and remarks in his ACR referred to in

para 6 supra. These were communicated to the petitioner on 20.02.2021, and the petitioner gave a representation on 15.03.2021. In the said representation, he had made some reference to one criminal case in which the father of the learned Judge had been charge-sheeted as an accused on the ground that he was Director of a Company which case he claimed had been tried by him.

59) But the Full Court rejected his representation on 16.04.2021 by modifying partially the remarks of the Judge in the manner set out in para 8 supra while affirming the '**average**' grading.

60) In our considered opinion, if the Judge-in-Charge of Judicial Education and Training had recorded about the manner of writing judgments by the petitioner in the manner indicated above, and the Full Court had also agreed with the same by modifying the language used by the Judge-in-Charge/Reporting Authority, no exception can be taken to it.

61) As regard the petitioner's allegation that he tried a criminal case in which the father of the Judge-in-Charge was an accused, and that this might have affected the Judge-in-Charge is concerned, no material in that regard is filed before this Court about the details of the said case i.e. the period it was pending, the Court where it was pending, who decided it and what was the verdict therein.

62) This allegation levelled by the petitioner against the Judge-in-Charge in that representation is wholly unwarranted and it had not been part of his previous representation dt. 26.02.2020 to the ACR of 2018, the remarks in which were communicated to him on 11.02.2020.

63) Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of ***Union of India and Others v. G.R. Meghwal***⁴. He has also relied upon a decision of this Court rendered in the case of ***Rajib Ray v. State of Tripura and Others***⁵ and also a decision of Delhi High Court in the case of ***Barkha Gupta v. High Court of Delhi through Registrar General and another***⁶.

64) The conclusions in those judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioner turned on the facts peculiar to the parties therein. These decisions do not deviate from the principles laid down in the above decisions cited and relied upon by us highlighting the limited scope for interference.

65) For all the aforesaid reasons, keeping in mind the limited scope of judicial review, we see no reason to grant relief to the petitioner in the writ petition.

66) The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

67) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand dismissed.

(S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)

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⁴ 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1291

⁵ (2025) 1 TLR 681

⁶ 2007 (93) DRJ 586(DB)