

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR

AT IMPHAL

WP(C) No. 258 of 2025

Heikrujam Debeswar Singh, aged about 51 years old, S/o (L) H. Ibohal Singh, a permanent residence of Porompat Thawanthaba Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Porompat, Imphal East District, Manipur – 795005.

... Petitioner

-Versus-

- 1.** The State of Manipur through the Principal Secretary/ Commissioner/ Secretary (Power), Government of Manipur, Manipur Secretariat, Babupara, Imphal West – 795001.
- 2.** The Manipur State Power Company Limited through its Managing Director, Keishampat Junction, Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipur – 795001.

... Respondents

- 3.** Shri Gurumayum Tapankumar Sharma, Deputy General Manager (Elect.), MSPCL, c/o MD, MSPCL, Keishampat Junction, Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipu – 795001.
- 4.** Khumukcham David Kumar Singh, DGM (Elect.), (TD-1),

... Private Respondent

B E F O R E

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH

For the petitioner	::	Mr. H.S. Paonam, Senior Advocate; Mr. Sushruta, Advocate
For the respondents	::	Mr. S. Nepolean, GA; Mrs. R.K. Emily, Deputy GA; Mr. N. Ibotombi, Senior Advocate & Mr. Ningtamba, Advocate
Date of hearing	::	28-04-2025
Date of judgment & order	::	16-05-2025

JUDGMENT & ORDER

[1] Heard Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Sushruta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Mr. S. Nepolean, learned GA assisted by Mrs. R.K. Emily, learned Deputy GA appearing for the respondents No. 1 and 2 and Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Ningtamba, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3. None appeared for the respondent No. 4, despite service of notice.

The present writ petition has been filed with the prayer for quashing and setting aside the impugned transfer order dated 27-03-2025 in respect of the petitioner and the private respondent No. 3 only.

[2] Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner raised the following grounds in assailing the impugned transfer order:-

- (i) The impugned transfer order had been issued by the authorities arbitrarily and with malafide intention to oust the petitioner from his present place of posting in order to bring another person of their choice; and
- (ii) The impugned transfer order had been issued in violation of the transfer policy of the State Government as notified on 12-05-2022 and as such, the impugned transfer order is a nullity in the eyes of law.

[3] Elaborating the first ground, it has been submitted by the learned senior counsel that the petitioner has been sincerely discharging his duties and sincerely looking after 10 (ten) projects under his present place of posting. However, a junior who is under probation had been transferred and posted in his place and that transferring out an experienced officer and bringing in an inexperienced officer, who is under probation and that too on the verge of completion of the ten projects executed by the petitioner lacks rationality and that the same had not been issued in public interest but with an ulterior motive.

3.1 It has been submitted that from the chain of events as narrated in the writ petition regarding the hostile attitude shown by the respondent No. 2, viz., MD, MSPCL towards the petitioner for his acts and omissions, such as –

- (a) The petitioner's alleged involvement in litigation against the respondent No. 2;
- (b) Writing a letter dated 04-03-2025 requesting the Commissioner (Power), Government of Manipur, pointing out the deficiency and non-inclusion of three sub-stations under the SSD-II in the report submitted by the respondent No. 2;
- (c) Declining to accede to the request made by the respondent No. 2 to the petitioner to put up liability for an amount of about Rupees 2 crore under the SASCI;

- (d) Request made by the petitioner for engagement of manpower on daily wages basis to fill up the shortage of manpower;
- (e) Request made by the petitioner with regard to the non-release of reimbursement fund and for raising objection with regard to the transferring out staff serving under the petitioner, etc.,

has clearly revealed the arbitrariness and malafide intention on the part of the authorities in issuing the impugned transfer order and that the same had been issued with an ulterior motive to victimize the petitioner and to bring in a person of their choice in place of the petitioner.

[4] With regard to the other ground raised by the learned senior counsel, it has been submitted that under the policy for transfer and posting of the Government employees of the State of Manipur as notified on 12-05-2022, it has been, inter alia, provided that –

"III General Conditions:

"(ii) No transfer may be effected unless the concerned employee has completed 1 (one) year and 6 (six) months in a post, unless there are compelling reasons/ circumstances to do so."

(viii) Transfers shall normally be effected in the month of April/ May after the financial year is over so that disruption of work is minimal"

(xi) All transfer orders will indicate the first-mover and charge shall be handed over by the relieved officer to the relieving officer after briefing him/ her of the priority/ sensitive issues connected with the post."

[4.1] According to the petitioner, the private respondent No. 3 was promoted to the post of Deputy General Manager (Elect.) in the MSPCL along with two other Manager (Elect.) by an order dated 30-10-2024 and

was allowed to continue in their place of posting. It has been contended that the private respondent No. 3 was transferred out by the impugned order from his earlier place of posting before completion of five months and as such, transferring out an Officer under probation and before completion of five months from the date of promotion is violative of the transfer policy dated 12-05-2022 as contained in Clause-III (i) and (ii) of the said transfer policy. Accordingly, such impugned transfer is liable to be interfered with by this court.

[4.2] The learned senior counsel submitted that there is no cogent reason for effecting transfer and posting of the petitioner just when the financial year is coming to an end, therefore, the impugned order dated 27-03-2025 having been issued without spelling the compelling reason for issuance of the said impugned transfer and posting order will be a nullity in the eyes of law as the same having been issued in contravention of the transfer policy dated 12-05-2022 contained in Clause-III (viii). Accordingly, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside.

[4.3] Lastly, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that in the impugned transfer and posting order dated 27-03-2025, nothing has been mentioned or indicated as to who will be the first mover and as such, the petitioner is yet to hand over the charge formally and the petitioner has not been released from his place of posting. According to the learned senior counsel, such omission on the part of the authorities

while issuing the impugned transfer and posting order is violative of the transfer policy as contained in Clause-III (xi) of the said transfer policy and on this ground also, the impugned transfer order is liable to be quashed and set aside.

[5] In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel relied on the following case laws:-

(a) **"Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) & ors. Vs. State of Bihar & ors."** reported in **1991 Supp (2) SCC 659**. wherein it has been held at para. 4 as under –

"4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department. If the courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer orders issued by the government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court overlooked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders."

(b) **"Union of India & ors. Vs. S.L. Abbas"** reported in **(1993) 4 SCC 357** wherein it has been held at para. 7 as under

"7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said

guideline however does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right."

(c) "State of UP & ors. Vs. Gobardhan Lal" reported in (2004) 11

SCC 402 wherein it has been held at para. 7 as under –

"7. It is too late in the day for any government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision."

(d) "Somesh Tiwari Vs. Union of India & ors." reported in (2009) 2

SCC 592 wherein it has been held at para. 16 as under –

"16. Indisputably an order of transfer is an administrative order. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that transfer, which is ordinarily an incident of service should not be interfered with, save in cases where inter alia mala fide on the part of the authority is proved. Mala fide is of two kinds—one malice in fact and the second malice in law. The order in question would attract the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made against the appellant in the anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that the employer is entitled to pass an order of transfer in administrative exigencies but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment."

When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.”

[6] Mr. S. Nepolean, learned GA appearing for the official respondents submitted that the petitioner has been posted as Deputy General Manager, Sub-Station, Division No. II, MSPCL by an order dated 20-07-2022 till the issuance of the impugned transfer order dated 27-03-2025 and as such, the petitioner had already completed more than two and half years at the said place of posting. Accordingly, the authorities have not violated any transfer policy in effecting the new transfer and posting of the petitioner in the impugned order. The learned GA further submitted that the respondent No. 3 was promoted from Manager (Elect.) to Deputy General Manager (Elect.) by an order dated 30-10-2024 along with two other officers and that the impugned transfer order dated 27-03-2025 is the transfer and posting of the said respondent No. 3 after his promotion as Deputy General Manager (Elect.) and as such, there is no merit or basis in the contention made on behalf of the petitioner that by effecting the transfer and posting of the private respondent No. 3, the authorities have violated the transfer policy of the State Government. The learned GA further submitted that the petitioner is not the competent authority to state that the private respondent No. 3 lacks experience and competency and that the petitioner is more competent and efficient than the private respondent No. 3. Accordingly, it has been submitted that such allegations and

contentions made by the petitioner in challenging the impugned transfer order is without any merit or substance and the same are liable to be rejected as devoid of merit.

[7] Mr. S. Nepolean, learned GA submitted that the petitioner has not been given any DDO power in his earlier place of posting and the nature of his work is not at all related with the end of financial year and there is no disruption of work relating to the end of financial year. Accordingly, the impugned transfer order cannot be considered to have been issued in violation of the transfer policy of the State Government.

Mr. S. Nepolean, learned GA submitted that as per the MSPCL Office Order No. 171 dated 18-12-2023, every transfer and posting issued by the competent authority i.e., Managing Director, MSPCL as per power conferred under Part-III Clause 6(b) of the delegation of power of MSPCL, should be treated as both transfer and release order. The learned GA also submitted that till date, the petitioner and private respondent have not yet perform handing over and taking over of charges and the same can be effected after the authorities issued necessary orders in this regard and as such, the allegations raised by the petitioner that the impugned transfer order had been issued in violation of the transfer policy as contained in Clause-III(xi) is without any substance or merit and accordingly, liable to be rejected.

[8] With regard to the petitioner's allegations of mala fide and ulterior motive on the part of the authorities in issuing the impugned transfer and posting order, the learned GA submitted that the so called elaboration and contentions made on behalf of the petitioner in support of such ground are nothing but mere allegations and imaginary story concocted by the petitioner with the intent of showing that the transfer order was issued with mala fide intention and ulterior motive and to victimize the petitioner, in order to obtain sympathy and favourable order from this court. According to the learned GA, such allegations and contentions made on behalf of the petitioner are all bereft of truth and without any substance. The learned GA further submitted that all such allegations have been specifically and elaborately refuted by the official respondents in their counter affidavit and that such unfounded and baseless allegations cannot be a ground for interfering with the impugned transfer order.

[9] The learned GA submitted that the impugned transfer and posting order dated 27-03-2025 is a general transfer order issued in public interest and that no Government employee, who is holding a transferable post, can insist on being posted at a particular place of his choice. It has also been submitted that who should be transferred and where is a matter for the competent authority to decide and that transfer and posting is not only an incident of service but also a condition of

service and one cannot make a grievance against such decision of the competent authority if the same has been done in public interest. The learned GA submitted that there is no illegality or irregularity in the impugned transfer order and as such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the present writ petition as being devoid of merit.

In support of his contentions, the learned GA cited the following case laws:-

- (a) **“National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shri Bhagwan & anr.”** reported in **(2001) 8 SCC 574** wherein it has been held at para. 5 as under –

“5. On a careful consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel on either side and the relevant Rules to which our attention has been invited to, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the impugned orders of transfer. It is by now well settled and often reiterated by this Court that no government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. On the facts and circumstances of the cases before us, we are also unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that Rule 4.1.1 of the Seniority Rules interdicts any transfer of the employees from one office or project or unit to any one of the other as long as the seniority of such an employee is protected based on the length of service with reference to the date of promotion or appointment to the grade concerned irrespective of the date of transfer. We also consider it to be a mere submission in vain, the one urged on the basis of alleged adverse consequences detrimental to their seniority resulting from such

transfer. In the facts of the present cases, at any rate, no such result is bound to occur since the Project undertaken to which the respondents have been transferred is itself a new one and, therefore, we see no rhyme or reason in the alleged grievance.

(b) **“Union of India & ors. Vs. Janardhan Debanath & anr.”**

reported in **(2004) 4 SCC 245** wherein it has been held at paras.

12 and 14 as under –

“12. That brings us to the other question as to whether the use of the expression “undesirable” warranted an enquiry before the transfer. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondents on a decision of this Court in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India (AIR p. 456, para 21) to contend that whenever there is a use of the word “undesirable” it casts a stigma and it cannot be done without holding a regular enquiry. The submission is clearly without substance. The said case relates to use of the expression “undesirable” in an order affecting the continuance in service by way of discharge. The decision has therefore no application to the facts of the present case. The manner, nature and extent of exercise to be undertaken by courts/tribunals in a case to adjudge whether it casts a stigma or constitutes one by way of punishment would also very much depend upon the consequences flowing from the order and as to whether it adversely affected any service conditions — status, service prospects financially — and the same yardstick, norms or standards cannot be applied to all categories of cases. Transfers unless they involve any such adverse impact or visit the persons concerned with any penal consequences, are not required to be subjected to same type of scrutiny, approach and assessment as in the case of dismissal, discharge, reversion or termination and utmost latitude should be left with the department concerned to enforce discipline, decency and decorum in public service which are indisputably essential to maintain quality of public service and meet untoward administrative exigencies to ensure smooth functioning of the administration.”

“14. The allegations made against the respondents are of serious nature, and the conduct attributed is certainly unbecoming. Whether there was any misbehaviour is a question which can be gone into in a departmental proceeding. For the purposes of effecting a transfer, the question of holding an enquiry to find out whether there was misbehaviour or conduct unbecoming of an employee is unnecessary and what is needed is the prima facie satisfaction of the authority concerned on the contemporary reports about the occurrence complained of and if the requirement, as submitted by learned counsel for the respondents, of holding an elaborate enquiry is to be insisted upon the very purpose of transferring an employee in public interest or exigencies of administration to enforce decorum and

ensure probity would get frustrated. The question whether the respondents could be transferred to a different division is a matter for the employer to consider depending upon the administrative necessities and the extent of solution for the problems faced by the administration. It is not for this Court to direct one way or the other. The judgment of the High Court is clearly indefensible and is set aside. The writ petitions filed before the High Court deserve to be dismissed which we direct. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs."

- (c) **"Paresh Choudhury Vs. State of Assam & ors."** reported in 2004 (3) GLT 295 wherein it has been held at para. 15 as under

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"15. The ground of attack that the progress of the work pertaining to various scheme would be hampered automatically falls through. The petitioner may feel his service indispensable at a particular place of posting. But it is the Government which is to decide as to who should be posted where. The kind of dissatisfaction expressed in the functioning of the petitioner coupled with the stand of the respondents in their affidavit that the petitioner did not show any interest towards implementation of the scheme in the division perfectly justified the action of the respondents in transferring the petitioner."

- (d) **"S.C. Saxena Vs. Union of India & ors."** reported in (2006) 9 SCC 583 wherein it has been held at para. 6 as under —

"6. We have perused the record with the help of the learned counsel and heard the learned counsel very patiently. We find that no case for our interference whatsoever has been made out. In the first place, a government servant cannot disobey a transfer order by not reporting at the place of posting and then go to a court to ventilate his grievances. It is his duty to first report for work where he is transferred and make a representation as to what may be his personal problems. This tendency of not reporting at the place of posting and indulging in litigation needs to be curbed. Apart therefrom, if the appellant really had some genuine difficulty in reporting for work at Tezpur, he could have reported for duty at Amritsar where he was so posted. We too decline to believe the story of his remaining sick. Assuming there was some sickness, we are not satisfied that it prevented him from joining duty either at Tezpur or at Amritsar. The medical certificate issued by Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital proves this point. In the circumstances, we too are of the opinion that the appellant was guilty of the misconduct of unauthorisedly remaining absent from duty."

(e) “Registrar General, High Court of Judicature of Madras”

reported in **(2011) 12 SCC 137** wherein it has been held at paras. 22 to 24 as under –

“22. In the context of transfer of a government servant we may refer to the dicta of this Court in N.K. Singh v. Union of India where this Court observed in AIR para 22 as follows: (SCC p. 108, para 23)

“23. ... Transfer of a government servant in a transferable service is a necessary incident of the service career. Assessment of the quality of men is to be made by the superiors taking into account several factors including suitability of the person for a particular post and exigencies of administration. Several imponderables requiring formation of a subjective opinion in that sphere may be involved, at times. The only realistic approach is to leave it to the wisdom of the hierarchical superiors to make the decision. Unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm of principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinised judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinising all transfers and the courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel management of all government departments. This must be left, in public interest, to the departmental heads subject to the limited judicial scrutiny indicated.”

“23. In State of M.P. v. S.S. Kourav the Administrative Tribunal had interfered with the transfer order of the respondent and directed him to be posted at a particular place. It is relevant to note that while setting aside the order of the Tribunal this Court observed in para 4 of its judgment as follows: (SCC p. 272)

“4. ... The courts or tribunals are not appellate forums to decide on transfers of officers on administrative grounds. The wheels of administration should be allowed to run smoothly and the courts or tribunals are not expected to interdict the working of the administrative system by transferring the officers to proper places. It is for the administration to take appropriate decision and such decisions shall stand unless they are vitiated either by mala fides or by extraneous consideration without any factual background or foundation. In this case we have seen that on the administrative grounds the transfer orders came to be issued. Therefore, we cannot go into the expediency of posting an officer at a particular place.”

“24. We may mention that this Court has reiterated the legal position recently in Airports Authority of India v. Rajeev Ratan Pandey that: (SCC p. 339, para 10)

“10. ... In a matter of transfer of a government employee, [the] scope of judicial review is limited and the High Court would not interfere with an order of transfer lightly, be it at interim stage or final hearing. This is so because the courts do not substitute their own decision in the matter of transfer.”

[10] Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel appearing for the private respondent No. 3 submitted that as the father of the respondent No. 3 is about 73 years old and suffering from serious ailment with his health condition deteriorating day by day, the respondent No. 3 is taking care of his ailing father and that as the writ petition is handling ten projects under the SSD-II, out of which five projects are to be commissioned within three to four months, the respondent No. 3 submitted an application dated 03-04-2025 to the Commissioner (Power), Government of Manipur, stating, inter alia, that the respondent No. 3 do not want to get involved in the present writ petition as it gives him extra and huge mental stress and also requesting to arrange his new place of posting as DGM, Transmission Division No. 1 (TD-1) instead of DGM, SSD-II and that the said application is still pending for consideration by the authorities.

[11] I have heard at length the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also carefully perused the materials available on record. I have also perused the judgments cited by the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

With regard to the allegations of mala fide raised on behalf of the petitioner, it is to be noted that all such allegations have been specifically and elaborately refuted by the authorities in their counter affidavit and as such, this court cannot accept such allegations and contentions raised by the petitioner as the absolute truth, since it involves disputed question of facts. Even if the allegations and contentions raised by the petitioner in support of the ground of mala fide are taken to be true, such allegations and the contentions cannot be construed to establish the allegations of mala fide on the part of the authorities in effecting the impugned transfer order of the petitioner specifically when such actions of the authorities does not result in any civil consequences upon the petitioner in any manner or affect any of his rights established by law. Looking from this point, this court cannot come to the conclusion that the petitioner has been victimized by the authorities by effecting the transfer and posting order of the petitioner. Accordingly, this court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned transfer order on ground of mala fide.

[12] It has been specifically stated by the authorities that the petitioner was posted at his present place of posting by an order dated 20-07-2022 and he continued to serve in the said post till the issuance of the impugned transfer order dated 27-03-2025 and as

such, the petitioner had already completed more than two and half years at his present place of posting. It has been clearly stated by the authorities that the respondent No. 3 was promoted from Manager (Elect.) to Deputy General Manager (Elect.) by an order dated 30-10-2024 and that after such promotion, the impugned transfer and posting order is the first transfer order in respect of the respondent No. 3. Accordingly, this court is of the considered view that the allegations raised by the petitioner that the impugned transfer order had been issued in violation of the transfer policy of the State Government is without any substance and devoid of merit.

The authorities have also specifically stated that the petitioner has not been given any DDO power in his earlier place of posting and that the nature of his work is not at all related with any financial transaction relating to the end of the financial year and such transfer does not cause any disruption of the work relating to the end of the financial year. It has also been specifically stated by the authorities that the handing over and taking over of the petitioner and the private respondent No. 3 can be done after the authorities issued any order in this regard and as such, the petitioner cannot find any merit in the contentions made on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned transfer order has been effected in violation of the transfer

policy of the State Government. Accordingly, this court declined to interfere with the impugned transfer order on this ground also.

[13] It is well settled principle of law that a Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at the place of his choice and he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other in public interest or for an administrative reason. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide and court should not interfere with the transfer order unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rules or on the ground of mala fide.

In the present case, as discussed above, this court did not find any ground or reason for interfering with the impugned transfer order on the basis of the grounds raised on behalf of the petitioner and as such, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition.

[14] I have also perused the case laws cited on behalf of the petitioner and this court is of the considered view that the ratio laid down therein is of no help to the petitioner, rather the same are all against the petitioner.

So far as the contentions made on behalf of the respondent No. 3 is concerned, this court is of the considered view that it is for the authorities to decide on the grievances raised by the

respondent No. 3, especially as the respondent No. 3 has already approached the authorities by filing a representation.

In the result, the writ petition is hereby dismissed is being devoid of merit, however, without any order as to cost. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated.

JUDGE

FR / NFR

Devananda