

* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Judgment reserved on: 01.05.2013

% **Judgment delivered on: 28.05.2013**

+ **W.P.(C) 2739/2004**

RAJBIR SINGH Petitioner
Through: Ms. Vaishalee Mehra, Advocate.
versus

D.T.C. Respondent
Through: Ms. Saroj Bidawat, Advocate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI

J U D G M E N T

VIPIN SANGHI, J.

1. The petitioner workman has preferred the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to assail the order dated 17.10.2001, as well as the award dated 05.09.2003 passed by the Labour Court-VII in I.D. No.956/96. By the first order dated 17.10.2001, the Labour Court decided the preliminary issue with regard to the legality and validity of the domestic inquiry conducted by the respondent, in favour of the respondent, and by the subsequent award dated 05.09.2003 the reference made by the Appropriate Government on 15.11.1996 with regard to the removal of the petitioner from service was answered in favour of the respondent by holding that the punishment of removal from service was not disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the petitioner.

A charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner by the respondent management on 28.05.1992. The charge against the petitioner was that on 15.05.1992, while he was working as Conductor in Bus No.9651, the said bus was checked at 15:47 hours by the checking officials at Guru Tegh Bahadur Nagar. According to them, it was found that the petitioner had issued an already sold ticket to one passenger, who was travelling from Azadpur to Camp. The statement of the passenger was recorded. The passenger stated that he had boarded the said bus from Azadpur for going to Camp. He had paid Re.1 to the Conductor and the petitioner had issued one ticket to him. He doubted that he had been issued an already sold ticket. When the bus reached Camp, the checking officials checked the bus. On such checking, it was found that the petitioner Conductor had issued an already sold ticket to him. The case of the respondent was that the checking officials prepared the challan (Exhibit MW-1/1). The statement of the passenger was recorded (Exhibit MW-1/2), which bears his signatures and complete address. The charge sheet put the petitioner to notice that, while passing the final order in the matter, his past record shall be kept in view.

2. A departmental inquiry followed since the petitioner denied the charges against him. The Inquiry Officer made his report, finding the petitioner guilty of all the charges leveled against him. The inquiry proceedings recorded that letters were sent to the passenger on three occasions on 17.07.1992, 24.07.1992 & 31.07.1992, but the passenger did not appear before the Inquiry Officer. The petitioner was granted opportunity to bring his own witnesses in defence. The petitioner, however, did not produce any witness apart from himself. He gave his final statement

on 07.08.1992. In response to the show-cause notice proposing to remove him from service, the petitioner sent a communication on 20.08.1992 seeking certain information from the respondent. On the basis of the inquiry report, the respondent passed the order of removal of the petitioner from service.

3. The Labour Court by the impugned order dated 17.10.2001 held that the inquiry had been properly conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The submission of the petitioner - that the passenger had not been produced in the inquiry proceedings, was rejected, since three attempts appear to have been made to summon the passenger, and it was not necessary to produce the passenger in these circumstances - as held by the Supreme Court in *State of Haryana & Another Vs. Rattan Singh*, (1982) 1 LLJ 46.

4. The Labour Court -on a perusal of the inquiry proceedings, and on the application of the judgment in *Rattan Singh* (supra) concluded that a fair & proper inquiry had been held against the petitioner by granting him fair opportunity. It could not be said that there was no evidence produced in the enquiry, on the basis of which the findings of guilt were returned. The Labour Court held that the inquiry report reflects application of mind by the Inquiry Officer to the pleadings and evidence produced before him. The same revealed that the report of the Inquiry Officer duly considered and scrutinized the statements of the witnesses and his conclusions were based on cogent evidence on record.

5. The final award, in view of the proven misconduct of the petitioner, came to be passed since the said misconduct tantamounted to misappropriation of the management's funds on his part.

6. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that there are serious infirmities in the respondent's case. Firstly, she submits that on the basis of the evidence brought on record, under no circumstance, the petitioner could have been held to be guilty of the alleged misconduct. She submits that there was no legal evidence and the petitioner has been condemned without any evidence worth the name. She submits that the Way-Bill of the petitioner was duly signed by the raiding team and returned to the petitioner. That would not have been the case, had the petitioner been found guilty of misconduct alleged against him. She further submits that the alleged statement of the so-called passenger was not recorded in the presence of the petitioner. This is evident from the so-called statement of the passenger, who himself states that his statement was recorded after he had deboarded the bus, and after the bus had left. She submits that the petitioners signatures were not taken on the used ticket allegedly issued by the petitioner to the said passenger Sh. Raju S/o Sh. Sewa Ram. She further submits that the petitioner was not challaned on the spot by the raiding party. The complaint book was not closed. No independent witness or evidence was produced in the inquiry. Though it was alleged against the petitioner that he took away the bus while the checking staff was still looking into the matter, no action was initiated against the Driver, who was driving the bus and allegedly drove away the bus.

7. She submits that though the Inquiry Officer records that on three occasions notices were issued to the said passenger, there was nothing on record to show as to how the said notices had been issued. She submits that the petitioner had specifically sought several informations from the respondent in his communication dated 20.08.1992 (sent in response to the show-cause notice dated 17.08.1992, whereby it was proposed to impose the punishment of removal from service upon the petitioner), including whether the alleged passenger was at all summoned by the Inquiry Officer. No response was received by the petitioner to the said communication.

8. She places reliance on the statement of MW-1 Sh. B. Das, who admitted that the Inquiry Officer had not supplied the list of documents to the petitioner workman. She submits that this amounted to gross violation of the principles of natural justice. In this regard, she placed reliance on the decision of this Court in ***Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Shri Pratap Singh***, 2007 V AD (DELHI) 424. She submits that even if the passenger in question was not produced, the obligation of the respondent to establish the charge through some independent evidence still remains. In support of this submission, she placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in ***D.T.C. Vs. Anup Singh***, 133 (2006) DLT 148 (DB).

9. She submits that the cash of the petitioner was also not counted, which would have established, conclusively, whether the petitioner had pocketed the money allegedly paid by the passenger to whom the petitioner is alleged to have issued the used ticket.

10. She has also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in **Anil Kumar Vs. Presiding Officer & Others**, AIR 1985 SC 1121 to submit that the report of the Inquiry Officer should be a reasoned one. The Supreme Court had held that where the evidence is annexed to an order sheet and no co-relation is established between the two - showing application of mind, the inquiry report was bad.

11. She also placed reliance on the decision in **Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Others**, AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 921, to submit that the domestic inquiry cannot proceed on the basis of mere conjecture and surmises. She submits that suspicion, however high, cannot take place of proof.

12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that in the present case a proper domestic inquiry was conducted by the respondent, as held by the Tribunal. The statements of the two witnesses, who constituted the raiding party were recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The petitioner was granted the opportunity to cross-examine them, which he availed of. The statement of the passenger, which was recorded contemporaneously at the time of raid, was also produced in the inquiry.

13. She further submits that the petitioner chose to defend himself in the inquiry and did not take any other assistance. He had not produced any evidence despite being granted opportunity to do so. The petitioner did not chose to produce the passenger on his own. The passenger was summoned on three occasions – as is evident from the inquiry proceedings as well as the original record. This aspect has been taken note of by the Labour Court

as well. She submits that the non-production of the passenger is not fatal to the domestic inquiry.

14. She heavily places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in ***Rattan Singh*** (supra). She submits that the evidence before the Inquiry Officer in the form of the statement of the passenger and the statements of the raiding team members constitute “some” evidence as held by the Supreme Court in ***Rattan Singh*** (supra). She relies upon paragraph 4 of the said judgment, which reads as follows:

*“4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. Ail materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below mis-directed themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passengers from American jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. **The simple point is, was there some evidence or***

was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair common-sense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge leveled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.” (emphasis supplied)

15. She further submits that the Labour Court rightly did not interfere with the domestic inquiry, since no patent error or perversity was found in the said inquiry report. Therefore, the Labour Court did not have the jurisdiction to interfere with the same. She further submits that the view taken by the Labour Court is a plausible view and, therefore, this Court should not interfere with the same as this Court is not sitting as an appellate Court. She further submits that merely because another view may be plausible, is no reason to interfere with the view taken by the Labour Court.

16. The scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution while examining the industrial award is limited. This Court does not sit in appeal over the findings returned by the domestic enquiry tribunal or the industrial adjudicator. There are only a few exceptions to this general rule and, one of them is, where the finding is based on no evidence. Therefore, the issue which arises for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, which were brought on record in the domestic enquiry proceedings, it could be said that there was some evidence to hold the petitioner guilty of the misconduct alleged against him. Pertinently, the

statement of the passenger was recorded behind the petitioners back. The said passenger had already got down from the bus and the bus had already left the spot by the time the said statement was recorded. The members of the raiding party had also deboarded the bus after returning the way bill of the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, had no occasion to personally know as to who had made the statement; whether the said statement had been made voluntarily, or not; whether the statement was correctly recorded, and; to record his observations or protest on the said statement. Normally, the statement of the passenger who makes a complaint against the conductor - of his not issuing a ticket after collecting the fare, or issuing used ticket, is recorded in the presence of the conductor and the signatures of the conductor taken on the said statement. At that stage, the conductor has the opportunity to witness the recording of the said statement, and to record his observations or protest while counter signing the statement.

17. It is also pertinent to note that the waybill of the petitioner/conductor was checked and returned to him. The waybill would, invariably, be retained by the checking staff if some wrongdoing or omission on the part of the conductor comes to light. The statement of the checking staff that when the waybill was demanded once again, the petitioner refused to part therewith was not recorded in the presence of the petitioner. There was no independent evidence to corroborate the said statement of the checking party. The allegation against the petitioner that he fled away with the bus does not appear to be plausible, since no action was taken by the respondent against the driver. Pertinently, the petitioner was not challaned on the spot by the raiding party. The complaint book was not closed. No independent witness

or other evidence was produced in the enquiry. In these circumstances, I find merit in the petitioners plea that the present was a case of no evidence. The mere statements of the raiding party, in the absence of any other corroborative evidence, cannot be considered as “some” evidence in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in ***Rattan Singh*** (supra). Pertinently, the Supreme Court in ***Rattan Singh*** (supra) observed that the essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiates the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.

18. In the facts of this case, apart from the recordings made of the raiding party behind the back of the petitioner, there is no evidence to connect the petitioner with the alleged issuance of a used ticket to a passenger. The statements of the raiding party members recorded during the course of enquiry cannot improve upon, or fill up the gaping holes in the case of the respondent management in the present case. As to who that passenger was has remained a mystery, since the said passenger was not produced in the enquiry. No doubt, in view of ***Rattan Singh*** (supra), it is not necessary to produce the passenger. However, there should be some other independent evidence to connect the delinquent with the alleged misconduct. In this case, there was none at all. On the contrary, the pointers are in the direction of the petitioners innocence since : his waybill was returned after checking; his challan book was not closed; his cash was not counted; his bus was

allowed to leave, and no action was taken against the driver for his allegedly driving away the bus.

19. The Supreme Court in **Roop Singh Negi** (supra) had observed:

“17. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof”.

20. Coming to the enquiry report, perusal of the same shows that the enquiry officer has merely set out the evidence recorded before him and jumped to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charges leveled against him. There is no discussion of the evidence to establish a link between the evidence and the finding returned against the petitioner. As to why the version of the petitioner has been rejected and has not been accepted, is not discussed. Merely because the prosecution witnesses had deposed in a particular way, their version has been accepted. The Supreme Court in **Anil Kumar** (supra) considered a similar situation. The Supreme Court observed that a disciplinary enquiry is a quasi judicial enquiry to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The enquiry officer has a duty to act judicially. The enquiry officer is required to apply his mind to the evidence. In that case, like in the present case, apart from setting out

the names of the witnesses, there was no discussion of the evidence. In the present case, the enquiry officer merely reproduces the statements of the witnesses without discussing the evidence. As in that case, in the present case, the enquiry officer merely recorded his ipsi dixi that the charges are proved. Like in that case, in the present case, the enquiry officer has not assigned a single reason why the evidence produced by the workman did not appeal to him or was not considered creditworthy. Why the evidence of the management was preferred over that of the petitioner has not been disclosed in the enquiry report, as in the case of *Anil Kumar* (supra). In that case, the Supreme Court, *inter alia*, observed as follows:

“5. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the enquiry officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well settled to be supported by a precedent. In *Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India* [AIR 1966 SC 671 : (1966) 1 SCR 466 : (1966) 1 SCJ 204] this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. Similarly in *Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P.* [AIR 1966 SC 671 : (1971) 1 SCR 201] this Court reiterated that *satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appealed to the authority. It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this case the enquiry report is an order sheet which merely produces the stage through which the enquiry passed. It clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and it is this report on which the General Manager acted in terminating the service of the appellant. There could not have been a more gross case of non-application of mind and it is such an enquiry which has found favour with the Labour Court and the High Court.*

6. *Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The Court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no enquiry in this case worth the name and the order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable". (emphasis supplied)*

21. I also find merit in the petitioners submission that the enquiry was vitiated on account of non supply of documents sought by the petitioner. That the documents sought by the petitioner were not supplied is an admitted fact. Sh. B. Das, MW-1 admitted that the enquiry officer had not supplied the list of documents to the petitioner workman. In **Pratap Singh** (supra), this Court held the domestic enquiry to be vitiated on account of non supply of documents to the delinquent. The submission of the workman in this regard, and the findings of the Court in **Pratap Singh** (supra) are as follows:

“5. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent has stated that the enquiry against the workman has not been conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice as there was no corroboration of the evidence of an enquiry officer by any independent witness. He has also submitted that during the enquiry proceedings on 04.11.1991 he had requested for the supply of documents comprising of copy of way bill, copy of challan, copy of the statement of passengers with their addresses and vouchers blank and print ticket copies etc., but, none of these documents were supplied to the workman.

Counsel for the respondent further submitted that the petitioner had failed to follow the mandatory procedure as laid down in Circular No. AdmI-3(1)/52 dated 29th July, 1954 and, Therefore, the enquiry proceedings became bad and illegal. Clause (iv) of the said Executive instructions also mandates supply of copy of challan form to the conductor but, admittedly, no challan form was supplied to the workman in the present case.

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9. *This admission on the part of the management witness in no uncertain terms clearly gives an indication that the management had seriously breached the principles of natural justice by withholding the documents although specifically demanded by the respondent workman vide his application dated 4th November, 1991. The examination of passengers during the enquiry may not in itself prove fatal to hold the enquiry as illegal, but to deny the delinquent workman copies of statement of passengers as recorded at the time of raid certainly is fatal and such an act on the part of the management is in clear breach of the principles of natural justice. The documents, which were admittedly in the possession of the petitioner management and formed basis of the chargesheet against the respondent workman have to be mandatorily supplied to the delinquent workman facing the charges. The delinquent employee, who is facing the charges must know as to what case he has to met with during the course of enquiry and the petitioner management in the present case has failed to give any Explanation as to why the documents demanded by the respondent workman were not supplied to him. In a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in South Bengal State Transport Corporation v. Sampan Kumar Mitra and Ors.(2006)ILLJ1087SC the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that whether the enquiry as held by the*

enquiry officer was bad and invalid in law as the documents relied by the enquiry officer neither feature in the list of documents annexed to the chargesheet nor the copies of the same were supplied to the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court after placing reliance on various judgments including Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar of the Constitution Bench reported in (1994)ILLJ162SC made the following observations:

11. On the question, whether copies of the documents relied on by the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority must be served on Respondent 1 before passing any order of removal from service, it is no doubt true that such order of punishment, ought not to be passed without supplying the copies of the documents to Respondent 1. Now the question is whether non-supply of the documents, as referred to hereinbefore, would vitiate the departmental proceeding in its entirety and directions for reinstatement should be passed or directions to supply copies of documents relied on by the authorities should be made and thereafter direct reinstatement of Respondent 1 into service on condition that the disciplinary authority shall continue with the disciplinary proceeding from the stage of supplying copies of the documents to Respondent 1 to reach a fresh and final conclusion. It cannot be disputed that serious prejudice would be caused to Respondent 1 if the documents on which reliance was placed by the authorities in removing him from service were not supplied to him. This will cause denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing to him. This view was also expressed by the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan which was approved by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B.

Karunakar. This Court in Ramzan Khan case at para 18, has clearly observed as follows: (SCC p. 597)

'Wherever there has been an inquiry officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non- furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter.'

12. As noted, this decision was approved by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar. The Constitution Bench has clearly held that in order to impose punishment of removal on a delinquent employee, it is necessary to supply a copy of the inquiry report to him before such punishment is imposed by the disciplinary authority. The Constitution Bench on the issue of non-supply of inquiry report, observed as follows: (SCC p. 754, para 26)

26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its

conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, Therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its

own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it.

13. In view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court, as referred to herein earlier, we Therefore, cannot have any dispute that Respondent 1 was entitled to a copy of the inquiry report, report of the District Magistrate and all allied documents, including depositions of witnesses relied on by the District Magistrate.

10. The judgments cited by learned Counsel for petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case as the petitioner management has violated the principles of natural justice right at the threshold by not supplying the documents relied upon, which formed very basis of the chargesheet against the respondent workman. I, Therefore, do not find any illegality in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal.”

22. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the impugned award cannot be sustained and the same is, accordingly, set aside. The petitioner's guilt has not been proved by the respondent and he is entitled to exoneration. The petitioner was removed from service on 30.06.1995. Considering the fact that the petitioner has remained out of service for nearly 18 years, it is difficult to accept that he would have been unemployed throughout the said period. After all, it is not the petitioner's case that he has been subjected to complete ruination. The petitioner would have raised his family and the same would not be possible without having some avocation, even if not a permanent job.

23. Considering the overall scenario, I, therefore, direct that the petitioner be reinstated in service from the date of his removal with continuity in service for all purposes including pay fixation, seniority and for pensionary benefits. The petitioner is also awarded lump sum compensation, in lieu of back wages, of Rs.4 Lakhs. The compensation shall be paid within 8 weeks failing which the same shall carry interest @ 8% per annum from the date hereof till realization. The petitioner shall also be entitled to Costs quantified at Rs.25,000/-.

(VIPIN SANGHI)
JUDGE

MAY 28, 2013