

**HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA**

WP(C)(HC) No.01 of 2025

Smt. Pinki Saha Roy, W/O. Sri Raju Barman, Resident of Buddhamandir,
Opposite of Bazar India Shopping Mall, P.O.-Ujan Abhaynagar, P.S.-N.C.C.,
District-West Tripura, Pin-799005.

On behalf of Detenue in Custody:

Sri Raju Barman, S/O. Lt. Madan Barman, Resident of Ushabazar, Chinaihani,
P.S.-Airport, District-West Tripura, Pin-799009.

..... Petitioner(s).

V E R S U S

1. The State of Tripura, Represented by the Secretary, Home Department,
Government of Tripura, Agartala.

2. Secretary, Home Department, Government of Tripura, Agartala.

3. The District Magistrate and Collector, West Tripura, Agartala.

..... Respondent(s).

For Petitioner(s)

: Mr. Samrat Kar Bhowmik , Sr. Advocate,
Mr. Ezekiel L. Darlong, Advocate,
Mr. Sreekanta Bal, Advocate,
Mr. Nirjati Debnath, Advocate.

For Respondent(s)

: Mr. Sankar Lodh, Advocate,
Mr. Subham Majumder, Advocate.

**HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA**

CAV reserved on : 31.07.2025.

Judgment delivered on : 20.08.2025.

Whether fit for reporting : YES.

JUDGMENT & ORDER

(M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)

Heard Mr. Samrat Kar Bhowmik, Senior counsel assisted by Mr.
E.L. Darlong, counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Sankar Lodh, counsel
for the respondents-State.

2. In this Writ petition, the petitioner Smt. Pinki Saha Roy on behalf of detenue Raju Barman challenges;

(i) order of detention dt. 05.09.2024 passed under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (*for short, 'the Act'*) passed by the District Magistrate & Collector, West Tripura, Agartala,

(ii) order dt. 08.10.2024 of the Home Department of the Government of Tripura issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura rejecting the representation of the detenue, and

(iii) order dt. 11.11.2024 of the Home Department of the Government of Tripura issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura confirming the order of detention under Section 12(1) of the Act and directing that said Raju Barman be detained for 12(twelve) months w.e.f. 06.09.2024 under the said law.

3. The Superintendent of Police, West Tripura made a request to the District Magistrate, West Tripura to consider for issuance of a detention order under the Act against the detenue Raju Barman. Along with the report, the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura also placed on record several documents.

The detention order dt.5.9.2024

4. On receipt of the report along with the documents, the District Magistrate, West Tripura got satisfied for issuance of a detention order under Section 3(3) of the Act after opining that the activities of the detenue were of such a nature that an inference could reasonably be drawn that he would be likely to repeat such illegal activities so as to warrant his detention. The said detention order was passed on 05.09.2024 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition).

5. The detention order mentions 7(seven) cases registered against the detainee in various Police Stations and also 8(eight) G.D. entries. They are:

(i) MURDER/CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY: Airport PS case No.37/2024 dt.1.5.2024 u/s.302/120B IPC and Section 27 of Arms Act-The allegation is he conspired and got killed one Durga Prasanna Deb who was shot in full public view in an open market on 30.4.2024 by one of the associates of the detainee and this caused panic among the public.

(ii) VOLUNTARILY CAUSING GRIEVOUS HURT BY DANGEROUS WEAPON OR MEANS/ATTEMPT TO MURDER : West Agartala PS case No.169/2022 u/s.326/307/34 IPC & Section 27 (ii) of the Arms Act- The allegation is that the detainee on 25.10.2022 shot at one Subir Sarkar who was having tiffin at Nutan Nagar in front of Sonar Bangla Dhaba using fire arms and two persons Haripada Das and Sanjay Das suffered bullet injuries and were admitted in a private hospital.

(iii) LURKING HOUSE TRESPASS OR HOUSE BREAKING BY NIGHT IN ORDER TO COMMIT OFFENCE PUNISHABLE WITH IMPRISONMENT/ASSAULT OR CRIMINAL FORCE TO WOMAN WITH INTENT TO OUTRAGE HER MODESTY/ MISCHIEF/ DACOITY ; West Agartala PS Case No.123/2020 dt.10.8.2020 u/s.457/354/427/395/34 IPC – the allegation is that on 9.8.2020, the detainee and associates broke into the house of one Amit Ghosh by breaking down the main gate of his house, and when his mother tried to stop them from entering the property, they tried to outrage her modesty apart from ransacking the household items and started breaking doors and windows to kill Amit Ghosh. It is alleged that they looted Rs.20,000/- and also damaged a motorcycle and a car in the house.

(iv) WRONGFUL RESTRAINT/VOLUNTARILY CAUSING GRIEVOUS HURT BY DANGEROUS WEAPON OR MEANS/ ATTEMPT TO MURDER: AIRPORT PS CASE NO.75/2019 DT.4.9.2019 U/S. 341/326/325/307/427/34 IPC – On 4.9.2019 after midnight, the detainee and associates are alleged to waylaid near a jungle Satyabrata Sarkar and his companions and made a murderous attack with axe, daos, iron road resulting in severing of 3 fingers of the hand of the complainant and also striking him on the back with a dao and fled away.

(v) WRONGFUL RESTRAINT/VOLUNTARILY CAUSING GRIEVOUS HURT/THEFT/CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION: AIRPORT PS CASE NO.29/2019 DT.9.5.2019 U/S.341/325/382/506/34 - The allegation is that on 8.5.2019, the detainee and his associates wrongfully restrained one Sujit Saha and his brother when they were returning from the market, assaulted them and snatched his gold chain and also cash of Rs.20,000/-.

(vi) PUTTING A PERSON IN FEAR OF DEATH OR OF GRIEVOUS HURT IN ORDER TO COMMIT EXTORTION/ CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION/-: AIRPORT PS CASE NO.05/2021 DT.8.1.2021 U/S.387, 506, 34 IPC - The allegation is that the detainee and his associates threatened a contractor who was awarded a tender for the airport terminal building and asked him to withdraw the tender and demanded Rs.15 lakhs and also tried to assault him.

(vii) KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM /CONSPIRACY : AIRPORT PS CASE NO.01/2021 DT.1.1.2021 U/S.364-A & 34.- The allegation is that the detainee and his associates conspired and kidnapped an employee of an Assam based Company which had bid and was successful in a tender, took away his

phone, put him in a private car and later released him after midnight on a road cutting a paddy field.

The 8 GD entries reflect that the detainee and his associates were threatening local people and extorting money.

In the 7 Criminal cases, there was acquittal on compromise in items (v) and (vi). In all other cases charge sheet had been filed. The detainee has secured bail/anticipatory bail in all cases except in item (i), where he is in custody since 10.7.2024.

6. The detention order records that from the said data, it is evident that the detainee was continuously involved in the noxious activities of trying to create reign of terror among the people, being involved in various illegal activities such as murder, dacoity, extortion, kidnapping, possessing and handling of prohibited arms or ammunitions, assaulting and terrorizing, threatening, blackmailing others in order to extort money from the innocent public, businessman, creating obstruction during construction works/projects, creating panic and fear among the public for his personal gain and thus vitiating the public peace, tranquility and security of the State. It was also stated therein that since his activities are prejudicial to public order, it is necessary and expedient to detain him under the Act.

7. The District Magistrate, West Tripura deployed on 06.09.2024, 3(three) Police Officials for supply of the detention order to the detainee along with the enclosures thereto (Annexures-B, C & D to the counter affidavit).

8. It is not in dispute that the State Government, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3(3) of the Act had issued a notification dt. 29.06.2024 conferring powers upon all the District Magistrates within their

jurisdiction to exercise powers for issuance of a detention order under Section 3 of the Act, and in terms of the said notification, the District Magistrate, West Tripura passed the said order of detention. The said order was also communicated to the State Government on 05.09.2024 itself.

The approval of detention order by State Government on 13.9.2024

9. On 13.09.2024 the State Government approved the detention order as per Section 3(4) of the Act (Annexure-E to the counter affidavit).

10. On 18.09.2024 the State Government also communicated/ reported to the Central Government the same under Section 3(5) of the Act (Annexure-F to the counter affidavit).

11. On 20.09.2024, the detinue submitted a representation to the State Government under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

12. On 25.09.2024, the Home Department of the State Government referred the matter also to the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Act which was received by the said Advisory Board on 26.09.2024. The Advisory Board convened a meeting on 04.10.2024.

13. The Advisory Board on that date noted that the detinue had a right to be heard in person by the Board and directed his production before the Board by the Jail Authority on 09.10.2024 at 11 a.m.

14. The Home Department communicated this order to the District Magistrate, West Tripura to take action to comply with the said direction.

15. In the meantime, on 08.10.2024 the State Government rejected the representation of the detinue in terms of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, vide Annexure-7.

16. On 09.10.2024 the detainee made a representation before the Advisory Board (Annexure-5) and was also provided a personal hearing.

17. On 23.10.2024 the Advisory Board opined that there was enough material that the detainee had indulged in criminal activities detrimental to peace, tranquility and public order in the locality, and that he poses a serious threat to the peace and tranquility in the locality if allowed to remain free, and there may be chance of his being released on bail in pending criminal cases also. It also held that the order of preventive detention was not based on surmise or conjecture and that the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was not mechanical and there was sufficient justification for passing the same.

18. This was submitted within 7(seven) weeks from the date of detention, i.e. 06.09.2024 as stipulated under Section 11(1) of the Act.

19. On 11.11.2024 the State Government confirmed the detention order dt. 05.09.2024 under Section 12 (1) of the Act. (Annexure-9, page-348 to 349 of the writ petition).

The Writ Petition

20. Assailing the same, this writ petition was filed.

21. Among the 7(seven) criminal cases referred to in the detention order, admittedly the detainee was acquitted in (a) Airport P.S. case No.29/2019 dt.9.5.2019 under Sections 341,323,506,34 IPC and also in (b) Airport P.S. case No.05 of 2021 dt. 08.01.2021 under Sections 387/506/34 of IPC.

22. But the factum of acquittal in these two cases does not appear to have been noticed by the Detaining Authority and is not referred to in the detention order dt. 05.09.2024 passed by him.

23. Counsel for the petitioner contended that since the Sponsoring Authority i.e., the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Agartala had suppressed before the Detaining Authority i.e., the District Magistrate, West Tripura the factum of acquittal of the detenue in both these cases, the detention order as well as the consequential orders passed by the State Government are all vitiated.

24. Counsel for the State contended that the acquittal in these two criminal cases was on account of compromise/settlement with the complainants/victims and so they have no bearing on the detention order in view of Section 5-A of the Act. The said Section 5A states as under:

"5A. Grounds of detention severable.—Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention whether made before or after the commencement of the National Security (Second Amendment) Act, 1984 under section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly—

(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are—

(i) vague,

(ii) non-existent,

(iii) not relevant,

(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or

(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever,

and it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention;

(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said

section after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds."

25. In the case of **Bimla Dewan Smt. v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi**¹, the Supreme Court held that if in the detention order there are references to criminal cases, but in some of those cases, the detainee was found to be acquitted or discharged, they cannot be legitimately taken into consideration for detaining the detainee under Section 3(2) of the NSA. The Supreme Court held that since the Detaining Authority would naturally have been influenced by the reference to the said criminal cases for coming to the conclusion that the detainee required to be detained under the provisions of the Act, the entire order of detention is unsustainable.

26. The judgment in **Bimla Dewan** (1 supra) though rendered under the National Security Act, 1980, it was rendered at a time when Section 5A was not there in the said statute book as the said provision was introduced by Act 60 of 1984 with retrospective effect from 21.06.1984.

27. In fact, provision akin to Section 5A was already there in the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 i.e. the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 by the date of the judgment in **Bimla Dewan** (1 supra).

The petitioner in **Bimla Dewan** (1 supra) contended that because there was no provision like Section 5A of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 in the National Security Act, 1980 at that point of time, the whole order would get vitiated if one of the grounds is bad and the entire order has to be quashed and this argument was accepted by the Supreme court. It held :

¹ (1982) 2 SCC 469

“ 6. ... Mr Ram Jethmalani, Senior Advocate who appeared for the petitioner in this case submitted that in the National Security Act there is no provision like Section 5-A in COFEPOSA (Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act) and, therefore, if one of the grounds is bad the order of detention has to be quashed in its entirety and that as the detaining authority has based the order of detention of Grounds 1 to 24 and 28 also, the order of detention is unsustainable. The learned counsel for the respondent did not submit anything to controvert that submission of Mr Ram Jethmalani. We are of the opinion that since the detaining authority would naturally have been influenced by these grounds as well for coming to the conclusion that the detenu requires to be detained under the provisions of the Act, the entire order of detention is unsustainable.” (emphasis supplied)

28. Thus it appears that absence of provision like Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act in the National Security Act, 1980 at the time the judgment was rendered, made the Supreme court to take the view that the entire detention order is vitiated if any of the grounds of the detention is not valid.

29. But the instant case has arisen long after introduction of Section 5-A in the National Security Act, 1980 by Act 60 of 1984 w.e.f 21.6.1984. This is in *pari materia* with the Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act. Section 5A of the National Security Act, 1980 specifically provides that an order of detention will not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds are invalid for any other reason whatsoever [Clause (v) of Section 5A].

30. The General Diary entries (mentioned in the detention order) record all important transactions/events taking place in a Police Station and

there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the entries as there is no presumption that the General Diary entries have no value.

31. In our opinion, each of the 7 Crimes mentioned in the detention order and the 8 GD entries will constitute independent grounds since the nature of the offences alleged are several i.e., murder/ extortion/ kidnapping/ attempt to cause grievous hurt/criminal intimidation/wrongful restraint/ outraging modesty of woman. Each of them constitute individual grounds for detention. Almost all of them took place in public spaces causing terror to the general public.

32. Assuming for the sake of argument without conceding that the detention order was invalid for non consideration of acquittal in the two Criminal cases, they are severable, and the entire order of detention cannot get vitiated because the other 5 FIRs and the 8 GD entries are adequate to base the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. So the judgment in ***Bimla Dewan*** (1 supra) cannot be relied upon by the petitioner.

33. Similar view was taken in ***State of U.P. v. Sanjai Pratap Gupta***², the Supreme Court held:

"16. A bare perusal of the quoted portion from the grounds of detention makes it clear that two aspects i.e. one relating to criminal background of antecedents and other relating to a particular incident were treated separately. This becomes apparently clear because the detaining authority in the backdrop of the criminal antecedents referred to the particular act. Therefore, one was the general background, and the other was the particular incident. They are clearly separable.

² (2004) 8 SCC 591 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 366, at page 598 :

17. Section 5-A of the Act was introduced to take care of the situations when one or more of the grounds can be separated from the other grounds for justifying detention.

18. In **Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas**³ it was observed that where the detention order is based on more than one ground, by a legal fiction it would be deemed that there are as many orders of detention as there are grounds which means that each of such orders is an independent one. In that case the Constitution Bench was considering scope of Section 5-A of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (in short “the COFEPOSA Act”) which is in pari materia with Section 5-A of the Act. In view of the factual position analysed, the inevitable conclusion is that Section 5-A is applicable to the case and the High Court was not justified in holding to the contrary. The High Court’s judgment is therefore clearly indefensible.”(emphasis supplied)

34. Moreover, the Supreme court had held that even after the detainee is acquitted in a criminal Case, a detention order can still be passed. (see **Haradhan saha v. The State Of West Bengal**⁴)

35. In the case of **Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others**⁵ the Supreme Court held that the power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. It is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. *It may also be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal.*

³ (1994) 5 SCC 54

⁴ (1975) 3 SCC 198

⁵ (2023) 14 SCC 641 at para 17

36. Therefore, merely because the detainee has secured acquittal in two criminal cases, it cannot be said that the order of preventive detention is vitiated.

37. Though counsel for petitioner had relied on the decisions in **Ramesh v. State of Gujarat and others**⁶ and **Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal v. Police commissioner and another**⁷ which have taken a contrary view, the said cases arose under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 but the acquittal of the detainee in those cases is not on compromise, as in the instant case. So the said judgments cannot come to the assistance of the petitioner.

38. In fact the said judgments do not appear to have been followed after 1989 by the Supreme Court.

39. We further agree with the contention of counsel for respondents that the non-consideration of orders of acquittal in two of the 7 cases has no bearing on the detention order as the orders of acquittal were passed on compromise. It is possible that such compromise happened due to fear of harm felt by the complainant from the detainee's associates.

40. The crimes registered against the petitioner range from May, 2019 to May, 2024. In the cases pertaining to the years 2019, 2020, 2022 and 2024 admittedly, charge-sheets have been filed and the matter is pending trial, though he had secured anticipatory bail in one of the cases (Airport P.S. case No.29 of 2019) and he was granted regular bail in the other cases. It is not in dispute that in the criminal case lodged against him in the year 2024 (item no.

⁶ (1989) 4 SCC 124

⁷ (1989) 2 SCC 370

(i) , his application for bail was rejected by the Sessions Court and he is in judicial custody.

41. There is no reference in the detention order passed in the instant case to the orders in the bail/anticipatory bail secured by the detainee. But the factum of grant of bail to him is mentioned in regard to all cases [except item (i) (where bail was refused) and item (iv) (where it was granted)] in the supporting documents relied on by the detaining authority. So it cannot be said that the detaining authority was not aware of the factum of bail being granted to the detainee.

42. It was contended by the counsel for the petitioner that mere reference to the grant of bail in the documents supplied by the Sponsoring Authority to the Detaining Authority without placing on record the bail orders vitiates the said orders as the subjective satisfaction cannot be said to be there of the Detaining Authority.

43. Strong reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of ***M. Ahamed Kutty v. Union of India and another***⁸.

In that case, it was held that bail application and bail order were vital materials for consideration and if those were not considered, the satisfaction of the detaining Authority itself would have been impaired, and if those had been considered, they would be documents relied on by the detaining Authority though not specifically mentioned in the annexure to the order of detention and those ought to have formed part of the documents supplied to the detainee with the grounds of detention, and without them, the

⁸ (1990) 2 SCC 1

grounds themselves could not be said to have been complete. In that case, Supreme Court set aside the detention order on the said ground.

44. But in several later cases, the Supreme court held that application for bail or order in the bail application need not invariably and mandatorily be placed before the detaining authority and copies thereof supplied to the detainee. (see *Sunlia Jain v. Union of India*⁹, *K. Varadharaj vrs. State of Tamilnadu and another*¹⁰ and *Vinod K.Chawla v. Union of India*¹¹).

In *K. Varadharaj* (10 supra), the Supreme Court held that it cannot read into the observations in *M. Ahmed Kutty* (8 supra) that in every case where there is an application for bail and an order made thereon, the detaining authority must as a rule be made aware of the said application and order made thereon. It held that the judgment in *M. Ahamed Kutty* (8 supra) does not lay down a mandatory principle of law that in every case the application for bail and the order made thereon should be placed before the Court. It held that such a requirement would depend upon the facts of each case and on the contents of those documents and if the documents do contain some material which on facts of that case would have some bearing on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, then like any other vital material, even this document may have to be placed before the detaining authority.

45. Even in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of *Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India and others*¹² relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, the judgment of *Ahamed Kutty* (8 supra) was referred to. But

⁹ (2006) 3 SCC 321

¹⁰ (2002) 6 SCC 735

¹¹ (2006) 7 SCC 337

¹² (2024) 9 SCC 53

at paragraph-31 thereof, it was held that a copy of every document mentioned in the order is not required to be supplied to the detainee and copies of only such of those documents as have been relied on by the detaining authority for reaching the satisfaction that preventive detention of the detainee is necessary are required to be supplied to him. It thus reiterated that only copies which form the ground for detention are to be supplied and non-supply thereof would prejudice the detainee and the documents which are merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot be termed to be documents without the supply of which the detainee is prejudiced.

46. In any event, the detainee was in custody in one of the criminal cases (item (i)) at the time the detention order was passed. So he cannot complain that the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction was vitiated on the ground of lack of knowledge of contents of the bail/Anticipatory bail orders.

47. In fact the fact that the detainee is in custody is not also a bar for passing of a detention order (See **Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra**¹³). The detaining authority obviously felt that that at some point of time the detainee was likely to be released on bail in item (i) murder case also and keeping in mind his alleged activities was justified in passing the order of detention notwithstanding that he was in custody at that time.

48. The other plea of the counsel for the petitioner is that the detaining authority is a Non-Bengali and since the material placed before him by the Sponsoring Authority contains some documents in Bengali, it is difficult to believe that the detaining authority had understood the purport thereof.

¹³ AIR 1986 SC 2177 PARA 28, PG.2186

This contention also cannot be accepted because in the counter affidavit filed by the detaining authority, it is specifically contended that after he (the District Magistrate) joined service as an IAS Officer, he cleared the departmental examination in which Bengali language paper was also there and he can read and talk in Bengali. It is common knowledge that this is the practice in the Indian Civil Service. Even otherwise, Indians are learning not only the local languages but also languages prevalent in other States where they are employed and even Foreign languages sometimes. We, therefore, find no merit in this submission because it cannot be said that a person who is not a native of the State/Country cannot speak the language spoken by people of the said State/Country. In fact though English is not the native language of Indians many people speak, read and write in English.

49. Next it is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the educational qualification of the detinue was only up to Madhyamik and no officer in jail had explained to him the contents of the detention order or the annexures.

The contents of the representation dt. 20.09.2024 given to the Government under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India as well as the representation dt. 09.10.2024 given to the NSA Advisory Board indicate that the detinue is well versed in English language and some aspects of law as well, as can be seen from paragraph-6 of the latter representation. Admittedly, the detinue is based in Agartala and cannot claim ignorance of the local language Bengali. It is therefore difficult to believe that he did not understand the contents of the documents given to him by the detaining authority.

50. It is also contended by counsel for petitioner that some of the cases in which the detainee was an accused were old cases of 2019 and there is no live connection with the present order of detention.

As pointed out by the Counsel for the respondents, the detainee got Anticipatory bail in item (v) on 15.5.2019, and within 4 months was involved allegedly in item (iv) Crime on 4.9.2019.

Within one year from that date, on 10.8.2020, he allegedly got involved in item (iii) Crime. He was arrested in connection with item (iii) on 20.10.2020 and was released on bail on 20.10.2020.

Within 3 months, on 1.1.2021, he got allegedly involved in item (viii) crime and on 8.1.2021 in item (vi) Crime.

On 25.10.2022, hardly a year later, he was involved in item (ii) Crime in which he got Anticipatory Bail on 17.2.2024.

Again on 1.5.2024, he got allegedly involved in item (i), a serious crime of murder.

The offences in respect of which the detainee is accused and those mentioned in the G.D. Entries are interlinked with his alleged unsocial and criminal behavior in mostly public places, they are continuous and are of a nature (punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property in the Indian Penal Code, 1860) jeopardizing the peace and tranquility in the State and causing terror to the general public, and the interval between the events is not too long. So we find no merit in this plea of counsel for petitioner.

51. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is not vitiated on any grounds and that there are no merits in the Writ Petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

(S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)

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